UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones
8-1-2013

Examining the Inner Experience of Left-Handers Using Descriptive
Experience Sampling
Aadee Mizrachi
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/thesesdissertations
Part of the Psychology Commons

Repository Citation
Mizrachi, Aadee, "Examining the Inner Experience of Left-Handers Using Descriptive Experience Sampling"
(2013). UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and Capstones. 1944.
http://dx.doi.org/10.34917/4798019

This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital
Scholarship@UNLV with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that
is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to
obtain permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons
license in the record and/or on the work itself.
This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Theses, Dissertations, Professional Papers, and
Capstones by an authorized administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact
digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.

EXAMINING THE INNER EXPERIENCE OF LEFT-HANDERS USING
DESCRIPTIVE EXPERIENCE SAMPLING

by

Aadee H. Mizrachi

Bachelor of Arts in Psychology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
2004

Master of Arts in Clinical Psychology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
2010

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the

Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology

Department of Psychology
College of Liberal Arts
The Graduate College

University of Nevada, Las Vegas
August 2013

Copyright by Aadee H. Mizrachi, 2013
All Rights Reserved

THE GRADUATE COLLEGE

We recommend the dissertation prepared under our supervision by

Aadee Mizrachi

entitled

Examining the Inner Experience of Left-Handers Using Descriptive Experience
Sampling

is approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy - Psychology

Department of Psychology
Russell Hurlburt, Ph.D., Committee Chair
Jeffrey Kern, Ph.D., Committee Member
David Copeland, Ph.D., Committee Member
Bo Bernhard, Ph.D., Graduate College Representative
Kathryn Hausbeck Korgan, Ph.D., Interim Dean of the Graduate College

August 2013

ii

ABSTRACT
Examining the Inner Experience of Left-Handers Using
Descriptive Experience Sampling
by
Aadee Mizrachi
Dr. Russell T. Hurlburt, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Psychology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Research suggests there are anatomical asymmetries of the human brain
associated with right-hand or left-hand preference. In addition, left-handedness has been
related to a wide range of psychological and physical problems. Despite these
relationships, little is known about the inner experience of left-handers.
The present study, a replication of Mizrachi (2010) using a larger sample, used
Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) with three objectives: 1) examine the inner
experience of left-handers; 2) compare the results of the present study to the results of
Mizrachi (2010); and 3) compare the inner experience of left-handers to that of the
general population as reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).
Of 256 volunteers who completed the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI), 10
identified as being left-handed were invited to participate in the DES sampling of their
inner experience. All agreed to do so and engaged in five days of DES sampling.
The findings suggest that the inner experience of left-handers is quantitatively and
qualitatively different from the inner experience of the general population. Left-handers
experience sensory awareness, words experienced without semantic significance, and
multiple experience at a substantially higher frequency than the general population. Left-
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handers experience inner seeing, inner speech, and feeling substantially less than the
general population.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Approximately 10 percent of the western population is left-hand dominant such
that they use their left hand for writing and other one-handed activities (Medland, Duffy,
Spurdle, Wright, Geffen, Montgomery, & Martin, 2005). Differences in anatomy and
behavior between left- and right-handers have been observed since the 1800s (Herron,
1980). However, little, if anything at all, is known about the inner experience of lefthanded individuals or about whether differences exist between the inner experience of
left-handed and right-handed individuals. The present study sought to explore these
characteristics and differences in inner experience using a methodology designed
specifically to reveal inner experience in as detailed a manner as possible, Descriptive
Experience Sampling (DES).
The following review of the literature is divided into four parts: handedness, lefthandedness and other constructs, left-handedness and cognition, and left-handedness and
self-awareness.
Handedness
There are several characteristics that distinguish human beings from other species.
Among them are higher-order cognitive processes and handedness. In fact, humans
appear to be the only species that exhibit a strong preference for the use of one hand over
the other (Martin & Jones, 1999). Aside from this unique aspect of handedness which
distinguishes humans from other species, handedness has been of particular interest in
psychology due to the behavioral differences between left- and right-handers (Martin &
Jones, 1999).
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Hand movements are extremely important in the physical experience of human
beings. The majority of what people do they do with their hands (Hammond, 2002).
Hammond (2002) defines handedness as “a fundamental behavioral characteristic that is
integrated into our everyday activities,” (Hammond, 2002, p. 285). Although many
people identify handedness with the hand that is used to write, handedness is actually a
construct that involves a variety of activities and modalities. Individuals who
consistently use the left hand to write may perform a variety of other activities with the
right hand. Thus individuals may be identified as consistent- or mixed-handed. Chemtob
and Taylor (2003) found that approximately 66% of the population are consistent righthanders whereas only approximately 4% of the population are consistent left-handers
(Chemtob & Taylor, 2003). The authors report that the remaining 30% of the population
are mixed right-handers (Chemtob & Taylor, 2003). Thus, the majority of the population
are either consistent or mixed right-handers.
Interest in handedness dates back to the 1800s; however, it is likely that interest in
this area existed throughout history. For example, there are references to left-handedness
in the Old Testament (Herron, 1980). Early theories regarding handedness include
structural asymmetry, dynamic balance, and blood supply. Such theories focused on
asymmetrical arrangements of internal organs or the asymmetrical distribution of blood
supply throughout the body. More recently, focus shifted to the brain when localization
of speech in the left cerebral hemisphere was identified in the 19th century by Paul Broca
(Herron, 1980).
The relationship of handedness and brain asymmetry continues to be of
considerable interest and brain anatomical asymmetries are thought to underlie hand
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preference (Phillips & Sherwood, 2005). Humans use their hands asymmetrically which
reflects asymmetrical neural control. For example, the dominant hand typically plays a
manipulative role while the non-dominant hand plays a stabilizing role. Research shows
that the primary motor cortex is larger in the dominant than non-dominant hemisphere
(Hammond, 2005). The primary motor cortex is important in controlling movements and
guiding the direction and amplitude of muscle forces involved in successive movements
(Phillips & Sherwood, 2005). It may be that the difference of the primary motor cortex in
the right- and left-hemispheres leads to the behavioral asymmetries that result in
handedness (Hammond, 2005).
Handedness has been associated with variation in size of the corpus callosum.
The corpus callosum connects the two cerebral hemispheres and plays an integrative role
in functional hemispheric specialization. Some postmortem and magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) studies show the total corpus callosum is larger in left-handed
individuals. The size differences of the corpus callosum are believed to be an indicator
for strength or quality of interhemispheric connections; thus, left-handed individuals
might have an advantage regarding interhemispheric communication (Westerhausen,
Kreuder, Sequeira, Walter, Woerner, Wittling, Schweiger, & Wittling, 2004).
Anatomic brain asymmetry surrounding the planum temporale has been the focal
point of much research and has received the most attention in terms of handedness
research (Beaton, 1997). The planum temporale is a roughly triangular region located in
the posterior temporal lobe involved in speech sound processing. The presence of a
larger planum temporale in the left-hemisphere was first introduced by Pfeifer in 1920
and von Economo and Horn in 1930. In 1968, Geschwind and Levitsky confirmed this
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presence (Sequeira, Woerner, Walter, Kreuder, Lueken, Westerhausen, Wittling,
Schweiger, & Wittling, 2006).
Relationship of Left-Handedness to Other Constructs
It is widely believed that handedness is indicative of hemispheric dominance such
that left-handers are right-hemisphere dominant and vice versa (Hicks, Bautista, & Hicks,
1999). Because of the right hemisphere’s involvement in attentional, visuospatial, and
affective processing, left-handed individuals have been linked to domains that rely on
these abilities, including fine arts, music, architecture, and mathematics among others
(McNamara, Clark, & Hartmann, 1998). In addition, left-handedness has been related to
a wide range of psychological and physical problems. Observations that there are a
higher percentage of left-handed individuals in certain groups than in the general
population have led to such associations (Coren, 1993). This section will review how
left-handedness relates to an assortment of psychological and physical problems.
Criminality
A documented association between left-handedness and criminality can be traced
back to the early twentieth century. In 1903, Cesare Lombroso found a disproportionate
number of left-handed criminals. Notable left-handed criminals include Billy the Kid,
Jack the Ripper, John Dillinger, and the Boston Strangler (Coren, 1993).
Current literature suggests that behavior of left-handed and right-handed
individuals differs and that hemispheric dominance is involved in the development of
delinquency. Similarly, research suggests that individuals who commit crimes have less
left-hemisphere dominance and rely more on emotional and impulsive right-hemisphere
responses (Gabrielli & Mednick, 1980).
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Starting in 1972, Gabrielli and Mednick (1980) examined 265 Danish children
drawn from a perinatal cohort of 9,125 children born between 1959 and 1961 in
Copenhagen. Investigators obtained psychiatric hospitalization records of the parents.
Children of schizophrenic parents (n = 72) and psychopathic fathers or characterdisordered mothers (n = 72) were included in the study. The remaining subjects had
parents with no previous psychiatric background (n = 121). These children were
intensively examined using psychological, neurological, medical, psychophysiological,
and social-family measures. Handedness was evaluated through the neurological and
psychological assessments. In 1978, the investigators checked the Danish police register
to determine which children had had problems with the law. The investigators found that
64.7% of the children identified by the neurologist as strongly left-handed were arrested
at least one time since the evaluation whereas only 29.5% of right-handers were arrested.
The authors concluded that left-handedness was a predictor of delinquency (Gabrielli &
Mednick, 1980).
Bogaert (2001) evaluated the relationship between non-right-handedness and a
history of criminal and/or sexual offending in a large sample of males (N > 8000). The
sample consisted of investigations conducted at the Kinsey Institute for Sex and
Reproduction in Indiana. After Bogaert controlled for parental income, year of birth, and
age he found that males with a history of criminality and/or sexual offending had elevated
rates of non-right-handedness. However, handedness was no longer significant when
Bogaert controlled for education. Bogaert suggested that the relationship between
education and criminality may be due to the educational difficulties non-right-handers
face. However, education was not related in the pedophilia-handedness association
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which suggests a different mechanism may be involved in this relationship. Bogaert
concluded that the effects were small; thus non-right-handedness should not be used as a
predictor of criminality (Bogaert, 2001).
Schizophrenia
Communication between the hemispheres is especially important in mental
disorders such as schizophrenia. It has been suggested that individuals with
schizophrenia may have an increase in left-hemisphere activity, a decrease in righthemisphere activity, diminished interhemispheric communication, or a combination of
the three (Ornstein, 1997).
An excess of non-right-handedness has been found in studies of schizophrenia. In
2001, Sommer and colleagues conducted a meta-analysis on studies on lateralization in
schizophrenia published between January 1980 and December 1999. The authors
grouped mixed-handedness and left-handedness together into a non-right-handedness
group. Meta-analysis on handedness studies showed that the incidence of non-righthandedness was significantly higher in schizophrenic patients than in healthy subjects. In
addition, a follow-up study on children showed that pre-schizophrenic subjects were
significantly more non-right-handed than were the general population. The authors
suggested a potential genetic mechanism may play a role in schizophrenia (Sommer,
Aleman, Ramsy, Bouma, & Kahn, 2001).
Verdoux and colleagues (2004) explored how Schneiderian first-rank symptoms
are related to handedness and speech disorder in psychotic subjects (Verdoux, Liraud,
Droulout, Theillay, Parrot, & Franck, 2004). Schneiderian first-rank symptoms are
symptoms identified by Kurt Schneider that are more likely to be found in schizophrenia
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than other disorders, including the following: third person auditory hallucinations,
thought broadcasting, delusional perception, running commentary, and thought echo
(Botros, Atalla, & El-Islam, 2006). Verdoux et al. (2004) recruited patients admitted to
the university department of the Bordeaux psychiatric hospital who had at least one
positive psychotic symptom over the last month. The Edinburgh Handedness Inventory
was used to assess handedness. Greater left-handedness was associated with higher
Schneiderian scores (Verdoux et al., 2004).
Dream Content
Due to hemispheric variation and dominance, some researchers have assumed that
dream content would vary as a function of handedness. McNamara, Clark, and Hartmann
(1998) hypothesized that the dream content of left-handers would be more visual,
affective, and bizarre than the dream content of right-handers. They recruited 420
undergraduate students to complete questionnaires. Of those, 109 reported a recent
dream. Participants were asked to complete the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI)
and were given a blank page to describe their dream. Dream content was evaluated by
two research assistants who were blind to the hypothesis of the study, the identity, and
the handedness of the participants whose dream content they were scoring. Seventy-nine
of the 109 subjects who reported a recent dream were right-handed and 30 were lefthanded, as indicated by the EHI. Researchers found that the dreams of left-handers
contained more high imagery nouns, more affective words, and were more fictional.
Dreams of right-handers more accurately reflected their everyday lives. The authors
concluded that handedness does play a role in dream characteristics. They reported that,
if their results could be replicated, it would imply a right-hemispheric advantage in
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processing unusually vivid dreams and a left-hemispheric advantage in processing
mundane dreams (McNamara et al., 1998).
In 1999, Hicks, Bautista, and Hicks replicated McNamara et al.’s findings. They
recruited 203 college undergraduates to participate in their study. Participants completed
the Briggs-Nebes Handedness Scale and the Spadafora and Hunt Dream Scale, which
measures seven types of dreams: lucid dreams, archetypal dreams, fantastic nightmares,
prelucid dreams, control dreams, post traumatic nightmares, and night terrors. Hicks and
colleagues (1999) found that dream types stressing the vividness of the dream experience
were more significantly related to handedness. More specifically, left-handers had
significantly more lucid dreams (vivid dreams during which the individual realizes he/she
is dreaming) and fantastic nightmares (highly vivid and upsetting dreams which are
remembered in detail) than right-handers. The results of this study were consistent with
McNamara et al. (1998) and support the idea that left-handers display right-hemispheric
talent (Hicks, Bautista, & Hicks, 1999).
Learning
Although an association exists between visuospatial, attentional, and affective
processing abilities and left-handedness, left-handedness has also been associated with
learning disabilities (McNamara et al., 1998). In 1982, Geschwind and Behan explored
the relationships between left-handedness and the frequency of developmental learning
disorders as well as migraine and immune disease. Geschwind and Behan (1982)
compared the incidence of these conditions in strongly left-handed subjects to strongly
right-handed subjects. In their first study, the investigators developed a questionnaire
containing questions about the personal and family history of the participant as well as a
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modified version of the Oldfield Handedness Inventory. Left-handers reported
significantly more developmental learning disorders such as dyslexia and stuttering than
did right-handers. Left-handers also reported more family members with learning
disorders than did right-handers. These results are consistent with previous findings
suggesting a relationship between left-handedness and learning disabilities (Geschwind &
Behan, 1982).
Even when no learning disability is present, left-handers and right-handers
perform differently. Ward, Alvis, Sanford, Dodson, and Pusakulich (1989) evaluated the
tactuo-spatial ability in subjects as a function of handedness. They recruited 78 selfidentified right-handed and 75 self-identified left-handed undergraduate students to
participate in their study. Handedness was also assessed by the Lateral Dominance
Questionnaire. Subjects were blindfolded and learned a finger maze with either their
dominant hand or nondominant hand. Investigators assessed transfer to the untrained
hand. They reported a left-hand advantage in comparison with the right. Acquisition by
the left-hand required fewer trials for both right- and left-handed subjects. This finding
suggests a left-handed (right-hemisphere) advantage with tactuo-spatial tasks (Ward,
Alvis, Sanford, Dodson, & Pusakulich, 1989).
Physical Well-Being
Immune disease has also been associated with left-handers and their relatives.
Geschwind and Behan (1982) found that left-handed subjects reported a significantly
higher frequency of immune disease than did right-handed subjects. In addition, lefthanders had significantly more relatives with immune disease, specifically thyroid and
bowel disorders. Geschwind and Behan (1982) also evaluated the frequency of left-
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handedness in patients with immune disorders or migraines in neurological clinics in
Glasgow and compared it to a general population group. They found a significantly
higher percentage of left-handers in patients with severe migraines. They also found a
higher percentage of left-handers in patients with myasthenia gravis, an autoimmune
neuromuscular disease (Geschwind & Behan, 1982).
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)
Although most of the research on Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) has been
conducted on war veterans, PTSD is also common in the general public. Attempts to
identify risk factors for PTSD other than exposure to trauma have indicated the
importance of cerebral lateralization (Choudhary & O’Carrol, 2007). Evidence suggests
that the right-hemisphere of the brain is involved in experiencing negative emotion such
as fear as well as in the avoidance of behavior. Behavioral, electrophysical, and
neuroimaging studies show comparative left-hemisphere hypoactivation and
right-hemisphere hyperactivation in individuals with PTSD (Choudhary & O’Carrol,
2007).
In an attempt to better understand risk for developing PTSD, researchers proposed
that a greater risk for developing PTSD in right-handers is associated with reduced
cerebral lateralization for language. Furthermore, a lesser degree of cerebral
lateralization for language in right-handed people was associated with the following
characteristics: female gender, familial left-handedness, and mixed lateral preference
(Chemtob & Taylor, 2003). According to this neuropsychological hypothesis, the righthemisphere in the brain is more involved in emotion regulation and detection of danger.
Thus cerebral organization of right-handers with less cerebral lateralization for language
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may give more weight to right-hemisphere input during ongoing cognitive processing
cognitive processing (Chemtob & Taylor, 2003).
An investigation with Israeli combat veterans indicated an association between
mixed lateral preference among right-handed veterans with a vulnerability to combatrelated PTSD. The study found a 65% rate of PTSD in mixed-handed veterans and a
43% rate in consistent right-handed veterans. Chemtob and Taylor (2003) replicated
these findings in a sample of U.S. Veterans. They explored the relationship between the
occurrence and severity of PTSD with degree of lateral preference (mixed versus
consistent) as well as parental left-handedness in right-handed Vietnam veterans.
Chemtob and Taylor (2003) found that veterans with mixed lateral preference were more
likely to have PTSD than were veterans with consistent lateral preference (Chemtob &
Taylor, 2003). Although these findings suggested a relationship between increased lefthandedness and increased PTSD symptomatology, they could not distinguish whether the
results were due to mixed-handedness or left-handedness (Choudhary & O’Carroll,
2007).
In 2007, Choudhary and O’Carroll explored laterality and experience of trauma in
a healthy sample as well as laterality and PTSD in a civilian population. The authors
hypothesized that there would be more leftward lateral preference in individuals with
PTSD. They recruited 596 individuals from the University of Sterling to participate in
their study. The Edinburgh Handedness Inventory and the Coren Inventory were used to
measure lateral preference. To assess PTSD, the authors distributed the Posttraumatic
Diagnostic Scale (PTDS; Foa, Cashman, Jaycox, & Perry, 1997) and, in some cases, a
clinical interview. The severity of reexperiencing, avoidance, and arousal symptoms was
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measured and summed. Fifty-one participants met all the criteria for a diagnosis of
PTSD with relatively more left-handers (15%) than right (8%). Strong left-handers had a
higher incidence of PTSD than did strong right-handers or mixed-handers. Left-handers
also had significantly higher scores for arousal symptoms of PTSD. Thus, the authors
found that leftward lateralization in handedness is associated with PTSD symptoms and
prevalence. They offered a possible explanation for this finding: left-handers may
experience emotional events differently. In addition, they suggested more research on the
potential differences between left- and right-handers is necessary to further explain this
phenomenon (Choudhary & O’Carroll, 2007).
Left-Handedness and Cognition
Actions are essential to human functioning and allow people to accomplish a
variety of goals from eating and sleeping to buying a car and taking a vacation (Lozano,
Hard, & Tversky, 2007). Traditionally, action and perception have been considered to be
separate domains with perception viewed as preceding action (Gallese, 2007). Such
traditional approaches viewed connections to the outside world as being of little
importance to the mind and perception—that is, an individual’s perceptual and motor
systems were considered to be input and output devices that did not impact cognitive
processes or mental representations (Wilson, 2002). This mode of thinking viewed
cognition as relying on amodal abstractions that exist independently of physical
operations. This idea is based on the popular computer metaphor which makes the claim
that the human mind’s software is independent of the body and brain hardware
(Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005).
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Recently, there has been a shift towards a more holistic view of the mind and the
body termed embodied cognition. The basic idea of embodied cognition is that
cognitions consist of simulations of bodily experiences (Casasanto, 2009). According to
this perspective, interactions with the physical space and world influence an individual’s
thought processes and mental representations (Markman & Brendl, 2005). Therefore the
particular experiences an individual has with the environment effect cognition; thus
individuals with different physical characteristics who inevitably interact with the word
differently must also think differently (Casasanto, 2009). Considering embodiment is an
important aspect of understanding cognition, interest in this area has been increasing for
the past thirty years (Markman & Brendl, 2005).
As mentioned above, embodiment suggests that physical interactions with the
world directly impacts cognition. A growing body of research on embodied cognition
shows that social and emotional information processing and the body are closely linked
such that our actions influence the way we understand the world (Lozan, Hard, &
Tversky, 2007). More specifically, physical and bodily experiences are a requirement for
perception (Gallese, 2007; Niedenthal et al., 2005). In this respect, one’s cognitions are
dependent upon the experiences one has with the world. Furthermore, cognitions can be
considered mental simulations of physical experiences (Casasanto, 2009; Lyre, 2008).
One area emerging as a topic of interest in embodiment is handedness. Inherent
physical differences between left- and right-handers have sparked interest regarding the
potential differences between in mental representations of abstract concepts. Some of
these studies will be discussed below.
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Interest in handedness and cognition is two-fold. In an attempt to explore the
relationship between handedness and cognitive processes, researchers interested in
handedness have referred to theories of embodied cognition. Similarly, researchers
interested in embodiment have expressed interest in handedness and the differences
between left- and right-handed individuals: if individuals’ cognitions are influenced by
bodily experiences, then people with different bodies and different bodily experiences
must also think differently. Individuals who are dominant with their right hand interact
with the world in a way that is different from individuals who are dominant with their left
hand. Considering the differences regarding manual performance between left- and righthanders, it is likely that right-handed individuals have more practice manipulating certain
aspects of objects thus their understanding of that specific object is experientially
different than left-handed individuals. The reverse is also likely to be true. Additionally,
according to theories of embodied cognition, thinking about an action requires some
mental simulation of how that action is carried out by the perceiver. Therefore actions
performed by the dominant hand should have qualitatively different mental
representations in left- and right-handed individuals. Casasanto (2009) termed this idea
the body-specificity hypothesis (Casasanto, 2009).
Casasanto (2009) conducted a series of five experiments to explore whether leftand right-handers differed in their mental representations of abstract concepts. Casasanto
(2009) was interested in how body-specificity may be important in the mental
representation of abstract concepts. Also of interest was how perceptuomotor simulations
influence the mental representations of abstract concepts, such as deceit and honesty,
despite the fact that such abstract concepts do not directly interact with individuals’
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perceptual and motor systems. That is, these abstract concepts have not been perceived
with senses or acted upon with muscles (Casasanto, 2009).
According to Casasanto (2009), abstract concepts are mentally represented
through the use of mental metaphors. Mental metaphors, to some degree, are conditioned
over time such that individuals make associations between emotional states and physical
experiences that usually co-occur (e.g., standing tall is usually associated with feeling
good and slouching down with feeling bad). Through conditioning, mental metaphors
such as positive is up and negative is down are established over time. Mental metaphors
are reflected in the physical world through linguistic metaphors. After an association
between a physical experience and an emotional state has been established, a mental
metaphor is encoded through linguistic metaphors (Casasanto, 2009).
Studies show that metaphors from the physical world influence mental
representations of a variety of notions. Examples of these include valenced concepts,
time, power, and number. Mental metaphors enable individuals to identify, compare, and
contrast abstract concepts even without the use of linguistic metaphors (Casasanto, 2009).
Casasanto (2009) aimed to explore whether handedness influences individuals’ judgment
and the embodiment of mental metaphors. Casasanto (2009) conducted five experiments
to test the associations between valence and horizontal space in left- and right-handers
(Casasanto, 2009).
Casasanto (2009) concluded that there is a body-specific association between
horizontal space and valence. Casasanto found that right-handers’ responses were
consistent with the mental metaphor of Good is Right whereas left-handers responses
were consistent with the mental metaphor Good is Left. The majority of participants’

15

responses were consistent with the Good is Up metaphor regardless of their handedness.
Considering left-handers have more interaction with the left resulting in more comfort
and positive feelings toward the left aspect of objects/tasks therefore, handedness does
influence individuals’ judgment. The same is true for right-handers and the right. This
result supports the notion that the relationship between valence and horizontal space is
body specific such that individuals experience positive valence depending on their
interaction with physical space or the world (Casasanto, 2009).
Casasanto (2009) found significant differences between left- and right-handers in
terms of emotional valence and lateralized physical action. His research is consistent
with the internalization of the Good is Left or Good is Right mental metaphors and
supports the body-specificity hypothesis. People with different bodies, in this case hand
preference, develop different mental representations including abstract concepts and in
the absence of using their hands (Casasanto, 2009).
Although Casasanto’s (2009) findings are interesting and an important
contribution to the literature in that they support the idea that embodiment influences
mental representations of abstract concepts, there are some flaws in this research.
Casasanto provided participants with pre-determined items on a paper-and-pencil
questionnaire which ignores the fact that there is very little, if anything at all, known
about the mental life of left-handers as a group. Most of the research conducted
throughout time has been developed for or evaluated under the assumption that the
respondents are right-handed. There have not been any documented explorations of
cognition as it is experienced by left-handers. The cognitive experience of lefthandedness needs to be explored before aspects of experience can be calculated and
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quantified. Casasanto (2009) also neglected to explore mental representations as they
naturally occur. It is possible that Casasanto targeted a characteristic of experience
(emotional valence) in his study that the participants do not typically experience.
Additionally, Casasanto (2009) inferred the presence and characteristics of mental
representations in his study and did not actually observe them. A way to approach the
exploration of cognitive embodiment and handedness while attending to the difficulties
previously mentioned is to use an exploratory, open-ended method that provides
participants with the opportunity to relay their own, unique experiences (mental and
physical) as they happen to them in their everyday lives.
Jones and Martin (1997) and McKelvie and Aikins (1993) explored the
relationship between handedness and memory. Jones and Martin (1997) asked subjects
to recall the direction the head of Queen Elizabeth II faced on British and Canadian coins.
They found that left-handers had a higher frequency of recalling the correct rightward
direction of the Queen’s head than did right-handers (as cited in Martin & Jones, 1999).
Thus handedness effects do appear to influence cognition.
Martin and Jones (1999) conducted five experiments to evaluate the assumption
that cognitive processes are independent of handedness. They examined whether
handedness effects on coin head recall also extend to coin head recognition using the coin
head illusion. All coins in Britain bear the profile of Queen Elizabeth II’s head facing the
observer’s right. Despite numerous interactions with coins, when asked to recall the
direction of the Queen’s head, most people recall her head facing the left (Martin &
Jones, 1999).
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The results of Martin and Jones (1999) indicated a significant difference in
recognition performance between left- and right-handed participants for memory of faces
strongly oriented to the left or right. In the first experiment, the authors found that the
proportion of participants (from the University of Oxford) who recognized the image that
accurately represented the Queen’s head on the British coin was significantly higher for
left-handed participants than for right-handed. In the second experiment, the authors
found that this effect of handedness on memory for the orientation of a coin also exists
when an experimental stimuli has only been seen on a single, controlled occasion. The
authors found that left-handed participants recognized right-facing heads better than
right-handed participants, whereas right-handed participants recgonzed left-facing heads
better than left-handed participants. The authors reported that left-handers have an
advantage in remembering right-facing heads whereas right-handers have an advantage
remembering left-facing heads. The authors suggested this difference is due to a
mnemonic handedness effect with both material encountered in everyday life (such as a
coin) and stimuli presented on one occasion in controlled conditions (Martin & Jones,
1999).
To test if there is an underlying effect of handedness on the physical drawing of
an object, Martin and Jones (1999) conducted a fourth experiment. They asked
participants to “draw a quick sketch of your mother’s head in profile” and “draw a quick
sketch of your bicycle,” (Martin & Jones, 1999, p. 273). The proportion of rightward
sketched bicycles did not differ between left- and right-handed participants; however, the
proportion of rightward sketched heads was significantly higher for left-handed
participants than right-handed (Martin & Jones, 1999).
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The first four experiments in Martin and Jones’s (1999) study did not explore the
subjective experience of the participants. In their fifth experiment, they set out to
investigate whether there is a correspondence between underlying motor processes and
reports of mental experience. This experiment involved recall, drawing, and mental
drawing of Diana, Princess of Wales (a person whom the authors believed all the
participants would be familiar with). In the recall condition, the authors found no
significant main effect of handedness but they did find a significant main effect of
orientation and a significant interaction between handedness and orientation. They
concluded that left-handers were better at recalling the right-facing head than righthanders whereas right-handers were better at recalling the left-facing head than lefthanders. For the drawing condition, the proportion of participants who drew right-facing
heads was significantly higher for left-handers than right-handers. For the mental
drawing condition, the proportion of participants who drew right-facing heads was
significantly higher for left-handers than right-handers (Martin & Jones, 1999). The
authors concluded that a significant contralateral handedness effect exists on the contents
of mental drawing thus asymmetric motor processes are activated during an entirely
introspective task (Martin & Jones, 1999).
Martin and Jones (1999) suggested that the motor image theory underlies the
handedness effects of the above mentioned findings (Martin & Jones, 1999). According
to the motor image theory, “the brain processes that are involved when specific
movements are performed should also be activated in the absence of the physical
movements themselves,” (Viggiano & Vannucci, 2002, p. 1482). If an object is being
physically held by the left hand, then the significant parts of that object should be stored
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into memory with the same spatial position and direction as it was experienced with the
left hand (Viggiano & Vannucci, 2002).
Viggiano and Vannucci (2002) investigated whether handedness and the
directionality of objects impacts performance on drawing and visual objects
identification. In their first experiment, the authors found a handedness effect for animals
and vehicles. When drawing animal heads, right-handers exhibited a leftward preference
whereas left-handers exhibited a rightward preference. With regard to the anterior part of
vehicles, right-handers exhibited a leftward preference whereas left-handers exhibited a
rightward preference. In the second experiment, the authors found a handedness effect
in reaction times associated with correct identification of mobile objects (animals and
vehicles) and animals. Right-handers were faster at identifying mobile objects facing the
left than mobile objects facing the right whereas the reverse was found in left-handers.
Right-handers were faster at identifying animals facing the left than facing the right
whereas the reverse was found in left-handers. The authors concluded that mental
representations involved in tasks such as object drawing and visual processes contain a
directionality description of elements relevant to the object (Viggiano & Vannucci,
2002). A handedness effect was only found for two categories of objects (animals and
vehicles) with the common features of asymmetry and motion (Viggiano & Vannucci,
2002). These findings are consistent with the idea of embodied cognition in that
handedness influences individuals’ perceptions.
Left-Handedness and Self-Awareness
Aside from some knowledge surrounding the difficulty left-handers have using
items or tools designed for the right-handed person (e.g., desks, notebooks, can openers,
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etc.) and some research exploring the associations between left-handedness and
psychological and physical disorders, little is known about the inner experience of lefthanders. The role of handedness has not been directly observed in studies of
consciousness; however, studies have explored the role of hemispheric activity in selfawareness and consciousness.
Evidence suggests that tasks associated with the left- and right-hemisphere differ
in electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings. Ehrlichman and Wiener (1980) recorded the
EEGs of subjects while they performed covert mental tasks. The authors found the
occurrence of EEG asymmetry related to left- and right-hemisphere tasks. Their
strongest finding involved covert verbalizations: the directions of all relationships were in
accordance with the literature on hemispheric specialization. Verbalizations were more
strongly associated with left-hemisphere amplitude. Ehrlichman and Wiener (1980) also
suggested that EEG asymmetries reveal cognitive differences between visuospatial and
verbal tasks. The authors concluded that more research is necessary to identify accurate
variation in hemispheric functioning (Ehrlichman & Wiener, 1980).
Some of the research on self-awareness has focused on covert verbalizations, or
inner speech. Morin (2005) defined self awareness as “the capacity to become the object
of one’s own attention, where the individual actively identifies, processes, and stores
information about the self” (Morin, 2005, p. 116). According to Morin, the self is
involved in awareness through cognitive processes of imagery and inner speech. Inner
speech has been indicated in such tasks as verbal self-guidance, problem solving, and
memory. Morin argued that the role of inner speech in self awareness has been
overlooked. Inner speech allows an individual to become more aware of his/her
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independent existence and mental states. Morin argues that inner speech plays a
fundamental role in self-awareness such that inner speech facilitates self-reflection
through verbally communicating with oneself. Furthermore, Morin suggests that without
inner speech apprehending one’s inner life becomes difficult. Morin compared inner
speech to a flashlight illuminating the room of self-awareness—that is, inner speech
makes self-awareness much more vivid and clear. Due to the role of the left prefrontal
lobe in self-reflection and inner speech, Morin suggested that the left-hemisphere is
involved in self-awareness (Morin, 2005).
Lindell (2006) argued that the left-hemisphere is not solely involved in language
processing. Lindell reported that “though there is no question that the left hemisphere is
the superior language processor, a growing body of research has demonstrated significant
linguistic ability in the “nonverbal” right hemisphere” (Lindell, 2006, p. 131). Research
shows that right-hemispheric language dominance directly increases with degree of lefthandedness. Lindell focused on the 95% of the population in which the right-hemisphere
lacks the ability to generate productive language. Lindell reviewed a body of evidence
suggesting right-hemispheric involvement in language processing. The left-hemisphere
is involved in propositional speech whereas the right-hemisphere is involved in
nonpropositional speech involving the “holistic construction of automatic, formulaic, and
context-bound utterances (e.g., counting, nursery rhymes, days of the week);
verbalizations that neither involve the generation of new ideas nor the processing of such
ideas into original, grammatical utterances” (Lindell, 2006, p. 133). Lindell reported that
the right-hemisphere is involved in the prosody of speech, including changes in pitch and
rhythm. The right-hemisphere is also efficient in recognizing words that represent a
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concrete referent, such as giraffe, whereas performance declines when the word
represents an abstract concept, such as faith. Lindell’s findings suggest that both
hemispheres play a role in language processing and production (Lindell, 2006).
Keenan, Rubio, Racioppi, Johnson, and Barnacz (2005) examined the role of the
right-hemisphere in self-awareness and the theory of mind. They reported that assessing
consciousness in the right-hemisphere tends to be difficult because the traditional speech
areas are located in the left-hemisphere; thus the right-hemisphere cannot verbalize its
consciousness. The authors report that theory of mind and self-awareness are related in
that one must have an understanding of one’s own mind to be able to understand the mind
of another. Theory of mind “involves the recognition that other minds are possible, and
the individual may be privy to thoughts of another” (Keenan, Rubio, Racioppi, Johnson,
& Barnacz, 2005, p. 695). The authors hypothesized that the right-hemisphere is active
in higher-order consciousness (Keenan et al., 2005).
In 2001, Keenan, Nelson, O’Conner, and Pascual-Leone used an fMRI to explore
cortical correlates during face recognition. They found that the right prefrontal cortex
was active in participants during self-recognition, supporting the idea that selfrecognition results from right-hemisphere activity (Keenan, Nelson, O’Conner, &
Pascual-Leone, 2001). Similarly, Vogeley, Bussfeld, Newen, Herman, Falkai, Maier,
Shah, Fink, and Zilles (2001) used fMRI to investigate the neural mechanisms of taking
one’s own perspective and taking someone else’s perspective. Vogeley et al. (2001)
found that self-perspective was associated with an increase in right temporoparietal
activity as well as activity in the anterior cingulate cortex. Theory of mind was
associated with an increase in anterior cingulate cortex and left temporopolar cortex
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activity. In addition, there was an interaction of both self-perspective and theory of mind
in the right prefrontal cortex (Vogeley, Bussfeld, Newen, Herrman, Falkai, Maier, Shah,
Fink, & Zilles, 2001). Research suggests that there are differential mechanisms in terms
of consciousness and that the right-hemisphere is more involved in processing of the self
(Keenan, Nelson, O’Conner, & Pascual-Leone, 2001).
Research regarding the localization of self-awareness is inconsistent.
Investigators have focused on certain tasks and attributed the localization of self
awareness to their respective cerebral hemisphere. Studies have employed EEG
recordings, fMRIs, etc. to explore this phenomenon.
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CHAPTER 2
INTROSPECTIVE MEASURES
Understanding Inner Experience
Thinking is one of the most fundamental phenomena in psychology, but despite
its importance, efforts to understand and explain this phenomenon have been
unsuccessful (Aanstoos, 1983). Cognitive scientists have inferred cognitive processes
through the development of performance measures. Clinical psychologists have relied on
the self-reports of their clients during interviews or on questionnaires (Davison, Navarre,
& Vogel, 1995). The questionnaire approach is limited by its retrospectiveness when
trying to access an individual’s stream of thought (Singer, 1975). Recall biases that
affect the reliability of self-report and questionnaire data include: 1) participants tend to
remember events that are more recent; 2) more salient experiences are likely to be
recalled; 3) participants have a tendency to recall events that make them consistent with
their view of how the world functions (Smyth & Stone, 2003; Yoschiuchi, Yamamoto, &
Akabayashi, 2008); 4) recall can be influenced be experiences that happen after the
situation to be recalled; and 5) recall may be impacted by the participant’s current mood
(Smyth & Stone, 2003). In addition, participants may misunderstand the questionnaire
instructions (Smyth & Stone, 2003; Yoschiuchi et al., 2008).
The need for alternative methods of examining the study of ongoing behavior and
everyday experiences arose from the limitations of laboratory studies. Investigators
called for a method that could provide ecological validity for the behavior of interest, aid
in the understanding of ongoing behaviors, explore the interaction between situation and
personality, and restore interest in the study of the individual (Hormuth, 1986). In an

25

effort to reduce the recall biases of self-report and questionnaire measures and the lack of
ecological validity of laboratory studies, psychologists have developed procedures to
access the inner world of individuals (Davison et al., 1995). A variety of these measures
will be discussed below.
Think-Aloud Methods
Think-aloud methods are designed to access an individual’s cognitions. This
involves an individual’s reporting aloud the thoughts that occur while he/she is
completing a problem-solving task. The goal of this method is to provide information
about the content and process of an individual’s cognitions. Think-aloud methods have
been used since the 1940’s to explore problem solving and, more recently, to study other
types of spur-of-the-moment thought (Klinger, 1978). Modern think aloud methods
consist of recording participants’ verbalizations of their cognitions while engaged in a
designated activity. Their responses are then evaluated in an attempt to understand an
individual’s ongoing thought process (Davison, Vogel, & Coffman, 1997; Singer, 1975).
Think-aloud measures have been criticized for several reasons. The situation
itself is unnatural. Because individuals can verbalize only one thought at a time, only a
small portion of what is going on inside the participants’ mind is captured (Klinger,
1978). In addition, the task itself may influence the behavior of the participants (Davison
et al., 1995). For example, evidence suggests that thinking out loud results in spending
more time on a content theme (Klinger, 1978). Lastly, cognitions that are of low
frequency but high significance may not be captured (Davison et al., 1995).
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Thought-Sampling
Thought-sampling is a method for exploring thought content that tries to avoid
some of those pitfalls. An experimenter will interrupt individuals during whatever
activity they are engaged in and will request a narrative description of their consciousness
before the interruption (Klinger, 1978).
In vivo thought sampling.
Klinger developed a thought-sampling approach that incorporated randomness
(Kendall & Korgeski, 1979; Klinger, 1978-79). Participants in this method are to carry a
beeper and, when the beeper sounds, freely record their thoughts or rate their inner
experience using a Thought Sampling Questionnaire. The questionnaire consists of
variables such as length of thought, vividness, and level of trust of their own memory.
Participants may also use tape recorders to dictate their thoughts (Kendall & Korgeski,
1979). This method allows the researcher to compare non-retrospective data about the
participant’s cognitions with the participant’s impression of his/her thought pattern
(Kendall & Korgeski, 1979).
During his original study in 1978-79, Klinger used the thought-sampling
technique to investigate the differences between fantasy and directed thought. He
differentiated between two types of thought: operant thought processes, which are
directed or task-oriented, and respondent processes, which are random daydreams or
undirected thought. Through the use of thought-sampling, he showed the importance of
current concerns as foreshadowing the content in the stream of consciousness (Klinger,
1978-79; Singer & Kolligian, 1987). Klinger recruited 20 college students who
completed a series of questionnaires and interviews, underwent training for reporting
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their inner experience, maintained a structured diary describing their lives in detail, and
participated in a thought-sampling procedure every few weeks (Klinger, 1978-79).
Klinger used two types of thought-sampling methods. One took place in the
laboratory; participants listened to two 15-minute prose narratives simultaneously
through earphones. The passages had been altered on both channels on 12 different
points to relate to a concern of the participant on one channel and relate to something
irrelevant to the participant on the other. Klinger provided trained participants with a
portable beeper that went off at random intervals. The randomness of the beeper allowed
Klinger to conclude that he was actually capturing a random collection of cognitions
(Kendall & Korgeski, 1979; Klinger, 1978-79). A tone was sounded 10 seconds after the
end of each altered passage, at which point the tape was stopped and participants reported
the thoughts that were occurring to them the moment before the tone sounded.
Participants completed a Thought-Sampling Questionnaire which consisted of a narrative
description of the mental content and ratings of variables. The additional variables
included: duration of thought, specificity, directedness, simultaneous thoughts,
detailedness, visualness, auditoriness, attentive to cues, recall of cues, controllability,
confidence in recall of thought, usualness, and strangeness. Lastly, participants rated
their ability to accurately rate the variables. In total, 936 thought samples were collected
over a series of 78 listening sessions (Klinger, 1978-79).
The second sampling model occurred outside of the laboratory and provided 285
thought-samples over a series of 24 days. Only 12 of the student participants completed
this portion. Participants were provided with a device that sounded randomly (“beeper”).
The beeper sounded roughly once every 40 minutes. Participants were to carry the
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beeper with them during their daily routines for a total of 24 waking hours. They were
also provided with a pad of Thought-Sampling Questionnaires to be completed. When
the beeper sounded, participants filled out a Thought-Sampling Questionnaire that was
almost identical to the laboratory questionnaire (Klinger, 1978-79).
Klinger reported that the distribution of thought properties outside of the
laboratory (the second sampling model) more likely represent typical human experience
than the laboratory model. He reported outside of the laboratory thoughts tended to be
more specific, more focused on the present, more directed, and more tied to immediate
stimuli than thought inside the laboratory. There appeared to be little difference with
regard to vividness of imagery between the two settings. Klinger found that the majority
of the participants had operant thought processes with some respondent elements.
Participants rated operant thoughts as more specific, controllable, more relevant to
setting, and more recallable. Most thoughts were visual, brief, and related to ongoing
activity. Most thoughts involved ongoing activity and consisted of typical kinds of
content; however, more than one fifth involved unusual or distorted features which were
mostly visual and brief (Klinger, 1978-79). Furthermore, Klinger reported that his
findings provide strong evidence that waking thought varies along three dimensions:
respondentness, stimulus independence, and fancifulness. He suggested a need to clearly
differentiate between the terms “daydreaming” and “fantasy.” Based on his findings,
Klinger reported that a “daydream” should be redefined as “thought that is respondent,
stimulus-independent, and fanciful.” (Klinger, 1978-79, p.112). Deliberate daydreams or
daydreams intentionally started for purposes such as self-entertainment or self-arousal
should be redefined as “thought that is operant, stimulus-independent, and fanciful” (p.
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112) and mind wandering about one’s own life should be redefined as “thought that is
respondent, stimulus-independent, and unfanciful” (Klinger, 1978-79, p.112).
More recently, Zotter and Crowther (1993) investigated cognitive characteristics
of bulimic, nonbulimic, repetitive dieting, and nondieting women on two randomly
selected days using in vivo thought-sampling. After screening and training were
completed, participants received a three inch by five inch spiral notebook and an alarm
that signaled every 30 minutes. Participants were told to record the thought they were
having and the activity they were engaged in at the moment just before the alarm
sounded. The researchers found that bulimic women report a significantly greater
amount of eating or weight-related thoughts than do nonbulimic and nondieting women.
In addition, the thoughts of bulimic women are more likely to be of negative affect than
the other women. Zotter and Crowther reported that their findings were consistent with
theoretical models of bulimia nervosa such that bulimics are more preoccupied with
thoughts of food, eating, weight, and shape (Zotter & Crowther, 1993).
Thought-sampling method.
A thought-sampling (or thought-and-mood sampling) method was developed by
Hurlburt to access and quantify an individual’s mental life (Hurlburt, 1980). Participants
were given a random interval sound generator and told to carry the generator with them
from the moment they woke up in the morning until the time they went to bed for three
consecutive days (Hurlburt, 1979). Participants were then interrupted at random intervals
and self-reported the thought that was occurring at the moment of interruption, what they
were doing, and the time of day (Hurlburt, 1979; Hurlburt, 1980).
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Unlike retrospective methods, thought-sampling involves an immediate
description of an actually occurring thought. This technique aims to gain ecologically
valid data of thinking and behavior by eliciting responses from individuals in their natural
environments. Individuals respond to random beeps and record their thoughts along with
any additional inner or outer experiences that were occurring at the time of the beep.
Participants respond by either completing a quantitative questionnaire, providing a short
written narration of their experience, or a combination of the two (Hurlburt, 1997). This
process is repeated until a series of single-thought descriptions are acquired. An
investigator rates the series of single-thought descriptions on rating scales (Hurlburt,
1980). The primary goal is for the investigator to quantify the aspects of the individual’s
thinking or thinking and mood (Hurlburt, 1997).
Articulated Thoughts During Simulated Situations
In 1983, Davison, Robbins, and Johnson developed an alternative approach to the
think-aloud paradigm. They evaluated the approaches developed by both Hurlburt and
Klinger and acknowledged that in-vivo thought sampling had potential in terms of
eliciting the participants’ immediate concerns; however, they reported the technique
lacked in ability to control or be knowledgeable about the actual stimuli the participants
were reacting to. In addition, the questionnaire format restricted the breadth of cognition
obtained. In response to these limitations, they proposed a need for a better method of
exploring cognition (Davison, Robins, & Johnson, 1983).
Davison et al. (1983) identified four main features necessary in a cognition
exploring method including: 1) allowing for open-ended verbal responses that would
capture the participant’s ongoing thought process as opposed to retrospective reporting;
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2) the experimenter should present realistic and complex stimuli to the participants as
well as have the capability of manipulating the stimuli; 3) both anxiety-provoking and
neutral stimuli should be presented to the participants; and 4) the procedure should not be
time-consuming or expensive. They introduced a model they believed met those
requirements: Articulated Thoughts during Simulated Situations (ATSS; Davison et al.,
1983).
ATSS offers an alternative to structured questionnaire methods (Davison, Haaga,
Rosenbaum, Dolezal, & Weinstein, 1991). Davison et al. (1997) refer to ATSS as a
“paradigm” because of its generality and lack of specificity in terms of procedures and
technology (Davison et al., 1997). The procedure involves participants’ listening and
responding to audio-taped conversations intended to mimic a complex event. Participants
listen to a 15-25 second audio-recording and are asked to imagine that the event is real
and that they are a part of it. The researchers tell the participants that they are interested
in the thoughts and feelings occurring during the situation. Following the recording are
30 seconds of silence. During the silent 30 seconds, the participants verbally report what
they are thinking and/or feeling (Davison et al., 1983). Participants are told to say as
much as they can until the 30 seconds are over (Davison et al., 1997). After the report,
another 15-25 second segment is played, followed by the participants’ 30-second report,
and so on. Participants’ verbal reports are tape-recorded to be analyzed later (Davison et
al., 1983).
Davison et al. (1997) reported that ATSS compliments the in vivo random
sampling of cognitions demonstrated by Hurlburt (1979). Furthermore, they report that
the flexibility of ATSS allows researchers to evaluate cognitions in situations that would
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be impractical, unethical, or too complex to study in vivo (Davison et al., 1997). Because
of the unstructured response format of ATSS, respondents are provided an opportunity to
engage in open-ended responding. This format increases the likelihood that the
researcher is actually capturing the scope of the participants’ cognitions without limiting
them to experimenter-selected options. The authors state that “thinking aloud that
immediately follows each brief segment taps cognitions as close to on-line as possible”
(Davison et al., 1997, p. 952). By dividing the ATSS stimulus tapes into short segments,
participants’ retrospective responding with generalized thinking patterns is reduced
(Davison et al., 1997). Due to the specificity of the audiotaped hypothetical situations
presented to the participants, Davison et al. (1997) reported that ATSS provides
situational specificity and experimental control in assessing cognitions. The researcher
can confidently relate certain thoughts with certain situations as well as compare
categories of thought across individuals. Researchers can also evaluate thoughts that are
of importance but which only occur in infrequent situations (Davison et al., 1997).
For example, Eckhardt, Barbour, and Davison (1998) evaluated the associates of
anger arousal in a community sample of 88 married men. The men were grouped into
one of three groups; maritally violent (MV), maritally distressed-nonviolent (DNV), and
maritally satisfied-nonviolent (SNV). The participants completed an assessment packet
consisting of a State Anger Scale, Survey of Personal Beliefs, and Dysfunctional
Attitudes Scale. Upon completion of the assessment packet, the participants listened to
tape-recorded instructions informing them of the ATSS procedure. Three stimulus
situations were included: two anger-inducing scenarios (overheard conversation and
jealousy), and one control. Each scenario was divided into eight 30-second segments.
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The researchers found that MV males articulated more aggregate irrational beliefs and
cognitive biases during anger arousal than did nonviolent males. In addition, ATSS was
more successful in discriminating between the groups as compared to the questionnaires.
The researchers concluded that the fact that ATSS measures cognition while participants
are enduring affective arousal is a significant strength in support of the method (Eckhardt
et al., 1998).
Thought-Listing
Brock and Greenwald developed a self-report tool called the thought-listing
procedure in the late 1960s. This procedure allows for eliciting either spoken or written
listings. Participants are asked to list all the thoughts they were having when presented
with a stimulus or a communication or problem of topic. It is assumed that participants
are able to distinguish thoughts elicited by the stimulus from other thoughts (Cacioppo &
Petty, 1981). Thought-listing differs from thought-sampling in that the listing occurs
immediately after the event rather than at an interruption during the event.
Cacioppo, Glass, and Merluzzi (1977) used thought-listing to study the social
anxiety of male participants prior to interacting with a female confederate. They found
that male participants who scored high on The Social Avoidance and Distress Scale
provided more negative self-statements (Cacioppo, Glass, & Merluzzi, 1977; Davison et
al., 1997).
Forerunners to Modern Sampling
Flugel’s method.
In 1925, Flugel proposed a method that would study the affect of individuals in
their normal, every day life. Flugel observed affect at intervals varying from two minutes
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to two hours. The nature and duration of the day’s activities largely determined the
length between the intervals. Flugel’s method had two main goals: 1) to quantify the
length and amount of pleasurable activities and unpleasurable activities experienced by
individuals, and 2) to describe the mental states such as sensations, moods, emotions and
thoughts that are related to the incidences of pleasures or unpleasures (Flugel, 1925).
Participants in Flugel’s study were instructed to keep a detailed record of their
pleasurable and unpleasurable experiences and the accompanying emotions.
Furthermore, they were told to make frequent entries as to provide a more accurate
description of the state. Participants rated the amount of their pleasure or unpleasure
from -100 to +100. A rating of +100 indicated the most pleasure whereas a rating of -100
indicated the most intense unpleasure. A rating of zero indicated indifference.
Participants also reported the content of the activity/experience as well as a description of
the activity/experience. They were instructed to record their affective states for at least
30 days. In addition, they were given a list of questions to answer regarding their opinion
of the captured affective states (Flugel, 1925).
Experience sampling method.
Experience Sampling Method (ESM) was developed by Csikszentmihalyi,
Larson, and Reed to explore the activities and experiences of individuals in a natural
setting (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987). ESM provides an opportunity to explore the
activities, thoughts, and feelings of individuals in the moment rather than retrospectively
(Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, 1982). ESM participants respond to random or quasirandom beeps which signal the participants to report various aspects of their experience
on the Experience-Sampling Form (ESF). ESF is a questionnaire designed to access the
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internal and external situation of the participant at the time of the signal. The form
consists of a variety of items, including open-ended questions regarding the location of
the participant, activities the participant is engaged in, content of cognitions, and time.
Likert-type items measure the participant’s motivation, activation, cognitive competency,
and affect (Csikszentmihaly & Larson, 1987).
An example is discussed to illustrate the use of this method. The earliest
investigation using ESM began at the University of Chicago in 1975. Csikszentmihalyi
et al. (1977) sampled 25 adolescent (age 13-18) volunteers in the Chicago area. The
participants completed self-report forms at random times throughout a week, cued by an
electronic paging device that sounded a beep at a predetermined, quasi-random schedule.
The schedule consisted of five to seven signals per day during normal waking hours.
Each participant was given a book of 50 self-report forms which consisted of four groups
of items. The first group consisted of open-ended questions involving the participant’s
location at the time of the beep, the activity they were engaged in, any other activities
going on, and who they were with. The second group inquired why the participant was
doing the aforementioned activity. They were to check one of three choices, including an
obligation to do it, a desire to do it, or lack of something else to do. The next group of
items was designed to evaluate the quality of the participant’s interaction with his/her
environment. Participants were to respond to these questions on a 10-point scale ranging
from “low” to “high.” Questions included their challenges during the activity, their skills
in the activity, and their level of control over the activity. The last group consisted of 13
items designed to access semantic differences between mood and physical experiences.
Participants rated their state at the signaled moment on 7-point scales of adjectives. The
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ends of each scale consisted of extreme opposites. The authors found that their sample
spent most of their time in conversation with their peers or watching television
(Csikszentmihalyi, Larson, & Prescott, 1977).
Johnson and Larson (1982) used ESM to investigate characteristics of the daily
lives of normal-weight bulimic women. They compared the overall moods, mood
fluctuation, social isolation, and amount of food related behavior of 15 bulimic patients
with 24 normal controls. Each participant provided self-reports of 40 to 50 random
moments in her life. Johnson and Larson (1982) found that bulimic women report
negative mood states significantly more often than do normal women. Bulimic women
experienced more dysphoria and mood fluctuation than did normal women. Overall,
bulimic women as a group were significantly more sad, lonely, irritable, passive, weak,
and constrained than the normal group. The two groups did not differ on items related to
excitement and alertness (Johnson & Larson, 1982).
Ecological momentary assessment.
Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) was developed as a way of assessing
variations in behavior across time and situations (Shiffman & Stone, 1998). Shiffman,
Stone, and Hufford (2008) argued that the typical scientific emphasis on global
assessments and retrospective reports limit both scientists and practitioners from
obtaining a complete and accurate depiction of an individual’s behavior (Shiffman,
Stone, & Hufford, 2008). EMA allows subjects to report their experiences in their real
world (Shiffman et al., 2008). EMA attempts to capture momentary reports of
psychological, behavioral, and physiological aspects in an individual’s natural
environment (Smyth & Stone, 2003). Collection of many momentary reports allows the
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researcher to arrive at a general picture of the participant’s characteristics. The inductive
approach of EMA uses sampling of many immediate, momentary instances to create a
summary of the particular phenomenon of interest (Shiffman & Stone, 1998).
In EMA individuals are signaled in their natural environment to immediately
report on a specific construct over repeated intervals (Smyth & Stone, 2003). For
example, individuals may be asked to report on current or recent psychological states,
environmental conditions or behaviors. Individuals are usually signaled multiple times a
day for a period of days or weeks (Smyth & Stone, 2003). Although EMA is similar to
ESM, EMA collects more diverse information and uses more flexible measures compared
to the self-report measures, checklists, or brief open-ended questions collected in ESM.
Smyth and Stone (2003) maintained that EMA and other data capturing
techniques were developed in response to the concern that retrospective recall of selfreported experiences in orthodox science are faulty. One of the concerns deals with
retroactive reconstruction or the influence the outcome of an event has on the recall of the
actual event. By signaling an individual to immediately report on a specific construct,
EMA helps control for retroactive reconstruction. Another concern with orthodox data
collection measures deals with ecological validity or generalizability of research
conducted in the laboratory. There is concern that data collected solely in the laboratory
may lack generalizability. Participants’ behaviors or psychophysiological processes may
differ in contrived situations such as the laboratory from their own natural environments.
Some situations may also be too difficult or unethical to recreate in the laboratory. EMA
signals participants in their natural environment thus reducing ecological validity and
generalizability concerns (Smyth & Stone, 2003).
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EMA studies vary depending on the behavior of interest to be studied.
Longitudinal designs using the EMA method have been used to study stress and coping,
depression, asthma, chronic pain, personality traits and negative affect, as well as eating
disorders (Smyth, Wonderlich, Crosby, Miletnberger, Mitchell, & Rorty, 2001). Shiffman
and Stone (1998) report that EMA has great potential to enhance the understanding of
how behavioral factors effects disease (Shiffman & Stone, 1998).
Stein, Kenardy, Wiseman, Dounchis, Arnow, and Wilfley (2007) tried to identify
the motivation behind binge eating in binge eating disorder through an exploration of the
antecedents and consequences of binge eating using EMA. They gave 33 females with
binge eating disorder a handheld computer for seven days and asked them to specify their
present hunger, emotions, and binge status when the computer signaled them to do so.
Investigators found more negative mood and hunger in prebinge than nonbinge times.
Negative mood was highest after the binge. Because of the heightened negative mood
following a binge, Stein et al. (2007) proposed that further research is necessary to
explore the reinforcing aspects of a binge. The authors suggested an escape from selfawareness as a potential benefit of bingeing (Stein, Kenardy, Wiseman, Dounchis,
Arnow, & Wilfley, 2007).
Descriptive experience sampling.
Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES; Hurlburt, 1990, 1993) is a descriptive
sampling method designed to explore and describe inner experience. Hurlburt and
Akhter (2006) define inner experience as “anything that is going on in awareness at the
particular moment defined by the beep” (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006, p. 274). DES was
developed by Hurlburt and grew out of his thought-sampling and cognition-sampling
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methods. DES was a response to the many problems and inadequacies of other methods
of introspection (Wheeler & Reis, 1991). Hurlburt sought to describe real inner
experience data by capturing participant’s cognitions at random moments (Hurlburt,
1997; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006; Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008).
DES is designed to capture inner experience as it occurs in the natural
environment (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006). Hurlburt and Akhter referred to the real events
that are really being experienced by real people as “pristine experiences.” They reported
that “pristine experiences” are important aspects of consciousness research and
psychology and general (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006).
DES is not only designed to provide high fidelity descriptions of individuals’
inner experiences, but to discover patterns of experience within individuals and across
individuals within groups. At any point in time, an individual has a countless array of
possible experiences. These experiences may be external such as temperature, tastes, and
smells. They may be interoceptive, proprioceptive, or kinesthetic such as pressures,
itches, and tickles. These potential experiences may also be inner events such as images,
feelings, and thoughts. At any moment, a person generally chooses one (sometimes
more) of these possibilities to create his or her pristine experience. One individual may
have an emotional experience while someone else, in the same situation, might have a
visual image. The goal of DES is to catch these pristine experiences in flight (Hurlburt &
Akhter, 2006). Inner speech, unsymbolized thinking, inner images, feelings, and sensory
awareness are examples of frequently found characteristics that have emerged across
subjects using DES (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008; Hurlburt, 1997; Hurlburt & Heavey,
2006).
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The method of DES has been refined throughout the years; however, the main
aspects of the method remain. A participant wears a beeper in his or her everyday
environment. The beeper sounds at random intervals averaging six beeps per three hours.
The beeps are delivered through an earphone and prompt the participant to pay attention
to the experience that was ongoing at the last undisturbed moment before the beep. The
participant is asked to immediately record the details of his/her experience in a notebook
or other form of recording device. Within 24 hours of capturing a certain number of
experiences, usually six, the participant will meet with a DES investigator for an
expositional interview. This interview is designed to aid participants in providing high
fidelity descriptions of their sampled experiences. Upon completion of the interview, the
investigator writes the description of the participant’s inner experience at each sampled
beep. This process is repeated over several sampling days, usually four to eight, until
approximately 20 to 50 samples of experience have been collected (Heavey & Hurlburt,
2008; Hurlburt, 1997; Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).
DES is an idiographic procedure that produces a characterization of a specific
person’s experiences (Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006). Some DES studies collect samples
from a group of participants that have some commonality. In this case, the investigator
reviews each idiographic characterization to see if the participants have any significant
characteristics in common. Thus, DES may be used in one of two ways: 1) as a purely
idiographic procedure used to capture the inner experience of one individual, or 2) as a
sequence of idiographic procedures with an ultimate, nomothetic purpose (Hurlburt &
Akhter, 2006).

41

For example, Jones-Forrester (2009) used DES to explore the inner experience of
13 individuals with bulimia nervosa. Participants were given a small beeper that sounded
a 400 Hz tone at random intervals ranging from one minute to one hour. Participants
were provided with a small spiral notebook to record notes on their inner experience
when the beep signaled. Participants were instructed to wear their beeper for
approximately three hours (to allow for six beeps) during their daily activity. Participants
were interviewed using the DES expositional interview method within 24 hours of
collecting their six beeps. The DES expositional interview consisted of detailed
questions to allow for an accurate depiction of the participant’s experience at the moment
of each beep. Participants repeated the sampling/interview process approximately six
times each. Jones-Forrester summarized the salient characteristics of each individual as
well as the salient characteristics of the group. She found that all the participants had
attention that was divided, which she referred to as fragmentation. Additionally, JonesForrester reported that the inner experience of individuals with bulimia nervosa was
characterized by unsymbolized thinking, inner speech, inner seeing, poorly differentiated
affect that is confused with cognition, and the presence of interfering phenomena (JonesForrester, 2009).
DES Compared to Other Methods
Various methods of exploring the subjective experiences of individuals have been
reviewed. This section will review the differences between those approaches and how
DES may add to the understanding of the inner experience of left-handers.
The think aloud paradigm attempts to understand the emotions and cognitions of
individuals as they occur. Think aloud studies are not retrospective in that investigation
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occurs while the participants are in the moment. In addition, participants’ reports are
recorded verbatim so that details are not missed. This approach provides a detailed report
of the internal processes of the participants. DES is similar to the think aloud paradigm
in that they are both interested in a detailed depiction of the inner world of individuals.
The think aloud paradigm uses the participants’ verbal narrative of their experiences as
the primary mode of data. Unlike think aloud studies that explore preselected events,
DES explores single, momentary experiences. DES randomly samples participants in
their natural environment whereas think aloud studies occur in experimental conditions.
The fidelity of the think aloud results are limited by the amount that can be narrated while
an activity is ongoing; that generally results in a gloss on cognitions, or perhaps
cognitions and emotions. By contrast, DES has no time constraints. It aims at a
particular moment, and will take as long as is required to elaborate all the salient details
of that momentary experience, thus allowing complex characteristics of an individual’s
inner experience, including thoughts, feelings, sensations, and multiple simultaneous
instances thereof to emerge. Furthermore, the DES focus on iterative immersion in the
method facilitates the bracketing of presuppositions necessary to high fidelity
descriptions.
Thought-sampling methods spontaneously explore thought content.
Experimenters interrupt participants as they are engaging in a task and solicit for a
narrative description of their thought content before the interruption. In Vivo Thought
Sampling uses a beeper to randomly sample the inner experience of participants. When
the beeper sounds, participants complete a Thought Sampling Questionnaire, rating
characteristic of their thoughts on Likert-type scales. Similarly, Thought-and-Mood
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Sampling also randomly explores the cognitions of individuals as they occur in their
natural environment; however, it also accesses their moods. DES is similar to Thought
(and Mood) Sampling in that both randomly sample participants in their natural
environments. Unlike DES, Thought Sampling has participants rate their cognitive
experiences on a questionnaire. Unlike Thought (and Mood) Sampling, DES explores all
aspects of an individual’s inner experience, not only their thoughts and/or moods.
ATSS is a broader approach to accessing the cognitions of individuals than
thought-sampling and the think-aloud paradigm. ATSS studies are conducted in a
controlled laboratory setting. Individuals listen and react to a series of tape-recorded
simulated situations. ATSS is useful in that it allows investigators to explore cognitions
during infrequent or complex situations. Individuals provide open-ended responses to the
simulations. In this sense, ATSS is similar to DES because both allow participants to
present the full range of their inner experience. Unlike DES, ATSS is conducted in a
laboratory setting and explores only the cognitions of the participants. And, perhaps
most importantly, ATSS aims at simulations whereas DES aims at pristine, naturally
occurring experiences. There are some situations where simulations are doubtless
faithful copies of pristine experiences, some situations where they are not.
Unfortunately, at this stage it is unknown which is which.
Thought-listing is a self-report procedure which elicits participant’s thoughts
directly after an event. This is different from DES in that thought-listing is conducted in
a controlled, laboratory setting. Additionally, the investigators in thought-listing studies
explore the thoughts surrounding certain situations from individuals. These lists are all
retrospective and are aimed only at thoughts with no careful attention paid to the

44

bracketing of the participants’ or the investigators’ presuppositions about the existence of
or nature of thoughts.
The Experience Sampling Method (ESM) and Ecological Momentary Assessment
(EMA) use beepers to interrupt individuals, randomly or at a set time, during their
naturally occurring lives. At the moment of beep, participants complete a questionnaire
which solicits feedback about their location, mood, environment, and other general
characteristics at the time of the beep. These methods provide an overview of who, what,
when, and where people spend their time as well as what they think and how they feel.
DES is similar to ESM and EMA in that both use beepers to sample experiences in the
naturally occurring lives of individuals. DES differs from ESM and EMA by working to
bracket presuppositions individuals have about the nature inner experience. Beliefs about
what one will find in a particular person’s inner experience are set aside as to not
contaminate what is there to be discovered. DES does not have a set of predetermined
questions that may limit the scope of inner experience elicited. In this way, DES is both
open ended and “open beginninged” (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008).
DES is unlike Thought-Sampling methods, ESM, and EMA in that it is a
qualitative method that provides qualitative descriptions and not quantitative analysis.
DES has an open-ended approach in that it allows the participants to develop their own
descriptive language for their inner experience. DES does not constrict participants’
descriptions of their inner experiences by having them answer questions based on a
predetermined concept or construct. The participant and the DES investigator together
develop apprehensions of experience over the course of several iteratively improving
interviews. In addition, the participant and investigator together identify salient
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characteristics of the participant’s inner experience. After these salient characteristics
specific to a certain participant’s inner experience have been identified, the investigator
may identify nomothetic regularities that occur among those who share a certain
similarity (Hurlburt, 1997).
For example, the differences between thought-sampling, ESM, EMA, and DES
can be seen in the motivation for and findings of their respective studies. To illuminate
the differences between the methods, four studies of bulimia nervosa, one a thought
sampling study, one an ESM study, one an EMA study, and one a DES study will be
discussed.
Zotter and Crowther (1994), in the study described above in the In Vivo Thought
Sampling section, used in vivo thought-sampling to explore the cognitive characteristics
of bulimic, nonbulimic, repetitive dieting, and nondieting women on two randomly
selected days. Participants were provided with an alarm that sounded every 30 minutes.
They were instructed to record the time, the thoughts they were having, and the activity
they were engaged in the moment before the alarm sounded. Investigators found that
bulimic women reported significantly more eating and weight-related thoughts than
nonbulimic or nondieting women (Zotter & Crowther, 1994).
Johnson and Larson (1982) used ESM to explore the characteristics of the daily
lives of normal-weight bulimic women. They investigated the overall moods, mood
fluctuation, social isolation, and amount of food related behavior of bulimic patients as
compared to normal control. Bulimic and normative women were provided with an
electronic pager that sounded randomly. The sounding of the pager prompted the
participants to fill out a self-report questionnaire which asked about their situation and
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subjective experiences at that moment. Johnson and Larson (1982) found that bulimic
women report negative mood states significantly more than normal women. In addition,
bulimic women experienced more dysphoria and mood fluctuations, were more sad,
lonely, irritable, passive, weak, and constrained than normal women (Johnson & Larson,
1982).
Stein, Kenardy, Wiseman, Dounchis, Arnow, and Wilfley (2007) used EMA to
investigate the motivational factors behind binge eating in individuals with binge eating
disorder through exploring the antecedents and consequences of binge eating. The
participants reported more negative mood and hunger during prebinge than nonbinge
times. Additionally, negative mood was at its peak after the binge (Stein et al., 2007).
Jones-Forrester (2009) used DES to explore the inner experience of individuals
with bulimia nervosa. Participants were instructed to wear a beeper that randomly
sounded in their natural environment. They were instructed to record all that was in their
awareness at the moment of each beep. Jones-Forrester found that fragmentation of
awareness, sensory awareness, unsymbolized thinking, inner speech, inner seeing, poorly
differentiated affect, and interfering phenomenon characterized the inner experience of
the participants (Jones-Forrester, 2009).
All four studies presented involved the use of a sounding device to prompt
participants into giving accounts of their subjective experience. DES is different in that
its lack of specificity allows for a more broad and accurate depiction of participants’
inner experience. For example, the thought sampling study specifically instructed
participants to record their cognitions the moment before the beep. This approach is
similar to DES in that it allows participants to freely respond as opposed to answering a
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series of preset questions or questionnaires. Thought sampling is different from DES in
that it is designed to explore the thoughts of the participants whereas DES is designed to
capture all that a participant experiences. In this way, thought sampling studies limit
their potential findings. Although cognitions are important aspects of experience, they
are not all of experience. Though DES studies may educe the cognitions of an individual,
they are not limited to them.
The EMA and ESM studies both instruct participants to answer a series of
predetermined questions. This approach assumes that all individuals share common
experiences which, in turn, limits the scope of experiences to be captured. Unlike the
thought sampling study which focused on the cognitions of the participants, the ESM and
EMA studies focused on behavioral factors. Although the focus is different, emotions
and cognitions versus behavioral factors, thought sampling, ESM, and EMA studies are
similar in that they all narrow the potential findings of the study by specifying a
particular aspect of experience. Though DES may find similar results to the three
mentioned studies, it is not limited to them.
DES has an advantage over the other measures of introspection in that it allows
for a more in-depth investigation to the inner world of participants. Unlike the findings
on the emotions and cognitions of individuals with eating disorders in thought-sampling,
ESM, and EMA studies, Jones-Forrester found that bulimic individuals as a group had
more fragmentation of awareness, sensory awareness, images, and perceptual awareness
than feelings, thought/feelings, feeling fact of body, and preoccupation with weight,
shape, or food, and cognition (Jones-Forrester, 2009). This is a finding that studies
exploring cognitions and emotions would not have been able to discover.
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Commonly Found Characteristics of Inner Experience
Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) explored the inner experience of a stratified random
sample of college students. They were interested in surveying the naturally occurring
phenomena in the inner experience within and across people. They administered the
Symptom Checklist 90-Revised (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994), a measure of
psychological distress, to 407 students taking introductory psychology courses at an
urban university. They stratified the 407 SCL-90-R scores into 10 strata and selected a
random sample of three participants from each stratum. Then they used DES to explore
the inner experience of these 30 participants (16 female and 14 male). Participants were
asked to participate in three days of DES sampling and interviewing with six samples per
day. Samples from the first day were discarded as this day is considered as training. The
first five samples were used on the second and third days of sampling unless one of those
samples were unusable, in which case the sixth sample was used in its place. After the
researchers gained an understanding of the experience occurring at each beep, they coded
the experience according to the codebook developed by Hurlburt and Heavey (1999).
The codebook describes 16 forms of inner experience. The researchers were aware that,
because DES is an exploratory procedure, it was possible that either none of the
codebook identified phenomena would occur or that new phenomena would emerge.
After completion of sampling, Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) did not discover new
frequently occurring characteristics of inner experience. They did find that five
characteristics that occurred with substantial frequency (22% or higher) in the inner
experience of their participants: inner seeing (34%), the experience of seeing things that
are not immediately present in the external environment, was the most frequently
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occurring main characteristic and had a within-participant frequency that ranged from 0%
to 90% (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008); feeling (26%), the direct experience of emotion,
occurred frequently across Heavey & Hurlburt’s (2008) sample and had a withinparticipant range of 0% to 90%; inner speech (26%), experienced to be like outer speech
except it happens internally and is usually experienced as being in the person’s own
voice, had a within-participant frequency ranging from 0% to 75%; sensory awareness
(22%), the attending to a particular sensory aspect of one’s internal or external
environment where the sensation itself is the focus of one’s perception, had a withinparticipant frequency ranging from 0% to 100% and was the least frequent of the five
main characteristics (along with unsymbolized thinking) in Heavey and Hurlburt’s
sample; and unsymbolized thinking (22%), the thinking of a thought without conveyance
of that thought in words, images, or any other symbolic representation had a withinparticipant frequency ranging from 0% to 80% and was the least frequently occurring of
the main characteristics in Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) sample along with sensory
awareness (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008).
The next most frequently occurring phenomena included inner hearing (3%) or
paying attention to auditory characteristics of an internal phenomenon and just doing
(2%) or being engaged in an activity with no awareness of thinking about it as well as no
other aspects of inner experience present at the moment. In fact, the remaining 11
characteristics (partially worded speech, unworded speech, worded thinking, imageless
seeing, inner hearing, just doing, just talking, just listening, just reading, just watching tv,
and multiple awareness) occurred with much less frequency than the main five (3% or
less) (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).
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DES and Left-Handedness
To date, there has only been one study that has used the DES method to
understand inner experience in left-handers. This study was a Master’s thesis in which
the present author (Mizrachi, 2010) used Descriptive Experience Sampling to explore the
inner experience of six left-handed participants (four male and two female participants).
Mizrachi (2010) compared her results to those of Heavey & Hurlburt (2008) and
suggested that sensory awareness may be more frequent in left-handers than in the
general population, that inner speech (and words in general) may be less frequent in lefthanders than in the general population. Additionally, when words were experienced by
left-handers, they had atypical presentations. For example, they were not explicitly
attended to for their function or meaning, or they were just happening—that is, they were
being spoken outside of awareness. Feelings also occurred at a lower frequency in
Mizrachi’s left-handed participants than the general population. Participants expressed
emotions through the tone of their speech, and understood that some of their thoughts
were emotionally valenced, rather than actually experiencing an emotion (Mizrachi,
2010).
In addition to the experience of five main characteristics discovered by Heavey
and Hurlburt (2008), novel characteristics of experience emerged across Mizrachi’s
(2010) left-handed participants. Left-handed participants’ inner experience had a
relatively high frequency of searching (i.e., being actively involved in the searching of
something), and concentrated doing (i.e., carefully and concentratedly engaged in a
physical activity). Just doing occurred with greater frequency in the sample of lefthanders than in the general population. This suggests that left-handers engage in
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activities outside of their awareness with more frequency than the general population.
Finally, left-handed participants had multiple experiences more frequently than did the
general population (Mizrachi, 2010).
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CHAPTER 3
METHOD
This section will review the method used to examine the inner experience of lefthanders in this study. This study consisted of three phases: the screening phase, the
orientation phase, and the sampling phase. The participants, instruments and procedures
used in each phase will be described below.
Phase 1: Qualification Phase
During the qualification phase, the researcher asked volunteers in psychology
courses at an urban university to complete the qualification battery, which consisted of
informed consent, a brief demographic questionnaire, and the Edinburgh Handedness
Inventory (EHI, a measure of handedness). Volunteers received 0.5 research credits to
meet a course requirement upon completion of the qualification battery. The volunteers
who exhibited moderate to strong left-handedness based on their scores on the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory (EHI laterality quotient less than -40) during this phase were
contacted via telephone to participate in the orientation phase. Volunteers who were
contacted and agreed to participate in the orientation phase arrived at the Experience
Sampling Lab in the Central Desert Complex of the UNLV campus.
Participants
Two-hundred and fifty-six students taking psychology courses at the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) participated in the screening phase of the present study.
Volunteers received 0.5 research participation credits upon completion of this phase.
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Instruments
The Demographic Questionnaire, devised for this study, asked students to provide
their name, date of birth, address, sex, e-mail address, home phone number, cellular
phone number, preferred phone number, race/ethnicity, marital status, education level,
employment status, a permanent address/phone number, and handedness.
The Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971) was used to identify
left-handed individuals invited to enter the Phase 3. The EHI, a brief 10-item handedness
questionnaire, is the most widely used handedness questionnaire and was developed to
provide a simple and brief method for assessing handedness in neuropsychological and
other clinical and experimental work. The EHI was tested for reliability by Oldfield on
over 1100 young adults (Lehnkering, Strauss, Wegner, & Siegmund, 2005; Oldfield,
1971). On the EHI, participants are asked to indicate their hand preference on the
following activities: writing, drawing, throwing, scissors, toothbrush, knife (without
fork), spoon, broom (upper hand), striking match (match), and opening box (lid). In
addition, participants are asked to indicate which foot they prefer to kick with and which
eye they use when only using one. Participants are asked to put a plus sign in the column
corresponding to their preferred side (left, right) and to place two plus signs in the
appropriate column if they never try to use the other hand unless absolutely forced to. If
they are indifferent, they are asked to put one plus sign in each column. To score the
laterality quotient of the EHI, the number of plus signs in the left column is subtracted
from the number of plus signs in the right column; that difference is divided by the total
number of plus signs and multiplied by 100. Scores range from -100 (strongly lefthanded) to +100 (strongly right-handed). Cutoff scores for handedness used in the
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literature are variable. However, Oldfield (1971) reported that laterality quotients
between +31 and +40 in his subjects were indicative of marked deviations from truly
right-handed behavior (Oldfield, 1971). Assuming that the reverse is also true, scores
less than -40 would indicate truly left-handed behavior; we therefore chose -40 as a cutoff
score for left-handedness.
Procedures
The researcher briefly described the study to students taking psychology courses
at UNLV and asked for volunteers to complete the qualification battery. After informed
consent was explained and obtained, volunteers completed the qualification phase
package. Volunteers received participation credit (0.5) to meet a course requirement.
The questionnaire was collected and scored. Volunteers who completed that qualification
battery, consented to be contacted, and who exhibited left-handedness based on their
scores on the EHI were invited to participate in Phase 2.
Phase 2: Orientation Phase
Ten individuals who in Phase 1 were identified as left-handed were invited to
participate in Phase 2. All of the volunteers who were contacted agreed to participate in
Phase 2. During this phase, the investigators explained the sampling method used in
Phase 3. Participants were given a consent form to sign if they wished to participate in
Phase 3 and be videotaped. If participants consented to participate in Phase 3 (all did so),
they completed the Symptom Checklist 90-R (SCL-90-R), a measure of overall
psychological functioning. They were also given a beeper and notebook used in Phase 3.
Participants received 0.5 research credit for completion of this phase.
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Participants
Ten individuals who in Phase 1 said on the demographic questionnaire that they
are left-handed and who scored less than -40 on the EHI were contacted via telephone to
participate in Phase 2. Participants received 0.5 research credit for participating Phase 2.
Recruitment continued, selected from those eligible, until 10 left-handed participants had
been advanced to Phase 3.
Instruments
The Symptom Checklist-90-R (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994) is a 90-item
inventory designed to provide an outline of both an individual’s symptoms and their
intensity. The items are scored on a five-point Likert scale indicating the rate of
occurrence of the symptom. It is designed to measure symptoms on nine different
subscales including: somatization, obsessive-compulsive, interpersonal sensitivity,
depression, anxiety, hostility, phobic anxiety, paranoid ideation, and psychoticism. The
SCL-90-R may be administered to individuals 13 years of age and older and takes
approximately 12 to 15 minutes to complete (Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis, Lipman, &
Covi, 1973).
Procedures
The purpose of Phase 2 was to orient qualified participants to the sampling phase
of the study (Phase 3) and to administer the SCL-90-R. Respondents met in the DES lab
at the UNLV campus and were invited to complete informed consent and the SCL-90-R.
They were informed of confidentiality and Informed Consent for the Orientation and
Sampling Phases was obtained. Participants were advised that they may discontinue
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sampling at any time and without penalty. Should a participant had chosen to withdraw
from the study, they were to receive one research credit per each attended meeting.
The investigators explained the nature of the DES method in detail to the
participants. Participants were given a three inch by five inch spiral notebook to record
their experiences and a pocket-sized beeper programmed to beep at random intervals.
They were instructed on the mechanisms of the device: how to turn it on and off, adjust
the volume, and how to reset it. They were instructed to wear this beeper the 24-hours
before the next meeting as to have “fresh beeps” for the expositional interview.
Participants were told to capture their naturally occurring experience at the last
undisturbed moment before the beep occurred and record their experience in a notebook.
They were informed of confidentiality and told to skip any samples they did not feel
comfortable reporting (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).
At their consent, participants were videotaped during the remaining interviews.
They were asked to schedule a convenient time to meet with the investigators in the
Experience Sampling Lab located in the Central Desert Complex at UNLV. Participants
received 0.5 research credit for this phase of the study. This phase of the study took
approximately half an hour to complete.
Phase 3: Sampling Phase
Ten participants who agreed to participate in Phase 3 individually met with two
DES investigators approximately five times in the DES lab. All of the participants who
participated in Phase 2 agreed to participate in Phase 3 and be videotaped. Participants
arrived at the Experience Sampling Lab. During the sampling phase, the participants
took the beeper with them and wore the beeper until it beeped six times (approximately
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three hours) but were free (and encouraged) to engage in their normal daily activities
while they wore the beeper. When the beep occurred, the participants were to write a few
notes about what was happening in their inner experience when the beep sounded in the
small notebook provided by the researcher. Within 24-hours of collecting the six beeps,
the participants were interviewed regarding their inner experience during the beeps by the
investigators at the Experience Sampling Lab. This interview was a detailed inquiry into
the characteristics of the experiences that were occurring at the moment of each beep.
This interview lasted approximately one hour and was videotaped for future examination
by the researchers. This sampling/interview procedure was repeated four more times.
Participants received four research credits for participating in this phase of the
experiment. Recruitment continued, selected from those eligible, until 10 left-handed
participants had completed the sampling phase.
Participants were advised that they may discontinue sampling at any time and
without penalty. Should a participant had chosen to withdraw from the study, they were
to receive one research credit per each attended meeting. During the participants' last
meeting, the investigators collected the beeper and the notebook from the participant,
though the participant was to keep the notes that they wrote down. Participants were
debriefed during the last meeting. Videotapes of the sessions were transferred to DVD,
given a number to identify the participant, and stored in a locked filing cabinet in the lab
area.
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Participants
Ten volunteers taking psychology courses at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas
aged 18 years and older, who were identified as left-handed in Phase 1, and who agreed
to participate in Phase 2, participated in Phase 3.
Apparatus
The participants received a random-interval-generating device (beeper) developed
by Hurlburt (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002). The pocket-sized beeper is rectangular in shape
and emits a 700-Hz tone at random intervals that can be heard from an earphone. The
random intervals were programmed for this study to range from a few seconds to one
hour with an average of 30 minutes. The volume of the beeper is adjustable and the beep
can be stopped by pressing a button. The participants also received a pocket-sized spiral
notebook for recording notes describing their inner experience at the last undisturbed
moment before the beep sounded (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002).
Procedures
Participants took the beeper with them and were asked to wear the beeper until it
beeped six times (approximately three hours) during a time of their preference. Within
24-hours of collecting the beeps, the participants individually met with two DES
investigators approximately five times in the DES lab at the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas (UNLV) campus. This phase of the study consisted of five, one-hour long
expositional interviews, with the exception of the last meeting. During the expositional
interviews the DES investigators interviewed the participant about the samples collected
the previous 24 hours. The last meeting also included a thorough debriefing after the
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expositional interview. Participants received four research credits for participation in this
phase.
Meetings 1-5: Expositional Interviews and Debriefing
Meetings 1 through 4 were one-hour long expositional interviews. Each
participant met with two investigators (Mizrachi and her advisor Hurlburt) to discuss the
participant’s recently collected samples of inner experience. Both investigators were
present during each interview. During the expositional interview, the investigators
essentially engaged in conversations with the participant in an effort to discover the
phenomenology of the participant’s inner experience. There is, essentially, only one
legitimate topic in this conversation: what did the participant experience at the moment of
the beep? The expositional interviews do not have a standard format although, typically,
the participants consult their notes about their beeps and attempt to describe to the
investigators their recently sampled experiences. The expositional interview is an
unstructured interaction, and the participant typically initially provides a variety of
reports about such things as: a) the background or context of the experience, b) the
situation (who they were with, who was there, etc.), c) the activity they were engaged in
(watching TV, driving, etc.), d) the experience that occurred before the moment of the
beep, e) the experience that occurred after the moment of the beep, and f) the ongoing
experience at the moment of the beep. The aim of the expositional interview is to focus
as exclusively on f) as possible, and to allow other aspects only to the extent that they
assist in the apprehension of f). This is a collaborative process in which the investigators
work together with the participant to come to a high fidelity apprehension of the
participant’s pristine inner experience. Within each interview, the lead interviewer on
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each beep was alternated. This is an iterative process which takes place over several
interviews. With each successive interview the participant may become more skillful at
identifying their at-the-moment-of-the-beep inner experience and filtering out extraneous
material.
Due to the iterative nature of the expositional interviews, the first expositional
interview is considered to be a training exercise rather than an opportunity for data
collection. During that first interview, participants are frequently surprised by the
amount of detail sought by the DES investigators, and therefore have difficulty answering
the questions posed by the investigators. After struggling through this first interview, and
hearing the kinds of details the investigators probe for, participants may become better
able to observe their own inner experience. The remaining expositional interviews
consist of the same kinds of questions aimed at the participant’s experience as were asked
in the first interview; however, participants are now likely to be better observers of their
inner experiences and more proficient in describing them.
Meeting 5 included both an expositional interview and a debriefing, where
participants’ participation was discussed and participants had the opportunity to ask
questions. Participants received research credit for their completion of the study.
Data
The aim of this study was to apprehend randomly sampled experiences from lefthanded individuals and then discover the characteristics of each of those samples. The
unit of data collected in this study is therefore the sample of inner experience.
DES, including the description writing of the participants’ inner experience
samples as well as the rating of the samples, is a collaborative process. Upon completion
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of each interview, one investigator (Mizrachi) wrote a high fidelity description of the
participant’s inner experience during each beep. Mizrachi then sent these descriptions to
her advisor and co-investigator (Hurlburt) to review and revise the descriptions, if
necessary. Hurlburt sent his revised descriptions back to Mizrachi to be reviewed for
final approval. If there were disagreements between the investigators, the videotape of
the interview was reviewed. Upon approval of the written beep descriptions, Mizrachi
then rated the inner experience characteristics during each beep. She then sent the ratings
to Hurlburt to review and agree or disagree. If there were disagreements, the videotape
of the particular interview was reviewed and the investigators discussed the beep until
they came to an agreement.
Upon completion of sampling, Mizrachi considered the participant’s entire set of
samples of inner experience and discovered the characteristics of experience that
emerged as salient across samples. This resulted in an idiographic description of each
participants’ experience. Upon completion of the idiographic description, Mizrachi sent
the idiographic chapter to Hurlburt for review.
After completion of the sampling process with all 10 participants as well as
completion of the 10 idiographic descriptions, the samples of experience from all
participants were collaboratively considered to discover whether there are patterns,
forms, and/or characteristics that emerged as salient across participants and that differ
from the experiences of the general population as described by Heavey and Hurlburt
(2008) and elsewhere. The characteristics of inner experience from the present study
were also compared to the left-handed participants in Mizrachi (2010). This resulted in a
nomothetic characterization of the experience of left-handers’ experience. Upon
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completion of the nomothetic characterization, Mizrachi sent the across-participant
chapter to Hurlburt for review.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
This study was aimed at exploring the inner experience of left-handed
participants; toward that end, 10 left-handed college students participated in Descriptive
Experience Sampling (DES). Their characteristics are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Demographics
EHI
Laterality
Quotient
Age
Gender
Ethnicitya
SCL-90-R
GSI Raw Score
GSI T-score
Norm Groupb
Number of
samplesc

Participants
“MM” “MO”

“AH”

“BP”

“CL”

“DH”

“NT”

“KA”

“JS”

“TS”

All

-100

-75

-75

-73

-68

-67

-53

-53

-50

-45

-65.9

18
M
H

18
F
AA

18
F
C

18
M
C

28
M
B

18
F
E

18
F
H

21
F
B

19
F
C

35
M
C

21.1

0.06
41
A
20
(9%)

0.53
59
A
20
(9%)

0.005
30
A
18
(8%)

0.79
56
B
24
(11%)

0.19
50
A
23
(11%)

1.53
61
B
20
(9%)

0.37
55
A
23
(11%)

0.71
61
A
21
(10%)

0.51
58
A
24
(11%)

0.32
55
A
24
(11%)

0.50
52.9
217
(100%)

Note. aAA is African-American, B is Biracial, C is Caucasian, E is Ethiopian, H is
Hispanic. bNorm A is adult nonpatients, norm B is adolescent nonpatients. cFirst day
samples excluded (considered training).
Participants were administered the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI), a
quantitative assessment of handedness, to evaluate their handedness laterality. The EHI
consists of 10 items evaluating the hand preference of a variety of activities. Completion
of the EHI yields a laterality quotient ranging from +100 to -100 (Oldfield, 1971).
Negative laterality quotients are associated with left-handedness whereas positive
laterality quotients are associated with right-handedness. The absolute values indicate
degree of handedness with larger values signifying stronger handedness in either
direction. Variations exist in the literature regarding the cutoff points of handedness;
however, the present study used laterality quotients of -40 to -100 as indicators of lefthandedness. Table 1 shows that our participants’ EHI scores ranged from -100 to -45,
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with four near -100, strongly left handed, and six clustering around -50, moderately left
handed.
Participants also completed the Symptom Checklist-90-R (SCL-90-R; Derogatis,
1994), a self-report inventory aimed at reflecting the psychological symptom patterns of
various respondents (community, medical, and psychiatric). The SCL-90-R is a selfreport inventory consisting of 90 items with a five point rating scale of distress from 0
“Not at All” to 4 “Extremely.” Scoring is based on nine symptom dimensions:
Somatization, Obsessive-Compulsive, Interpersonal Sensitivity, Depression, Anxiety,
Hostility, Phobic Anxiety, Paranoid Ideation, and Psychoticism. The Global Severity
Index (GSI) is one of three global indices of distress intended to summarize the level of
symptomatology and distress. The GSI is the best indicator of the current level or depth
of distress combining both the number of symptoms reported along with the intensity of
experienced stress. Overall, an individual’s severity of symptoms can be assessed
through elevations in the GSI thus the GSI should be used when only one summary
measure is reported (Derogatis, 1994).
The participants’ GSI raw scores and T-scores on the SCL-90-R are also
presented in Table 1, which shows that participants’ GSI T-scores ranged from 30 to 67.
In general, when compared to adult nonpatient norms, T-scores above 63 are indicative of
clinically significant psychological difficulties (Derogatis, 1994). Two of the
participants, DH and MM, had T-scores in this range. When compared to adolescent
nonpatient norms, DH’s GSI raw score converted to a T-score of 56 suggesting his
symptoms are not clinically significant. When compared to adolescent nonpatient norms,
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MM’s GSI raw score converted to a T-score of 61 suggesting her symptoms are not
clinically significant.
Organization
The main results of this study, the descriptions of left-handers’ experience, are
organized on two levels: 1) idiographically, within each individual participant; and 2)
collectively, across all participants. The next 10 chapters (Chapters 5 through 14) are
idiographic descriptions of the inner experience of each individual participant as
discovered by DES. Following the idiographic chapters, Chapter 15 describes the
patterns and emergent characteristics of inner experience across all ten participants and
compares the results from the present study to the literature.
The intent of idiographic analyses is to explore the characteristics of an
individual’s inner experience as thoroughly as possible. In DES, idiographic analyses are
performed through a consideration of all the samples of inner experience collected by a
participant and then describing those characteristics. Ten left-handed participants
participated in the present study; thus the investigators created 10 idiographic
descriptions. Each idiographic analysis is presented in its own chapter (Chapters 5-14);
the chapters are presented in descending order of degree of left-handedness as measured
by the EHI (that is, the most left-handed participant is presented first).
Following the idiographic analyses, an across-participant description considering
all the samples of inner experience from all participants was prepared; it is provided in
Chapter 15. The aim of this across-participant description is to discover the salient
characteristics and patterns of the inner experience in left-handers. The results of the
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present study are also compared to the results of Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) and
Mizrachi (2010).
In 2008, Heavey and Hurlburt explored the inner experience of a stratified
random sample of college students. They found that five characteristics occurred with
substantial frequency (22% or higher) in the inner experience of their participants: inner
seeing (34%), the seeing something in one’s imagination that is not actually there; feeling
(26%), the direct experience of emotion; inner speech (26%), the innerly speaking words
usually in one’s own voice; sensory awareness (22%), the attending to a particular
sensory aspect of one’s internal or external environment where the sensation itself is the
focus of one’s perception; and unsymbolized thinking (22%), the thinking of a thought
without conveyance of that thought in words, images, or any other symbolic
representation. The remaining characteristics occurred with much less frequency than the
main five (3% or less) (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).
In 2010, Mizrachi examined the inner experience of six left-handed participants.
Mizrachi (2010) found the main characteristics identified by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008)
occurred in her left-handed participants; however, they occurred in varying degrees.
Sensory awareness occurred with a frequency of 35%; inner seeing 24%; unsymbolized
thinking 20%; inner speech 9%; and feeling 4% (Mizrachi, 2010).
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CHAPTER 5
“AH”
AH was an 18 year-old Hispanic male who sampled with us in September and
October 2010. AH received a laterality quotient of -100 on the Edinburgh Handedness
Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971); that is the maximally negative EHI score, indicating he
is strongly left-handed. He received a GSI raw score of 0.061 (a T-score, compared to
nonpatients, of 41) on the Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90; Derogatis, 1994;
Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973), suggesting the absence of clinically significant
psychological difficulties.
Characteristics of Inner Experience
AH sampled on five separate occasions, collecting 24 samples. Because
Sampling Day 1 is considered training for the participants and AH declined to speak
about one sample, 20 of AH’s samples count towards his inner experience. The
following characteristics will be discussed: sensory awareness, occurring in 14 samples
(70%); unsymbolized thinking, occurring in 13 samples (65%); multiple experience,
occurring in 6 samples (30%); emotion, occurring in 4 samples (20%); inner speech,
occurring in 4 samples (20%); inner hearing, occurring in 3 samples (15%); feeling,
occurring in 3 samples (15%); not semantic words, occurring in 2.5 samples (13%); and
infrequently occurring characteristics.
Sensory Awareness
Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring characteristic in AH’s
inner experience, occurring in 14 of 20 samples (70%). Here is an example:
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Sample 5.4. AH was driving and the grey jeep in front of him had a Chicago
Bears tire cover on it. At the moment of the sample he focused on the appearance
of the bear and its shadings, noting the orange and blue in the logo. AH was also
thinking about his favorite team, the Raiders, beating the Chargers and that the
Raiders had not beaten the Chargers since 2003. This thought was centered on
the notion “since 2003” but AH was not sure if the specific words, “since 2003”
were present in his experience or if it was just the idea.
In this sample, AH was attending to the visual characteristics of the Chicago Bears tire.
Six of AH’s sensory awareness samples involved movement or spreading of a
sensory phenomenon. Here are examples:
Sample 3.3. AH was innerly speaking the words “I’m hungry!” as he was about
to place a bowl of spaghetti and meatballs into the microwave. His inner speech
had an emphatic tone. He was also feeling his entire inside and outside lower
abdomen grumbling, moving around, and tingling. At the same time, he was
seeing the food in his bowl and smelling the cold meat and sauce.
In this sample, the sensory awareness experienced in his lower abdomen involved some
movement. Here is another example:
Sample 4.5. At the moment of the sample, AH experienced the sides of his head
throbbing. He experienced the throbbing as originating in the inner portion of his
head and extending outwards toward his skull. The pain was concentrated in the
temporal area and faded outwards toward the rest of his upper cranium. The
throbbing was rhythmic, about once a second. The beep sounded when the
throbbing was at its maximum level. He was also slightly seeing the video game
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2K11, however, the throbbing was by far more central in his experience (an
estimated ratio of 99:1).
Not only did AH experience throbbing, the throbbing involved spreading or movement
from the inner portion of his head outwards towards his skull.
In three of his sensory awareness samples, AH experienced multiple and separate
sensory awarenesses occurring simultaneously. Here is an example:
Sample 3.5. AH was standing outside. At the moment of the sample, he was
drawn to the gloomy, gray colors of the clouds. That is, he was paying particular
attention to the color of the clouds, not their shape or their significance
(implications for weather, etc.). He also smelled the rain. He was also feeling
relaxed and calm which was experienced by a sensation of relaxedness throughout
in his upper body. He described this relaxedness sensation as a “dropping down”
sensation similar to sinking into a bed. He may also have been thinking, I love
this weather. This thought was not present in words or images. He was unsure if
this thought was in his experience at the moment of the sample or after the
sample.
In this sample, AH attended to the colors of the clouds (sensory awareness), the smell of
the rain (sensory awareness), and a “dropping down” sensation throughout his upper
body (sensory awareness).
Two of AH’s sensory awareness samples involved the sensory awareness of
words. Here are the samples:
Sample 3.4. AH was putting juice in the refrigerator. At the moment of the
sample, his attention was powerfully grabbed by the word “Ketchup” on the label
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of a ketchup bottle. His focus was on the entire word “Ketchup” without
attending to any particular aspect of its appearance or to its meaning or
significance. That is, AH had no particular relation to the ketchup at that time—
was not planning on using it, etc.—and no particular interest in the ketchup itself.
The meaningless word “Ketchup” overtook him, unbidden, by surprise, so to
speak, as he was involved with the juice. He was also thinking whether he should
go do bench presses or not. This thought was not experienced in words or
images.
Sample 4.2. AH was sitting in his car looking at the Monopoly game board he
had received at McDonalds. At the moment of the sample he was looking at the
black “$50”, which was superimposed over the two brown properties. He was
focused on the font, boldness, and black color of the “$50.” He was also thinking
he could actually win fifty dollars. This thought was not present in words or
images and had no location.
In these samples, words/numbers were present in AH’s experience; however, he was not
attending to the words/numbers for their significance. Rather, AH was drawn to their
appearance.
Two of his sensory awareness samples involved imaginary phenomena. In these
samples, AH was attending to sensory qualities of imaginary experiences. Here is an
example:
Sample 2.1. A second or so before the beep, AH’s phone had made a sound
indicating that a text message had arrived. At the moment of the sample, AH was
innerly hearing something like an echo of the text message notification sound.
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The innerly heard sound was a “faded version” of the real sound; the innerly
heard sound was repetitive like an echo but there were no pauses between each
repetition—that is, it seemed like a continuous fading in volume and perhaps in
some other way across time. This innerly heard sound seemed to be spreading
throughout his mind, unlike the original actual sound which occupied a specific
portion of experienced real space. He was also thinking the text message was
from his friend Lucy, but this was substantially less salient in his experience than
the hearing of the fading sound. Also less salient in his experience was being
interested in the text message. This was perhaps both a thought and a feeling, a
wondering what the text message said, and he was unable to describe the feeling
of interested any more than saying it had no physical characteristics.
In this sample, AH was attending to the auditory characteristics of an innerly heard text
message notification sound. Similar to the spreading/movement samples described
above, the innerly heard sound involved spreading throughout his mind.
Unsymbolized Thinking
Unsymbolized thinking occurred in 13 of AH’s samples (65%). Although
variations of unsymbolized thinking occurred frequently in AH’s inner experience, he did
not have any clear, textbook examples of unsymbolized thinking. All of his samples fell
into one of three categories: some kind of thinking secondary to something else
(primarily sensory awareness), the presence of multiple possibilities, and about what to
do next.
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In the majority (seven) of his unsymbolized thinking samples, the thinking was
occurring secondary, and sometimes tertiary, to another phenomenon. Here is an
example:
Sample 3.6. AH was flexing his left arm and was looking at it in a mirror. At the
moment of the sample, AH was seeing his left arm from the elbow to the
shoulder. He was noticing the cut of his tricep and bicep. He was also thinking to
himself, Are my arms getting bigger? This thought was not experienced in words
or images and was a general wondering and was not as present as the noticing of
the visual characteristics.
In this sample, AH was primarily attending to the noticing of the cut of his tricep and
bicep. The thought, Are my arms getting bigger? was secondary to this noticing. Here is
another example:
Sample 5.2. AH was watching the movie Night at the Museum, Part 2, the scene
where Ben Stiller was describing his glow-in-the-dark flashlight. At the moment
of the sample, AH was absorbed in the lime green color of the glow-in-the-dark
flashlight. He was also thinking that the glow-in-the-dark flashlight was a good
idea and wondering about if it would sell. This thought was not experienced in
words or images or other symbols, and was not as present as the noticing of the
lime greenness.
Similar to sample 3.6 described above, the unsymbolized thought in this sample
(wondering if a glow-in-the-dark flashlight would sell) was secondary to another
experience. In both of these samples, sensory awareness was the primary experience.
Five of AH’s unsymbolized thinking samples involved the presence of multiple
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possibilities. In these samples, there was a sense of multiple possibilities; however, the
possibilities themselves were not articulated. Here are examples:
Sample 2.4. AH was looking for a particular pair of pants. At the moment of the
sample, AH was innerly seeing clothes hanging on a hanger and a laundry basket
on the floor of his laundry room. He was seeing this as if he were standing in the
doorway looking left inside his laundry room. He saw the clothes in shades of
black and white, but did not differentiate the particular articles of clothing that
were hanging. This inner seeing somehow represented where he had last seen his
pants. Simultaneously he was wondering where could they possible be? He
experienced this thought as not in words or images. There was a notion present of
the places that they could be (in his closet, in his mother’s house, in his father’s
house, and so on); however, whereas there was an implication of specific possible
places, the specific places themselves were not present in his experience.
Sample 5.6. At the moment of the sample, AH was listening to his friend talking
on the phone about a gift for AH’s brother’s birthday. He was also thinking of
what he should get his brother for his birthday. This thinking seemed aimed at
deciding among several specific things that he might give him (a DVD set of a
TV show, some music) but the things themselves were not directly present to AH
at the moment of the sample. That is, it was as if there were several things “out
there,” not specified at the moment of the sample but also not absent, and AH was
waiting for one of them to “coalesce” or “advance” or “become salient.”
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In these samples, there was an experienced suggestion of a list of possibilities; however,
the members of the list were not articulated or directly present in AH’s experience at the
moment. Here is another example:
Sample 3.2. At the moment of the sample, AH was thinking that he had to choose
something to do tonight, out of many options available to him. There were no
words or images to be thought, he was just knowing he had to choose something.
He experienced time pressure or urgency about making this choice; that he had a
limited amount of time to make his choice about what to do later. It was unclear
whether this urgency was a mental feeling or a thought/feeling or some type of
thought. The phrase “thinking that he had to choose something to do tonight” is a
meta-awareness, in the sense that “choosing something to do” would be more
straightforward. In this case, the meta-awareness is correct: he was indeed aware
of his choices.
In this sample, the options were not quite as present as in the others. Additionally, it was
difficult to determine whether AH was experiencing a thought, feeling, or some
combination of a thought and a feeling. It is hard to know if this difficulty was an
accurate reflection of AH’s experience or if it is a reflection of AH’s difficulty
articulating his experience. This sample was counted as unsymbolized thinking.
One of AH’s unsymbolized thinking samples involved thinking about what to do
next:
Sample 2.2. AH was putting back a bottle of hot sauce in the pantry. At the
moment of the sample AH was thinking about what he was going to do next.
Included in this thinking was the sense that he had a lot of homework to do. This
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thinking did not include words, images, or any other symbolic representation. He
was also experiencing a slight feeling of pressure by the idea of not knowing what
to do. This was a mental feeling. Also in his experience was the visual seeing of
the hot sauce bottle. The notion that he has a lot of homework to do and
wondering what he was going to do next were the most salient aspects in his
experience (he estimated 80%) compared to the mental pressure (10%) and seeing
the hot sauce bottle (10%).
Multiple Experience
In six of AH’s inner experience samples (30%), multiple, separate, and distinct
phenomenon were simultaneously occurring. Examples of this have already been
described above. In sample 2.2, described in detail in Unsymbolized Thinking section
above, AH was thinking about what he was going to do next, feeling pressure, and seeing
a hot sauce bottle. In sample 3.4, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section
above, AH was seeing the word “Ketchup” on a ketchup bottle and thinking about
whether or not he should work out. In sample 4.5, described in detail in Sensory
Awareness section above, AH was experiencing the sides of his head throbbing and
seeing the video game 2K11. In sample 5.4, also described in detail in Sensory
Awareness section above, AH was focused on the appearance of a bear on a tire cover
and thinking about his favorite football team beating another team. Here is another
example:
Sample 4.1. AH was at McDonald’s waiting on his food order to come out. He
was wondering when his food was going to come out, and this thought had no
specific words, images, or other symbols to it. He was also re-hearing a series of
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beeps that he had heard a few seconds earlier. The innerly heard beeps were
about a third of a second apart, and there were five or six beeps in the series. As
far as he knew, this innerly heard series did not differ from what he had externally
heard, but he did not have clear recollection of the actual beeps. AH heard the
beeps in the interior of the top half of his head (roughly inside the cranium),
circulating in a way that he could not specify. He was also seeing his
McDonald’s tray with coffee on it, though this was a very small part of his
awareness.
In this sample, AH experienced multiple, separate, and simultaneous experiences,
including an unsymbolized thought (wondering when his food was going to come out)
and an inner hearing (re-hearing a series of beeps).
Emotion
In four of AH’s inner experience samples, an affective process was ongoing
outside of his direct experience (20%). All of his emotion samples involved inner words,
either spoken or heard, with an emphatic tone. Three of these examples have already
been described above. In sample 3.1, described in detail in Inner Speech section above,
AH was saying “He’s escaping!” with an emphatic tone, though he was not experiencing
an emotion at the moment of the sample. In sample 3.3, described in detail in Sensory
Awareness section above, AH was innerly saying “I’m hungry!” with an emphatic tone.
He was not, however, experiencing an emotion at the moment of the sample. In sample
5.1, described in detail in Inner Speech section above, AH was innerly saying “Ugh!”
with a strong emphasis indicating he found the color he was seeing repulsive. AH was
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not experiencing feeling repulsed at the moment of the sample, however. Here is the
other example:
Sample 4.3. AH had been playing 2K11 (a basketball video game). At the
moment of the sample, he was innerly hearing “I want to win!!!” The words were
innerly heard in his own voice with a hyper-dramatic emphasis. He was also (but
with much less emphasis) seeing the basketball on the screen.
Despite innerly hearing the words with a hyper-dramatic emphasis, AH was not
experiencing any feeling at the moment.
Inner Speech
Four of AH’s samples involved inner speech (20%). In all of these samples, the
inner speech involved an emotional or emphatic tone. Here is an example:
Sample 3.1. AH was watching the movie Shawshank Redemption and the warden
had just asked the inmate, “well?” At the moment of the sample, AH was innerly
saying, “He’s escaping” (a fact known to AH because he had seen the movie
before). This was said with some emotional emphasis.
In two of his inner speech samples, AH’s innerly spoken words were commenting
on some internal or external event. One example has already been described. In sample
3.3, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above, AH was saying “I’m
hungry!” In this sample AH was also feeling his lower abdomen grumbling, moving
around, and tingling. At the moment, it was as if AH actively surveyed his body and
came to the conclusion that he was hungry. Rather than automatically processing the
grumbling of his abdomen, AH innerly commented on the process perhaps in an attempt
to integrate the grumbling into his experience. Here is the other example:
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Sample 5.5. AH was driving behind a white truck with a white horse trailer. At
the moment of the sample, AH was thinking that he was going to be late. He
innerly said, “I’m going to be late!” in an angry/frustrated tone. He also felt
frustrated, which was experienced as a quivering sensation originating at the base
of the back of his neck and fading outwards to his shoulders and down his spine.
AH was also just beginning to sweat, which was experienced as a tingly and
evenly spaced sensation across his forehead right along his hairline. He was also
seeing the whiteness of the horse trailer (as opposed to the trailerness of the
trailer), but this was the least salient aspect of his experience.
In this sample, it was as if AH had surveyed his environment and came to the conclusion
that he would be late. Rather than automatically processing this notion, AH commented
on it.
One of AH’s inner speech samples was not clearly an inner speech sample. In
this sample, AH was sighing:
Sample 5.1. AH was driving and, at the moment of the sample, he was staring at
a trash can to his right. He was captivated by the blue color of the trash can,
which was a bright blue of about medium hue. He was also seeing the
symmetrical white lettering in the middle of the trash can, but his attention was
directed at the blue color. He was innerly saying, “Ugh!” to himself in his own
voice with strong emphasis indicating that he found the color repulsive.
Similar to samples 3.3 and 5.5 described above, the innerly said “Ugh!” involved an
emphatic tone.
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All of AH’s inner speech samples, including sample 5.1 which is not clearly inner
speech, are said with some kind of emotional tone. In fact, all inner words in AH’s
experience whether innerly spoken or heard (e.g., inner hearing sample 4.3) are
emotionally charged in their expression, but not in experience. That is, even though
AH’s voice sounds emotional, he does not feel emotion at the moment.
Inner Hearing
In three of his inner experience samples, AH was experiencing inner hearing
(15%). In sample 4.3, described in detail in the Emotion section above, AH was innerly
hearing “I want to win!!!” with a hyper-dramatic emphasis. His other two inner hearing
samples involved an echo or rehearing of something that he had already heard. Both
examples have already been described. In sample 2.1, described in detail in Sensory
Awareness section above, AH was innerly hearing a “faded version” of the text message
notification sound. In sample 4.1, described in detail in Multiple Experience section
above, AH was innerly hearing beeps of a McDonald’s machine. The innerly heard
beeps were a rehearing or echo of a series of beeps he had actually heard a few seconds
prior.
Feeling
Three of AH’s inner experience samples involved feelings (15%). Two of his
feeling samples included strong bodily sensations. Here is an example:
Sample 2.3. AH was taking a test for a music class online and had been looking
through his music book trying to find the answer to the question around what year
did white and black gospel differentiate? At the moment of the sample, he was
looking at the time indicator on his computer that showed he had only five
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minutes left to complete the exam. The notion of having only five minutes to
complete four questions was in his experience without words, images, or any
other symbolic representation. More centrally in his experience he was feeling
nervous, experienced as “nerves shaking” concentrated around his spine in his
lower back. “Nerves shaking” meant multiple tingling sensations along and near
his spine, more or less the kind of sensation that could be produced by fingers that
were softly and lightly independently drumming rapidly inside and outside of his
lower back area. The feeling gradually faded away as it moved away from his
spine in his lower back but did not reach his extremities or the front of his trunk.
In this sample, AH was feeling nervous which was experienced as tingling sensations
along his spine. Similarly, in sample 5.5 described in detail in Inner Speech section
above, AH felt frustrated which was experienced as a quivering sensation originating at
the base of his neck. In these samples, it was difficult to tell if AH’s feelings were
manifested as bodily sensations or whether AH primarily experienced the bodily
sensations and then concluded that he must be experiencing a feeling.
One of AH’s feeling samples did not include a clear example of feeling. In
sample 2.2, described in detail in Unsymbolized Thinking section above, AH was
experiencing a slight mental feeling of pressure. Whether or not “pressure” should be
considered feeling is difficult to determine and dependent upon one’s definition of
feeling. That is, pressure is not a feeling in the same way as happy, sad, and frustrated
are feelings.
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Not Semantic Words
In three of his samples, words were present in AH’s experience; however, the
meanings of the words were not. In sample 3.4, described in detail in Sensory Awareness
section above, AH was drawn to the word “Ketchup” but was not cognizant at all of its
semantic nature. That is, he was drawn to the visual display (which could be said to be
the word “ketchup”) but it was not a word that drew his attention—it was rather
something that was seen. In sample 5.1, described in detail in Inner Speech section
above, AH was seeing lettering on a trash can but the meaning of the lettering was not in
his experience at the moment (he was attending to the blue color of the trash can and the
whiteness of the letters, not the wordness of the letters). In sample 4.2, described in
detail in Sensory Awareness section above, AH was attending to the font, boldness, and
black color of the $50 on the McDonalds’ Monopoly game board. Although AH was
attending to the visual characteristics of the $50, he did have some thinking that he could
actually win fifty dollars. It is hard to determine if this sample is semantic or not
semantic—that is, it is partially not semantic and partially semantic. Thus this sample
was counted as .5 for a total of 2.5 not semantic samples (13%).
Infrequently Occurring Characteristics
Inner seeing.
AH’s inner experience involved two samples of inner seeing (10%). In sample
2.4, described in detail in Unsymbolized Thinking section above, AH was looking for a
pair of pants and was innerly seeing clothes hanging on a hanger. Here is the other
example:
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Sample 4.4. AH was playing the video game 2K11 and his character (Michael
Jordan) was shooting foul shots. At the moment of the sample, AH was seeing
the number 23 on Michael Jordan’s jersey on the screen. The most prominent
aspect of his experience was innerly seeing Michael Jordan doing the “jumpman”
dunk. He was seeing Michael Jordan (wearing his red jersey with white stripes
and the number 23 in black) in the air with his right arm extended forward and
legs spread apart. He was seeing this from the side as if he was sitting in the
bleachers and Michael Jordan was dunking in the basket to AH’s right; his back
was toward AH. The inner seeing was still.
Anticipation.
In one of his samples (5%), AH was experiencing a sense of something to happen.
In sample 2.2, described in detail in Unsymbolized Thinking section above, AH was
thinking about what he had to do next. He also had a sense that he had a lot of homework
to do.
Discussion
Overall, AH seemed to be a motivated DES participant. He was interested in the
process of exploring inner experience as well as his inner experience. AH frequently
experienced sensory awareness, unsymbolized thinking, and multiple experiences.
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CHAPTER 6
“BP”
BP was an 18-year-old African-American female who sampled with us in October
and November of 2010. She received a laterality quotient of -75 on the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971) indicating she is strongly left-handed. She
received a GSI raw score of 0.53 (a T-score, compared to nonpatients, of 59) on the
Symptom Checklist-90-R (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi,
1973), suggesting the lack of clinically significant psychological difficulties.
Characteristics of Inner Experience
BP sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total of 25 samples. Because
Sampling Day 1 is considered training for the participants, 20 of BP’s samples counts her
inner experience characteristics. The following characteristics will be discussed: inner
speech, occurring in 8 samples (40%); sensory awareness, occurring in 5 samples (25%);
not semantic words, occurring in 5 samples (25%); unsymbolized thinking, occurring in 3
samples (15%); happening of, occurring in 3 samples (15%); inner hearing, occurring in
2 samples (10%); words present, occurring in 2 samples (10%); infrequently occurring
characteristics; and noteworthy characteristics.
Inner Speech
Inner speech was the most frequently occurring characteristic in BP’s inner
experience, occurring in 8 of her 20 samples (40%). All of BP’s inner speech samples
consisted of her own voice. Five of BP’s inner speech samples involved innerly saying a
statement. Here is an example:
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Sample 2.4. BP had been looking at one of two triangles on her classroom board
and had realized she was looking at the wrong triangle. At the moment of the
sample, she was innerly saying “I was focusing on the wrong triangle.” She was
also seeing the correct triangle on the board.
In this sample, BP’s inner speech similar to outer speech.
Two of BP’s inner speech samples involved innerly asking a question. Here are
the examples:
Sample 2.6. BP had read a Twitter post that said the singer Faith Evans died
when the rapper Notorious B.I.G (“Biggie”) died. At the moment, BP was innerly
saying “Did she really?” The innerly spoken words conveyed the message that
BP did not believe what the post had said.
Sample 5.5. BP was innerly saying “Why is he still talking about the same
thing?” referring to her teacher. There was nothing else in her experience.
One of her inner speech samples involved a recollection:
Sample 5.1. BP was driving and saw a little girl walking with a violin. At the
moment, BP was seeing the little girl. She was seeing all of the little girl and not
paying attention to any particular aspect of her. BP was also innerly saying “I
remember when I played the violin.”
One of her inner speech samples involved an inner speaking and a separate
inner hearing of unrelated phenomenon:
Sample 4.2. BP had heard a Brian McKnight song, and, before the moment of the
sample, she had been innerly hearing this song and innerly signing along to it. At
the moment, she had stopped singing and was innerly saying “I know the beeper
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is about to go off.” This was a declarative, flat sentence that was as clear as if she
had said it out loud. The meaning of the innerly said words were in BP’s
experience. The sentence was about BP—about what she knows—and not the
beeper—when it will go off. At the same time, BP continued innerly hearing the
Brian McKnight song. She was not innerly singing at the moment of the sample.
One of BP’s inner speech samples involved an attempt at problem solving:
Sample 2.2. BP had been doing her math homework on the computer. At the
moment, she was innerly saying “196 plus ___,” where the blank would
eventually hold the solution to the problem. She was aware of how the solutions
should visually look; that is, she was trying to create a solution that looked in the
right way, not a solution that followed some rule or that followed some verbal
instruction. And by “looked in the right way” we mean that it had the proper
visual characteristics. That is, if she were performing a sum, she would create a
column of numbers, not because the rule says to create a column but because she
had learned that when solving this kind of problem, you have to create something
that looks like a column of numbers. So far it only involved “196 plus___.”
Sensory Awareness
BP’s inner experience consisted of five sensory awareness samples (25%). All of
her sensory awareness samples involved the sensory awareness of words/letters/numbers.
We have already seen one example, sample 2.2 described in detail in Inner Speech
section above. In this sample, BP was aware of the visual characteristics of a solution.
The solution itself was not in her experience; however, she was aware of what it should
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look like. Two other sensory awareness samples involved attending to the visual
characteristics of seen words:
Sample 4.4. BP was looking at a list of songs on the computer screen as the songs
were being downloaded. In her experience, she was attending to the visual
characteristics of the display as it scrolled up. She was absorbed in the way the
list looked. She was not attending to the list for what it represents.
Sample 5.3. BP was reading a page in her UNLV Planner. At the moment, she
was seeing the phrase “feeling more confident and connected.” BP was seeing all
of the words in the phrase without understanding. BP understood that the
meaning would come to her later; however, at the moment of the sample the
meaning was not present, she was just seeing the words.
BP’s other two sensory awareness samples involved attending to the auditory
characteristics of heard words. Here are the examples:
Sample 4.1. Her grandmother was talking about not wanting Sarah Palin’s
daughter to be on the Dancing with the Stars anymore, but at the moment her
words as a meaningful sentence was not part of BP’s experience. Instead, BP was
hearing the vocal/auditory characteristics of her grandmother’s voice. That the
voice was speaking meaningful words was not relevant—only the sound of the
voice.
Sample 5.4. BP was listening to her teacher talk about the government being a
hard job. In her experience, BP was tracking the vocal expression patterns of the
words he was saying. BP was not tracking the meaning of the words. BP had

87

somehow zeroed in on the words “hard job” but recognized them as objects of
emphasis and not for content.
In all of these samples, the meanings of the written or spoken words were not in BP’s
awareness at the moment of the sample. All that she was attending to was the sensory
quality of the words.
Not Semantic Words
BP’s inner experience consisted of a rare phenomena relating to words. In five of
BP’s samples, words were present; however, BP was not attending to the words for their
meaning. All five of her samples involved the sensory awareness of words either seen or
heard (25%). In these samples, BP was attending to either the auditory/vocal and visual
characteristics of words rather than attending to their meaning. Three of these samples
involved attending to the visual characteristics of words. For example, in sample 2.2
described in detail in Inner Speech section above, BP was trying to create a solution that
had the proper visual characteristics. She was not aware of the solution itself, she was
only aware of how it should look. In sample 4.4, described in detail in Sensory
Awareness section above, BP was attending to the visual characteristics of a list of songs
on the computer screen. In sample 5.3, described in Sensory Awareness section above,
BP was seeing a phrase in her planner; however, the meaning of the phrase was not in her
experience. Two of these samples involved attending to the auditory characteristics of
words heard. In sample 4.1, described in detail Sensory Awareness section above, BP’s
grandmother was talking and BP was attending to the vocal/auditory characteristics of her
grandmother’s voice. In sample 5.4, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section
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above, BP was tracking the vocal expression patterns of her professor’s speech; she was
not attending to the meaning of the words he was saying.
Unsymbolized Thinking
Unsymbolized thinking occurred in three of BP’s samples (15%). Here are
examples:
Sample 4.5. BP was reading a status on Twitter. At the moment, she was reading
“I miss having a best friend.” The meaning of this sentence was immediately,
automatically a part of the reading process. She was also thinking that she misses
seeing her best friend. This was a thought without words, images, or any
symbolic representation.
Sample 4.6. She had just read a Facebook status and was in the act of clicking the
Like button. At the moment of the sample, she was still thinking about what the
status had said. The act of clicking the Like button was not in her experience.
In this sample, BP was thinking about the status she had read on Facebook earlier, the
thought did not include any characteristics.
One of BP’s unsymbolized thinking samples involved the unfolding of words, BP
experienced the words unfolding or coming to her rather than her creating the words.
Here is the example:
Sample 3.1. Before the moment of the sample, BP had thought about and figured
out what she was going to say in a phone claim to replace her grandmother’s
phone. At the moment of the sample, she was typing the phrase it won’t go to
another screen unless (the beep sounded as she was typing the word unless). The
notion it won’t go to another screen unless was present in her experience;

89

however, the words themselves were not in her experience. The thought was
unfolding as she was typing the words, but it seemed there were no words in this
thought—that is, there was a temporal unfolding of the thought in synch with the
typing of the words, but the experienced thought did not, apparently, include the
words rather it only included the idea the words represented. She was also aware
of typing with the intention of creating the words; she was not experiencing the
physical aspect of the typing.
Happening Of
In three of BP’s samples, there was an ongoing phenomenon; however, BP was
not actively involved in the creation of the phenomenon (15%). In these samples, she
was more of an observer. Two examples have already been described above. In sample
2.2, described in detail in Inner Speech section above, BP was innerly saying a math
problem and waiting for the solution to visually appear. BP was not actively involved in
creating the solution, experientially, she was just waiting for the solution to come to her
and look the right way. In sample 3.1, described in detail in Unsymbolized Thinking
section above, BP was typing the sentence it won’t go to another screen unless. At the
moment, BP was seeing the sentence unfolding on the screen. Here is the other example:
Sample 3.3. BP had been wondering if there was something wrong with the
beeper. At the moment, she was thinking I started it this morning. The specific
words were present in BP’s experience sequentially, that is they seemed to present
themselves to her one after the other. However they were not innerly spoken,
heard, or seen. In her experience, the words were presenting themselves to BP
and she was not creating them.
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In these samples, BP was not experiencing herself as the creator of the words rather she
was more of an observer. The words were just happening.
Inner Hearing
Two of BP’s samples involved inner hearing (10%), one of which was of her own
voice, a relatively rare phenomenon in right-handed people. One example of inner
hearing has already been discussed in Inner Speech section above: in sample 4.2, BP was
innerly hearing a Brian McKnight song. BP’s other sample of inner hearing involved the
hearing of her own voice:
Sample 2.3. BP was in her math class. At the moment, she was innerly hearing
“is my calculator in degrees?” in her own voice. She was confident that the
experience was of hearing her own voice (as if played back by a tape recorder)
rather than speaking in her own voice (talking into a tape recorder). She was also
reaching for her calculator but that was not in her experience.
Words Present
In two of BP’s samples, there were specific words present in her
experience (10%); however, the words themselves were not presented in any symbolic
representation. One example, sample 3.1, has already been described in detail in
Unsymbolized Thinking section above. In this sample, the notion it won’t go to another
screen unless was present as she was typing the words; however, the words themselves
were not present in her experience. In sample 3.3, described in detail in Happening Of
section above, the words I started it this morning were sequentially presenting
themselves to BP. However, the words were not innerly spoken, heard, or seen.
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Infrequently Occurring Characteristics
Multiple experience.
Only one of BP’s samples involved multiple experience (5%). In sample 4.2,
discussed in detail in Inner Speech section above, BP was innerly saying “I know the
beeper is about to go off” and innerly hearing a Brian McKnight song.
Computing.
In one of her samples, BP was involved in mental calculation (5%):
Sample 2.1. BP had just dropped off her grandmother at work and was driving.
She had been thinking about her ex-boyfriend’s cousin and was wondering how
old she was when she had her child. At the moment of the sample, the idea was
she pregnant when she was sixteen? was in her experience without words, images,
or any other symbolic representation. BP was calculating how old her exboyfriend’s cousin was when she had her child.
Doing of.
In one of her samples, sample 3.1 described in detail in Unsymbolized Thinking
above, BP was typing a sentence (5%). At the moment of the sample, BP was
experiencing the act of typing—that is, this was not just happening. BP was aware of the
act of typing with the intention of creating the words on the screen.
Words spoken out loud.
One of BP’s samples involved saying something out loud to herself (5%). Here is
the example:
Sample 3.2. BP had been trying on pants and looking in the mirror at herself from
a sideways stance. At the moment of the sample, she was seeing her whole self in
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the mirror. She was also saying out loud to herself, “I like these,” in reference to
the pants.
Listening with comprehension.
One of BP’s samples involved listening with comprehension—that is, BP was
following along and attending to the meaning of spoken words (5%). Here is the
example:
Sample 4.3. BP was watching an interview on TV with the singer Robin Thicke.
At the moment, BP was absorbed in the interview. She was being carried along
by the interview, what the interviewer was asking and Robin Thicke’s responses.
In this sample, the meaning of the sentences was immediately present as she heard
them; this is distinctly different from sample 4.1 (discussed in detail in Sensory
Awareness section above), where the meaning did not accompany the words.
Noteworthy Characteristics
Feelings.
BP did not have any experience of feelings in her samples. Furthermore, the
presence of emotion without being directly experienced did not occur in her inner
experience either.
Discussion
BP seemed to be a motivated DES participant. BP had a difficult time elaborating
on her individual samples. However, overall, her samples seemed to be more
straightforward and less complicated than the other participants in this study. Her most
frequently occurring characteristic was inner speech (40%). She also experienced
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sensory awareness and not semantic words frequently. BP did not have any experience
of feeling nor did any of her samples involve an ongoing affective process.
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CHAPTER 7
“CL”
CL was an 18-year-old Caucasian female who sampled with us in September and
October 2010. CL received a laterality quotient of -75 on the Edinburgh Handedness
Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971); indicating she is strongly left-handed. She received a
GSI raw score of 0.005 (a T-score, compared to nonpatients, of 30) on the Symptom
Checklist-90-R (SCL-90; Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973), suggesting
the absence of clinically significant psychological difficulties.
Characteristics of Inner Experience
CL sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total of 21 samples. Because
Sampling Day 1 is considered training for the participants, 18 of CL’s samples counts her
inner experience characteristics. The following characteristics will be discussed: sensory
awareness, occurring in 7 samples (39%); feeling, occurring in 6 samples (33%); inner
seeing, occurring in 6 samples (33%); anticipation, occurring in 4 samples (22%);
listening with comprehension, occurring in 2 samples (11%); inner speech, occurring in 2
samples (11%); emotion, occurring in 2 samples (11%); and infrequently occurring
characteristics.
Sensory Awareness
Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring characteristic of CL’s inner
experience, occurring in seven of her samples (39%). Two characteristics emerged in
CL’s sensory awareness samples, including attending to a bodily sensation and attending
to the sensory characteristics of an innerly seen image.
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Two of CL’s sensory awareness samples involved paying attention to a bodily
sensation. Here are the examples:
Sample 3.1. CL was sneezing. In her experience, she was innerly saying the
words, “I’m sneezing,” in her own voice in a matter-of-fact tone. She was also
experiencing the sneezing sensation in her nose and squinting eyes.
Sample 3.2. CL was taking a shower. At the moment of the sample, her eyes
were stinging and she was annoyed. The annoyance was a mental annoyance.
Both the stinging and the annoyance were simultaneously experience, the stinging
more prominent.
In both of these samples, CL was attending to the sensory qualities of some bodily
experience (sneezing sensation in nose and squinting eyes, stinging in eyes).
Two of CL’s sensory awareness samples involved attending to the sensory
characteristics of an innerly seen image. Here is an example:
Sample 2.3. At the moment of the sample, CL was innerly seeing herself in her
English class. She was seeing this from her own perspective, as if she were
sitting in her class. She innerly saw her paper, saw her notebook curved to the left
on the table, her blue sharpie pen on the left, and her left hand. She also saw the
classroom walls in her periphery. Something about the ugliness of the
whitish/yellowish wall color was present in her awareness; however, she was
mostly attending to the paper, pen, and her hands.
In this sample, CL was drawn to the ugliness of the whitish/yellowish classroom wall
color.
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Feeling
Feeling was found in six of CL’s inner experience samples (33%). Four of her
samples involved a mental feeling. One example has already been described in detail in
Sensory Awareness section above. In sample 3.2, CL was taking a shower. At the
moment of the sample, CL’s eyes were stinging and she was annoyed. The annoyance
was a mental annoyance that was simultaneous to but less salient than the stinging. Here
are other examples:
Sample 2.1. At the moment of the sample, CL was worried. This was a powerful
mental experience that was contained within the mental realm—that is, CL
understood herself to be feeling not thinking, and there was no experienced bodily
aspect.
Sample 4.2. CL had completed a math problem on the computer and the math
program had just indicated to her that her answer was incorrect. At the moment
of the sample, CL was innerly saying “what!?!” to herself in her own annoyed,
frustrated, cock-sure voice, as if she knew the computer must be mistaken
(although that was not explicitly being thought). She was also annoyed that the
computer indicated she was incorrect. This was a mental annoyance. CL was
unable to describe her feeling annoyed more than saying that it was occurring
mentally. CL said that others would not have been able to recognize that she was
annoyed. CL was both innerly saying “what!?!” in an annoyed way and feeling
annoyed at the moment of the sample.
In this sample, the annoyance presented itself in two ways to CL, CL was innerly saying,
annoyingly, “what” and more or less separately feeling annoyed. However, despite the
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multiple presentations of the annoyance, CL was sure that observers would not have been
able to recognize she was annoyed. That is, the experience of annoyance was contained
within the mental realm.
In one of CL’s feeling samples, she was experiencing curiosity. Whether
curiosity should be called feeling is questionable. Here is the sample:
Sample 3.4. CL had been thinking about the DES experiment and what the DES
investigators expect to find in left-handers in general and particularly about CL
herself. At the moment of the sample, CL was mentally curious. This curiosity
was aimed at the DES experiment; however, the DES experiment was not in her
experience at the moment of the sample. CL was under the impression that the
thought content, about the experiment and her own participation, had been
explicitly present a few seconds earlier, but had now passed, leaving a sense of
curiosity but no particular content.
Unlike the abovementioned feeling samples, CL’s other two samples of feeling
involved some bodily manifestation of the feeling. Here is an example:
Sample 2.2. CL had launched her Macintosh computer in the Windows mode by
mistake; it was about to load the Windows screen. At the moment of the sample,
CL was innerly seeing the screen of her Mac computer laptop. She was seeing the
start bar on the side of the screen, a large “W” on the screen, and three large
icons. She was also seeing the silver frame of the screen. She saw three icons,
but the icons were not detailed enough to see the writing on them. She was seeing
the screen straight ahead. This was an accurate rendition of the screen that would
be coming on her real computer in a few seconds. CL was also experiencing a
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bodily frustration located in the middle of her chest that was actively spreading
outwards on both sides. The innerly seen image was more salient in her
experience. Regarding her feeling, CL said she “felt it, but it wasn’t that big of a
deal.”
In this sample, CL’s feeling (frustration) was spreading from the middle of her chest
outward. Similar to this, her other bodily feeling also involved movement. Here is the
example:
Sample 2.4. CL was talking to a woman on the phone. The woman had helped
CL come up with a solution for a problem CL was having. At the moment of the
sample, CL was experiencing relief. This was experienced as the release of
tension from her upper body as if a weight had been lifted off of her shoulders.
She was also taking in what the woman was saying. The relief was more salient
in her awareness.
Inner Seeing
Inner seeing occurred in six of CL’s inner experience samples (33%). Here is an
example:
Sample 5.1. CL had been looking in a magazine at a picture of a laptop case she
wanted to purchase, trying to determine if her laptop would fit in it. At the
moment of the sample, CL was innerly seeing her left hand placing her silver
laptop into a laptop case that was black and white with polka dots. She was
seeing the computer halfway into the case. She was also seeing the brown
wooden kitchen table the computer was on and the white tile floor underneath the
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table. She was not paying particular attention to the colors. The things seen were
moving.
Four of her inner seeing samples included sensory awareness. One example,
sample 2.3, has already been described in the Sensory Awareness section above. In this
sample CL was drawn to the ugliness of the whitish/yellowish classroom wall color in her
inner seeing. Here is another example:
Sample 3.3. CL had told her sister, Amy, where to find quarters in her room. CL
was innerly seeing the drawer of her dresser. She was seeing the drawer half
open, seeing at the left side of the drawer a pink box with quarters and pennies,
the orange lid to the pink box, and an empty perfume bottle. The pink box and
orange lid were distinctively pink and orange. Something about their color was
important. The inner seeing was in motion though nothing in the image was
moving. The inner seeing was a simplification of what was actually in the
drawer—that is, her real drawer has those things in it as she saw them, but also
has other objects that were not included in the inner seeing. CL had a sense that
she was seeing what Amy would see if she looked into the drawer, although this
sense was not differentiated from the seeing itself. Simultaneously, CL was also
expecting to hear Amy’s voice (because CL knew that Amy would not be able to
find the quarters). This was some kind of mental expectation, as if she knew that
Amy would be calling out soon; that is, this was not a listening-for or perking-upher-ears-for Amy’s voice.
In this sample, CL was drawn to the pink and orange color of the innerly seen box.
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Two of CL’s inner seeings included involvement with her external environment.
For example, in sample 2.2 described in detail in Feeling section above, CL was innerly
seeing her computer screen in the way that would actually exist in her external
environment, but was not yet in that state. Here is the other example:
Sample 5.5. CL was putting makeup on in the bathroom. She heard the movie
her sister had started playing in the living room. CL had seen this movie many
times and, at the moment of the sample, CL was innerly seeing the scene that she
was actually hearing. Her experience was of seeing the movie, with the dialogue
and sounds being provided by the actual hearing. As far as she could tell, the
innerly seen movie was identical to the actual movie (although she didn’t claim
they were identical—she simply didn’t know of any differences). She was seeing
an overcast scene with a girl walking and pulling off her wig on a corner with a
taxi behind her. CL was innerly seeing what seemed to be all the details of the
real movie scene. She was taking in the whole scene but mostly attending to the
main character. She was also hearing the audio of the movie playing. So she was
both innerly seeing the scene of the movie and hearing the actual audio from the
movie.
In this sample, CL’s inner experience is directly involved with her external environment.
Anticipation
In four of her samples CL was anticipating something happening (22%). In
sample 2.2, described in detail in Feeling section above, CL was innerly seeing an
accurate rendition of the screen that would be coming on her real computer in a few
seconds. In sample 3.3, described in detail in Inner Seeing section above, CL was
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expecting to hear her sister’s voice, as if she knew her sister would be calling out for her
soon. In sample 4.1, the frozen emotion described in detail in Emotion section below, CL
was waiting for something to happen. In one of her samples, CL was anticipating finding
something. Here is the example:
Sample 5.2. CL was searching through her closet for a particular pair of shoes.
She was visually looking for them. She was also mouthing (nothing audible in
either her imagination or real world) words to a song playing on her iTunes;
however, this was happening automatically and not in her experience. All that
was in her experience was the searching for the shoes.
In this sample CL was actively searching for a pair of shoes in her closet.
Listening with Comprehension
In two of her samples (11%), CL was listening with comprehension. In sample
2.4, described in detail in Feeling section above, CL was talking to a woman on the
phone and taking in what she was saying. Here is the other example:
Sample 4.3. CL was talking to her friend, Christy, on the phone. At the moment
of the sample, she was listening with comprehension to what Christy was saying.
There was nothing else in her experience at the moment. When she surveyed
herself after the moment, she discovered that she was calm in her body and
shoulders, and was breathing deeply in relaxation (because of what Christy was
saying), but that was not in her experience at the moment of the sample.
In these samples, CL was following along and taking in what was being said.
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Inner Speech
Inner speech occurred two times in CL’s inner experience (11%). Both samples
involved CL’s own voice. In sample 3.1, described in detail Sensory Awareness section
above, CL was innerly saying “I’m sneezing,” in her own voice. In this sample, CL was
actively surveying, and commenting, on a bodily process rather than automatically
integrating this process as part of her experience. Her other inner speech sample
involved an emphatic tone. In sample 4.2, described in detail in Feeling section above,
CL was innerly saying “what!?!” to herself in her own annoyed voice.
Emotion
During two of CL’s inner experience samples, an affective process was ongoing;
however, CL was not directly experiencing a feeling at the moment (11%). One example
has already been described in detail in Listening with Comprehension section above. In
sample 4.3, CL was calm and relaxed; however, she did not experience this at the
moment. She only knew herself to be calm and relaxed after the moment of the sample
when she surveyed her body. Here is the other example:
Sample 4.1. CL had been doing her homework when a truck quickly pulled into
her driveway and she had seen someone head for her garage. A wave of pure fear
had overtaken her, but at the moment of the sample, she was in a suspended
animation state, frozen, anticipating, waiting to hear something, as if her senses
were oriented to anything that might happen in the garage, and she was waiting
for something to happen. Apparently the fear was suspended at the moment of
the sample, so that at the exact moment of the sample nothing is experienced, an
anticipatory void aimed at the garage.
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In this sample, CL had been taken over by fear although, at the moment of the sample,
the fear was frozen and not experienced. CL was somehow able to suspend her fear at
the moment.
In both of these samples, there was a clear emotional state (calm and relaxed,
fear) that had been experienced either prior to or would be experienced after the moment
of the sample; however, at the moment, CL’s experience did not include the feeling. Her
feelings appear to be separate, and oftentimes secondary, characteristics that can be
turned off and on at her will.
Infrequently Occurring Characteristics
CL had seven characteristics that each only occurred one time in her inner
experience samples (6% each).
Not semantic words.
In one of her samples, words were present in CL’s experience; however, the
meanings of the words were not. In sample 5.3, described in detail in Words Present
section below, CL’s eyes were aimed at the word magnificent; however, the word or its
definition were not in her experience at the moment of the sample.
Happening of.
In one of her samples, CL was drawing lines and attending to the drawing of the
lines; however, the watching of the lines unfold was a happening kind of experience.
Here is the sample:
Sample 4.4. CL was adding lines to a palm tree she had drawn. She was paying
attention to the drawing of the lines and watching the lines unfold.
Simultaneously, she was also wondering when the beeper would sound. This was

104

a thought without words, images, or any other symbolic representation. The palm
tree was experientially more in her awareness than the wondering (an estimated
ratio of 60:40).
This experience is unusual in the sense that, even though she was making the lines, it was
as if the lines were coming out of her pen—that is, the lines were driving the pen, rather
than the pen driving the lines.
Words present.
In one sample, words were present in CL’s experience without any symbolic
characteristics:
Sample 5.3. CL had been reading a magazine and looking at the word
magnificent, the last word in a sentence. Her experience was of the word
magnificent, not of the sentence that contained the word. At the moment of the
sample, CL was innerly seeing a cartoon pink elephant. The elephant was seen
from the right side, aimed towards the right but looking back at her. She was
seeing the pink elephant with a black outline; the remaining of her imaginary
visual field was black. The words pink elephant were also present in her
experience, separately from the innerly seen cartoon pink elephant. The words
were present in pink, bold letters without any spaces. The word pink and letter e
in elephant were all capitals, PINKElephant. The words were present in her
experience but, despite their visual characteristics (color, font, etc.), she was not
innerly seeing them, hearing them, or saying them. CL said that, although she
does not see the words pink elephant, she knew they were there in that way. Both
the seeing of the cartoon pink elephant and the pink words pink elephant were
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present in her experience at the same time but separately. Her eyes were still
aimed at the word magnificent, but that was not in her experience at the moment.
In this sample, the words pink elephant were present in CL’s experience with specific
visual characteristics; however, she was not seeing them (nor was she hearing them or
saying them). That is, somehow the visual characteristics of the words were present to
CL even though there was no visual experience of the words. That may seem impossible,
but the investigators questioned CL carefully on this point, and this was the joint
conclusion.
Focus on words (rather than sentences).
In one of her samples, sample 5.3 described in detail in Words Present section
above, CL’s eyes were aimed at a word (magnificent), which happened to be the last
word in a sentence. Her experience was of the word and not of the sentence that
contained the word. During the expositional interview, CL was unable to recall the
sentence that contained the word. CL’s experience seems to be of words rather than
sentences.
Multiple experience.
In one of her samples, CL was experiencing multiple, distinct phenomenon. In
sample 4.4, described in detail in Happening Of section above, CL was drawing a tree
and watching the lines unfold. Simultaneously, she was wondering when the beeper
would sound.
Inner hearing.
CL’s inner hearing sample involved innerly hearing a hummed version of a
commercial tune:
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Sample 2.5. CL was innerly hearing a hummed version of a commercial tune. It
was as if a hummed, simplified version of the tune was replaying in her head.
There were no words or instruments, just humming. She was experiencing this as
if it were the commercial. She was not experiencing the doing of the humming,
rather this was an inner hearing of the humming.
Unsymbolized thinking.
In sample 4.4, described in detail in Happening Of section above, CL was
wondering when the beeper would sound. This was a thought without words, images, or
any other symbolic representation.
Discussion
CL seemed to be a motivated subject. She expressed interest in DES and
appeared to have gained clarity and self-awareness from the process. Most of CL’s inner
experience samples consisted of one characteristic. Sensory awareness, feeling, and inner
seeing were her most frequently occurring inner experience characteristics.
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CHAPTER 8
“DH”
DH was an 18-year-old Caucasian male who sampled with us in October and
November of 2010. He received a laterality quotient of -73 on the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971) indicating that he is strongly left-handed.
He received a GSI raw score of 0.79 (a T-score, compared to nonpatients, of 67) on the
Symptom Checklist -90-R (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi,
1973), suggesting the possibility of psychological difficulties. When comparing DH’s
GSI raw score to adolescent nonpatients he received a T-score of 56, however.
Characteristics of Inner Experience
DH sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total of 30 samples. Because
Sampling Day 1 is considered training for the participants, 24 of DH’s samples counts his
inner experience characteristics. The following characteristics will be discussed: sensory
awareness, occurring in 11 samples (46%); inner seeing, occurring in 9 samples (38%);
unsymbolized thinking, occurring in 7 samples (29%); inner speech, occurring in 7
samples (29%); not semantic words, occurring in 4 samples (17%); multiple experience,
occurring in 4 samples (17%); emotion, occurring in 3 samples (13%); feeling, occurring
in 1 sample (4%); infrequently occurring characteristics; and noteworthy characteristics.
Sensory Awareness
Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring phenomenon in DH’s inner
experience, consisting of 11 samples (46%). Here are examples:
Sample 2.6. DH was playing the guitar. At the moment of the sample, he was
seeing his left hand and feeling the strings with his left hand to make sure his left
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hand was in the right position. He was feeling the strings more than the looking
(an estimated 70:30). He was also hearing the sound he was making as his right
hand strummed. The seeing/feeling of his left hand was most salient in his
experience (an estimated 70:30).
Sample 5.5. DH was looking down at the kitchen table at two magazines stacked
on top of each other. At the moment of the sample, he was seeing a part of a
man’s arm in a photo on the bottom magazine. DH was mostly attending to the
veins on the man’s arm from the bicep down towards his hand, the way the veins
bulged and their significance of muscularity.
Three of DH’s sensory awareness samples involved the sensory awareness of
words. Here are examples:
Sample 3.3. He had heard a song on the radio and had been trying to figure out
what the song was. He had gone to Yahoo Search and typed in the portion of the
lyric that he could remember. At the moment, he was seeing an array of bold and
unbolded words on the computer screen. He was paying attention to the pattern
of bolding, not to the meanings of the words that he was seeing. He knew the
bolded words were the ones that he had typed, but that was not part of his
experience at the moment; at the moment he was paying attention to the visual
characteristics of the bolding/nonbolding. He was also experiencing what he
called “gratification” because he knew the bolded words were what he was
looking for. Rather than gratification being directly experienced, at the moment
there was more a mental relief, an absence of the compulsion of needing to find
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the song that had strongly existed earlier. The seeing of the bold and unbolded
words was most salient in his experience (an estimated 70:30).
Sample 5.2. DH was writing the words white dwarf on a piece of paper. At the
moment of the sample, he was paying visual attention to what he was writing. It
was as if the writing was automatically coming out of him and he was visually
monitoring the appearance of words. He was attending to how the words looked
and not what the words represented or meant. He was also innerly saying, “what
is the sun?” in his own voice. The written words were more salient in his
experience (an estimated 80:20).
Similar to the samples just described, one of DH’s samples involved the sensory
awareness of a traffic signal. In this sample, DH was not attending to the signal for its
meaning. Here is the example:
Sample 3.4. He had been driving over a bridge. At the moment, he was noticing
the brightness of a red stop light as it emerged from being occluded by the bridge.
He was attending to the glowiness of the stop light. He was also seeing the road
around him but he was mostly attending to the glowiness of the stop light.
As mentioned above, sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring
characteristic in DH’s inner experience. The majority of his samples (8/11) were typical
sensory awareness experiences; however, 3 of his 11 samples involved attending to the
sensory qualities of words or symbols (sign in sample 3.4).
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Inner Seeing
DH’s inner experience involved nine samples of inner seeing (38%). Five of
DH’s inner seeing samples involved a seeing of something he had already seen, although
the inner seeing transformed the original in some way. Here are examples:
Sample 2.4. DH was on the couch with his eyes shut thinking about a movie he
had watched a week ago. At the moment, he was innerly seeing two girls
(characters from the movie) standing in a kitchen. He was seeing this as if he was
standing in the kitchen with them, he recognized himself as being in the scene.
The girls were standing close together facing DH (though he could not see any
aspect of himself). The seeing was a still image and in color. This was an
accurate recreation of a scene from the actual movie, with the exception of DH’s
presence. He was also thinking how sad without words, images, or any other
symbolic representation.
Sample 3.6. DH had been studying. At the moment, he was innerly seeing two
arrows. He was seeing a red arrow point up to the left and a blue arrow point
down to the right. The arrows were both bent outwards in the center similar to the
recycling logo (except the recycling logo is gradually curved whereas the seen
arrows were rather sharply bent). He was seeing the arrows against a black
background. The heel of each of the arrows seemed to “fade” or disintegrate in
both color and form. There was some sense of the meaning of the arrows. This
was a seeing of what he had seen before, though the original arrows were straight
up and down, not bent, and without fading or disintegrating.
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Sample 4.4. DH was looking in a magazine at an advertisement for a wristwatch.
Before the moment of the sample, DH had been innerly saying “My dad has the
same exact watch but nicer,” (referring to the fact that the advertised watch has a
leather band whereas his father’s watch has a stainless steel band). At the
moment, he was seeing the wristwatch as he had seen it in the magazine, except
that now his inner seeing had replaced the leather band, which was wrapped
around a model’s wrist, with a stainless steel band similarly wrapped. Thus he
saw the magazine wristwatch advertisement (but what he saw had had the band
replaced). He was seeing the watch with a stainless steel band in the same
position and orientation of the original leather band. Simultaneously, the thought
that his father’s watch was nicer was still in his experience; the meaning
continued on in his experience (that is, half the meaning of the original sentence
somehow continued on) but the words were no longer present.
Sample 5.6. DH had just finished having a conversation with his sister, Jamie, in
which she indicated if she had to die she would rather drown than be stabbed. DH
had disagreed with Jamie and was walking away from her. At the moment, he
was innerly saying, “You’re nuts.” The words were innerly spoken in a mostly
irritated and also comical way (60:40). DH was not feeling irritated at the
moment; that is as far as he knew if it had not been for the characteristics of his
voice, there would have been no indication of irritation at all. Simultaneously, he
was innerly seeing a scene from the movie Saving Private Ryan. DH was innerly
seeing a man in a green suit laying on top of another man, trying to stab him with
a knife. The man on the bottom was struggling against his attacker with his

112

hands. The seeing was in motion. The only colors DH was seeing was the green
uniforms and the pale white faces of the men. The whiteness of the faces was
unrealistic and more pale in nature than what would be in real life. It was as if the
seeing were incompletely colored, not that he was focused on the incompleteness
but that most of the scene was in black and white except for the green of the
uniforms. DH was seeing this from an angled perspective, he was seeing the rear
left side of the man on bottom and right side of the man on top.
One of his samples involved innerly seeing himself:
Sample 3.5. DH had been talking to his mom about taking a new class at the
gym. At the moment, he was innerly seeing a vivid and still picture of himself jiu
jitsu fighting another male, Tommy. DH was seeing himself with his back on the
floor with Tommy up on his knees and on top of DH. Tommy’s body was
parallel to DH’s. DH was wearing a yellow belt and white gi, and Tommy was
wearing a blue gi. DH was seeing this image from a viewpoint closer to his feet
(in the image). He was seeing the right side of his body and the left side of
Tommy’s.
Here is a visual image that may have significance for understanding the visual
experience of left-handed individuals:
Sample 3.1. DH had been irritated because he needed to use the bathroom and his
sister, Olivia, was occupying it, brushing her teeth. At the moment, he was
thinking its taking her so long without words, images, or any symbolic
representation. He was also hearing Olivia brushing her teeth. He was also
innerly seeing Olivia’s reflection in the mirror brushing her teeth. This was an
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illustration of what he was hearing. He was seeing Olivia as if she were bent over
and her face near the mirror. He was seeing Olivia with pimples, greasy hair, and
a grey shirt brushing her teeth. He was seeing more of the right side of her face.
He was only seeing Olivia’s reflection, however (not her face and body that were
being reflected). The thought was more salient in his experience (an estimated
60:40).
In this experience, he innerly saw Olivia’s reflection, not Olivia herself. Although it is
unknown why he would do that, it is worth noting that seeing the reflection reverses
Olivia’s seen handedness.
Unsymbolized Thinking
Unsymbolized thinking occurred in seven of DH’s samples (29%). Six of his
unsymbolized thinking samples were straightforward. Two examples have already been
described in detail in Inner Seeing section above. In sample 2.4, DH was thinking how
sad without words, images, or any other symbolic representation. In sample 3.1, DH had
been waiting for his sister to finish brushing her teeth so that he could use the bathroom.
At the moment, the thought its taking her so long was present without words, images, or
any symbolic representation. Here are other examples:
Sample 2.1. DH was watching TV. He was paying attention to the appearance of
a woman’s hair on the screen (“it had a weird design on it”). He was also
thinking that her hair was odd. This was a thought process that did not involve
words, or comparisons, or any other symbolic representation. At the moment of
the sample, he was both seeing the oddness of the woman’s hair and thinking that
her hair is odd.
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Sample 2.5. DH was feeling the edge of his ipod headphones, tracing them to
find the end. At the moment of the sample, he was wondering where is the end of
it, this thought was present without words, images, or any other symbolic
representation. He was also feeling the wires though the thought was more salient
in his experience (an estimated 70:30).
Sample 5.1. He had been looking for a can of soda and eliminating places of
where it could be. At the moment of the sample, DH was wondering where his
soda could be. This was a thought process that did not involve images, words, or
any symbolic representation. The soda itself or the places it could be were not in
his experience at the moment. He had a pill in his mouth and was experiencing a
light weight on the middle of his tongue. He was also physically looking for the
soda; however, this was not in his experience at the moment.
One of DH’s examples involved a lingering thought. In sample 4.4, described in
detail in Inner Seeing section above, DH had innerly said “My dad has the same exact
watch but nicer” prior to the sample. At the moment of the sample, the words were no
longer present; however, the idea was still in DH’s experience.
Inner Speech
Inner speech occurred in 7 DH’s 24 samples (29%). All of DH’s inner speech
samples consisted of his own voice. Here is an example:
Sample 5.3. DH had been looking at a five-point star he had drawn in his notes
earlier indicating that the section in his notes was important. At the moment, DH
was seeing the five-point star. He was also saying, “H e Flare” (as in helium
flare). Before the moment of the sample, he had been repeating the words “H e
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Flare.” At the moment of the moment of the sample, he was saying one unit of
the “H e Flare” repetitions. He was attending more to the sound of the words.
What the words refer to was not in his experience at the moment. That is, the star
had indicated that this was important, and he was repetitively saying the words
over and over. But he was not thinking about or attending to what the words
meant. It was as if the repetition of the word sounds was all that was ongoing.
In this sample, DH was attending to the sound of the innerly spoken words and not the
meanings.
Three of DH’s inner speakings involved an emotional or emphatic tone. One
example has already been discussed in detail in Inner Seeing section above. In sample
5.6, DH was innerly saying, “You’re nuts” in an irritated, comical way. Here is another
example:
Sample 3.2. He had been doing homework simulations on the computer. He had
been trying to make a rat press a lever by shocking him. At the moment, he was
innerly saying, “Why aren’t you!?!?” DH was saying this in a powerful, almost
yelling, tone which represented his frustration though he was not experiencing
frustration at the moment. This inner speech conveyed DH’s wondering about
why the rat was not moving to the right. DH was also noticing the rat was facing
the wrong direction on the screen, the rat was facing the left and the lever was to
the right. DH was frustrated, and his inner speech conveyed frustration, but he
did not experience frustration at the moment.
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In two samples, DH was innerly speaking; however, he did not seem to be the
agent of his inner speaking. Here is an example:
Sample 4.3. DH had been writing his experience in sample 4.2 in his notebook.
At the moment, he was innerly seeing the same image as he was seeing in sample
4.2. Most of his attention was focusing on himself having the image, a cognitive
process or an examination of the extent to which he had been experiencing the
image at the moment of sample 4.2. At the moment, he was innerly saying “50
vision,” meaning that 50% of his attention had been aimed at the image. The
inner speaking was happening automatically. That is, he had little or no
experience of the creation of the speaking, although he had experience of the
speaking itself. .
Not Semantic Words
In four of DH’s samples (17%), words were present but he was not attending to
the words for their meaning. These examples have already been described above. In
sample 3.3, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above, DH was seeing an
array of bold and unbolded words on the computer screen. DH was not attending to the
words for their meaning, rather he was attending to them for their visual characteristics.
In sample 3.4, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above, DH was noticing
the brightness of a red stop light and was not paying attention to the meaning of the stop
light. In sample 5.2, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above, DH was
writing the words white dwarf. DH was attending to the visual characteristics of the
words and not the meaning of the words. In sample 5.3, described in detail in Inner
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Speech section above, DH was innerly saying “He Flare.” He was attending more to the
sound of the words than their meaning.
Multiple Experience
Four of DH’s samples involved multiple experience (17%). In these samples, DH
was experiencing separate and unrelated stimuli simultaneously. For example, in sample
5.1 described in detail in Unsymbolized Thinking section above, DH had been thinking
about where his soda could be. Simultaneously and unrelated to the thought, DH was
also feeling a pill on his tongue.
Emotion
In three of DH’s samples, there was an ongoing emotion (13%) but DH was not
directly experience the feeling. These examples have already been described above. In
sample 2.4, described in detail in Inner Seeing sample above, DH was thinking how sad;
however, he was not experiencing sadness at the moment. In sample 3.2, described in
detail in Inner Speech section above, DH was innerly saying “Why aren’t you!?!?” in a
powerful tone representing his frustration, though he was not experiencing frustration at
the moment. In sample 5.6, described in detail in Inner Seeing section above, DH was
innerly saying “You’re nuts” in an irritated and comical way though he was not feeling
irritated at the moment.
Feeling
DH’s inner experience rarely involved feeling, only one of his samples involved
the direct experience of an emotion (4%):
Sample 4.2. DH had been watching the World Series baseball game. At the
moment, he was innerly seeing the pitcher from the chest up, seeing the right side
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of the pitcher’s torso and face. Mostly DH was seeing the pitcher’s eyes, they
were bright blue and watery (as if he was going to cry). This inner seeing was an
accurate re-seeing of what had appeared perhaps five minutes earlier on TV,
except that the inner seeing was a still screen shot (as if it were one frame from
the original viewing). DH was also innerly saying, “that sucks.” This was in his
own voice and said with a drawn-out empathic tone. DH was also feeling
empathy for the pitcher. This was mostly experienced mentally and (perhaps)
partially experienced as a pulling-downward in his face.
Three other samples might be marginally considered feelings by a broad
definition of that term. In sample 3.3, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section
above, DH was experiencing gratification or mental relief, an absence of a compulsion he
had been experiencing prior to the beep. Whether one should call the lack of something
that had previously been ongoing an experience is questionable; if so, then sample 3.3
might be called a feeling. Here is another example:
Sample 4.1. DH was driving home. He had just picked up food and was singing
his own “private remix” of a Blink 182 song. That is, he was adding and
changing words to the song. At the moment, he was singing, “I can’t wait ‘til I
get home.” He was singing the song from Blink 182’s perspective. DH was
singing the song as if transported into the Blink 182 persona. He was also
experiencing anticipation to get home. This was a mental anticipation or
“compulsion” to get home, DH would not feel peace until he ate. That is, it was
as if the need/want to eat imposed itself actively on DH; that is, the urge to eat
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was a being-done-to experience, not an active experience. The singing was more
salient in his experience (an estimated 70:30).
If mental anticipation or “compulsion” to get home is considered an emotion, then sample
4.1 is a feeling. Here is the other example:
Sample 4.5. He had read something funny on Facebook. At the moment, he was
having a reaction to a statement, a reaction that the statement was ridiculous,
which, if put into words, would be something like Nah! or No way! or Yeah, right!
This was a mental, automatic reaction to the statement that seemed to come to
him, rather than being created by him. That is, DH understood this reaction as
being much more similar to the I have to eat compulsion of sample 4.1
aforementioned than to the my father’s watch is nicer thinking of sample 4.4
(described in detail in Inner Seeing section above), and he understood the
similarity to 4.1 as that the reaction was experienced as being done to him rather
than his creating the reaction. DH was also smiling, though that was not in his
experience at the moment.
If noticing ridiculousness can be considered an emotion, then sample 4.5 can be
considered a feeling.
Infrequently Occurring Characteristics
Doing of.
In three of his samples, DH was engaged in the completion of an activity (13%).
In sample 2.6, described in detail Sensory Awareness section above, DH was feeling the
strings of his guitar to make sure his hand was in the right position. In sample 4.1,
described in detail in Feeling section above, DH was singing a song from the perspective
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of the band who sings the song. In sample 5.2, described in detail in Sensory Awareness
section above, DH was visually monitoring the appearance of the words he was writing.
Happening of.
In two of his samples, DH had little or no experience of the creation of an
activity—that is, the activity was just happening (8%). In sample 4.3, described in detail
in Unsymbolized Thinking section above, DH was innerly saying “50 vision”; however,
he had little or no experience of the creation of the inner speaking. In sample 5.2,
described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above, DH was writing the words white
dwarf. He was attending to the visual presentation of the words and not the writing—that
is, the writing was automatically happening.
Anticipation.
One of DH’s samples involved an anticipatory state (4%). In sample 4.1,
described in detail in Feeling section above, DH was experiencing a mental anticipation
to get home.
Inner hearing.
One of DH’s samples involved inner hearing (4%). In this sample, DH was
innerly hearing a song:
Sample 4.6. DH had been looking at a picture of Mario Brothers’ characters on
his computer screen with a solicitation to add a caption to the picture. At the
moment, he was innerly hearing the Jaws theme song, which was seeming to him
as being a good caption. He was also seeing the picture on the screen. The inner
hearing was most salient in his experience (an estimated 60:40).
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Noteworthy Characteristics
Words.
DH had seven inner speakings, which are quite similar to the inner speakings of
right-handed people. In one sample, DH had an inner speaking that was outside of his
experience—that is, the inner speaking was just happening. DH did experience inner
hearing in one sample. In this sample, he was innerly hearing a song (the theme song to
Jaws). Three of DH’s sensory awareness samples involved the sensory awareness of
words. In these samples, words were present; however, DH was attending to them for
their auditory of visual characteristics and not for their meaning.
Discussion
Overall DH seemed to be a motivated DES participant. He was interested in the
process of exploring inner experience as well as his inner experience. DH frequently
experienced sensory awareness, inner seeing, unsymbolized thinking, and inner speech.
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CHAPTER 9
“NT”
NT was a 28-year-old Biracial (Caucasian/Asian) male who sampled with us in
January and February 2011. NT received a laterality quotient of -68 on the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971) indicating he is left-handed. He received a
GSI raw score of 0.19 (a T-score, compared to nonpatients, of 50) on the Symptom
Checklist-90-R (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973),
suggesting the absence of clinically significant psychological difficulties.
Characteristics of Inner Experience
NT sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total of 27 samples. Because
Sampling Day 1 is considered training for the participants, 23 of NT’s samples counts his
inner experience characteristics. The following characteristics will be discussed: sensory
awareness, occurring in 16 samples (70%); not semantic words, occurring in 10 samples
(43%); multiple experience, occurring in 10 samples (43%); doing of, occurring in 8
samples (35%); unsymbolized thinking, occurring in 3 samples (13%); emotion,
occurring in 2 samples (9%); anticipation, occurring in 2 samples (9%); inner seeing,
occurring in 2 samples (9%); feeling, occurring in 1 sample (4%); and noteworthy
characteristics.
Sensory Awareness
Sensory awareness occurred in 16 of NT’s samples (70%), which suggests that
sensory awareness is highly characteristic of NT’s inner experience. Here are typical
examples of sensory awareness:
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Sample 3.1. NT was sitting in the passenger seat of a car while his girlfriend was
driving. At the moment, he was seeing a dull silver color (which happened to be a
sign), a white color (which happened to be the post the sign was connected to),
and black etchings (he was experiencing the etchiness of it, not the etchings
themselves) within the metal square (which happened to be letters). NT was not
attending to the signness, postness, wordness, or letterness. All that was in his
experience was the silverness, whiteness, and blackness of the etchings. This was
a weak experience in that NT was passively or idly involved in the apprehension
of the colors, and they did not grab him as energetically as sample 3.4 below.
Sample 3.4. NT was looking at a pastry. At the moment, he was seeing white,
brown, yellow, which happened to be a pastry of several pastries, but he was not
aware of the pastryness at the moment. And he was seeing dark circles that
happened to be chocolate chips on one of the pastries, but he was not aware of the
chocolate-chipness at the moment. All that was in his experience was the
whiteness, brownness, yellowness, and dark circleness.
Here is a less typical example:
Sample 2.2. NT was flipping through a book. As he flipped, his eyes came to
rest on a diagram with cross-hatchings. At the moment, the many cross-hatchings
were central in NT’s experience. He was not attending to them as part of the
diagram or for their meaning, but he was attending to them for their visual
aspect—in fact, he did not know what the diagram was about. He was also seeing
the pages that surrounded the diagram, seeing an array of opened pages as he
flipped them. In retrospect, he said that the pages looked sort of like the petals of
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a flower (although the flowerness was not in his experience at the moment).
Thus, it was as if he was experiencing cross-hatchings with something around
them (paper).
This sample is an unusual sensory awareness in that NT was also aware of the area
surrounding the focus of his attention (the opened pages surrounding the cross-hatchings)
despite their being irrelevant to the cross-hatchings. Here is another unusual example:
Sample 3.6. NT was in class and his professor was talking about the downregulation of drugs. At the moment, NT was innerly seeing a double ring circle
that was his representation of the down-regulation of a cell. The outer ring was
pink and the inner circle was white. NT was also seeing “suckers,” by which he
meant things that looked like the suction cups on an octopus tentacle, popping
into the outer ring. NT was seeing only a slice of the cell. NT was attending to
the colorness and shapeness of the cell more than the suckerness of it. NT was
writing notes and experienced a low level recognition of the act of writing, and no
experience whatever of the words he was writing. There was nothing else in his
experience, including no experience of the instructor, who was speaking (even
though he was processing her meaning as evidenced by the taking of notes and the
creation of a parallel inner seeing).
In this sample, NT was attending to the sensory stimuli (the colorness and shapeness) of
an innerly seen image.
Five of NT’s sensory awareness samples featured the sensory awareness of words.
Two of these samples involved the sensory awareness of a written word. Here is an
example:
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Sample 4.3. NT had been idly looking at a phrase handwritten in his notepad. At
the moment, his eyes were directed at the word “collecting.” Something about the
word “collecting” had drawn NT’s attention. The word was mentally present in
his head, however, the meaning of the word or the words that came before it were
not in NT’s experience. It was as if his experience consisted of word, word,
word, collecting (beep). He was not apprehending the meaning of the word.
In this sample, the word “collecting” was present in NT’s experience, however, he was
not attending to the meaning of the word, rather he was drawn to the word for other
reasons, though that was not in his experience at the moment. Here is the other example:
Sample 5.1. NT had been reading a text book. He had looked away to see who
was talking, and now had returned his gaze to the textbook. At the moment, his
eyes were directed at the textbook and he was seeing fuzzy black shapes against a
white background. The fuzzy black shapes were letters in the text book, however,
he was not recognizing them as letters.
In this sample, although NT had been reading and was currently seeing the words on the
page, he was not recognizing the letters he was seeing as words, rather he was attending
to the letters for their sensory qualities (their appearance against the whiteness of the
page). NT’s other sensory awareness of words samples involved attending to the
auditory characteristics rather than the meaning of spoken words. Here are examples:
Sample 3.5. NT was in class attending to a classmate named Ellen. NT was
listening to Ellen talk about drinking and driving and seeing her arm movements.
The object of NT’s experience seemed to be Ellen as a person, not merely her talk
or her arm movements. That is, NT heard Ellen talk from the perspective of
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recognizing that that is how Ellen always talks; and he was seeing her gesticulate
from the perspective of recognizing that Ellen always gesticulates like that.
Sample 4.6. NT was in class and attending to his professor, Dr. Simon. NT was
taking in the way Dr. Simon was speaking, somehow recognizing the Simon-ness
of her talking. NT was also experiencing anticipation or some sense of where the
discussion was heading. The actual topic was not in his experience, just the
expectation of the topic.
Not Semantic Words
NT had a unique presentation of words in his inner experience. In fact, words
were present very little in his experience and, when they were, NT did not experience the
words for their meaning regardless of their presentation. Ten of NT’s samples of inner
experience involved this phenomenon (43%). In these samples, words were somehow
present, either written, heard, read, or thought; however, the words themselves or the
meaning of the words were not in NT’s experience.
Three examples of not semantic words have already been described in detail in
Sensory Awareness section above. For example, in sample 3.1, NT was attending to the
sensory aspect of a sign. A sign is designed, constructed, and installed specifically to
convey words—everything about a sign is aimed at Read these words. Even though his
eyes were aimed at the sign, the words did not penetrate NT’s experience. Similarly, in
sample 2.2, NT was attending to the sensory characteristics of a diagram in a book. A
book is designed, constructed, and printed specifically to convey words—the main thrust
of a book is aimed at Read these words. But even though his eyes were aimed at the
book, the words did not penetrate his experience. This example is slightly weaker
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because books do contain pictures rather than merely words. But even those pictures are
designed for semantic purposes, and he sees them for their sensory purposes. In sample
3.6, NT was innerly seeing a double ring circle, a representation of the down-regulation
of drugs his professor was talking about at the moment. However, NT was not attending
to the double ring circle for its representation or meaning, he was attending to the sensory
characteristics. Even though the innerly seen image was a representation of what he was
hearing his professor talk about (down-regulation of drugs), the down-regulation of drugs
was not in his experience. Rather, NT was only attending to the sensory aspects of the
image.
Here is an example of reading:
Sample 5.5. NT had been reading an article about the quality of life outcomes in
children with Autism. NT had just read the phrase “academic achievement.” At
the moment, the notion of academic achievement and how NT could place the
concept of academic achievement into a paper he will be writing was present in
his awareness. This was a thought present without any form of symbolic
representation. NT was unable to determine whether the words “academic
achievement” were present in his experience or whether it was just the concept.
NT’s eyes were still directed at the words in the article (and probably continued to
track along as if he were reading); however, he was not comprehending the
reading. Furthermore, someone (perhaps the professor—he was in class) was
talking, but he was not hearing this at all.
Although NT was reading, he was not aware of the words or the meaning of the words he
was reading.
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Here is another example:
Sample 2.3. NT had been deciding between the phrases “it appears” or
“sometimes” to use in the e-mail he was writing. At the moment, he was waiting
for the cognition to happen, at which time the chosen word would come out of his
fingers. There was nothing in his experience—he was waiting for the choice to be
made so that he could continue typing.
In this sample, NT was trying to decide on choice of words. The words themselves,
however, were not in his experience at the moment.
Multiple Experience
Ten of NT’s inner experience samples feature multiple experiences (43%). The
most frequently occurring combination of multiple experience in NT’s samples included
sensory awareness with other sensory awareness (three times). Here is an example:
Sample 4.4. NT was at Starbucks chewing a pastry. At the moment, he was
experiencing the sweetness and chewyness of the pastry. He was also looking at
jars of brown caramel. In his experience was the brownness in the jars. He was
not attending to the bottleness or caramelness of the bottles—in fact, he did not
see the shapes of the individual jars. NT was also thinking about the vivid
sensory awarenesses in the inner experience of schizophrenics [referring to a
conversation he had had earlier]. This was a thought without any symbolic
representation.
In this sample, NT was experiencing multiple and separate experiences, including the
sweetness and chewyness of a pastry (sensory awareness), the brownness of the jars
(sensory awareness), and thinking about the sensory awarenesses in the inner experience
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of schizophrenics (unsymbolized thinking that happens to be about sensory awareness).
Here is another example of multiple experience:
Sample 5.2. NT was looking at a display of brown pastries. In his experience, he
was seeing “golden pockets” or splashes of goldness (approximately 10-20). NT
was seeing the golden-brown color of the pastries. He was not interested in the
pastryness or the shape of the bagels, scones, muffins, croissants, etc. he was
looking at, all that was in his experience was their golden-brownness. All the
splashes of color seemed the same. Simultaneously, NT was also idly thinking of
a cheese bagel. This thought was presented without words, images, or any other
symbolic representation.
Other combinations of multiple experience include sensory awareness and
doing of (twice); sensory awareness, doing of, and emotion (twice); sensory awareness
and unsymbolized thinking (twice); sensory awareness and emotion (once); inner seeing
and doing of (once); and not semantic and doing of (once).
Doing Of
Eight samples in NT’s inner experience involved intentional doing (35%). In
these samples, NT was actively involved in the doing of some action. The action was not
automatically happening. NT was experientially invested and directing the activity. Here
are examples:
Sample 5.3. NT had been typing on the computer, sent a document to be printed,
and was walking towards the printer. At the moment, he was experiencing the
movement towards, (and that towardsness was towards the printer but the aim of
the towardsness, the printer, was not in his experience at the moment). NT was
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not experiencing the movement as a bodily sensation, however the movement was
present mentally. NT was also experiencing a sense of drive and forwardness.
This was experienced as both a mental and bodily purpose. This was separate but
related to the experience of movement towards something. NT was also seeing a
purpleness and (less intently) silverness (which happened to be a stapler but that
was not in his experience).
Sample 3.3. NT and his girlfriend had just finished laughing. At the moment, NT
was looking down and seeing a jumble of light crooked angles against a dark
background. The angles happened to be steps but the stepness was not in NT’s
experience at the moment. NT was also experiencing an uplifiting or light feeling
that was left over from the previous laughter. NT also had some experience of
being in motion—that is, he was not simply moving.
Sample 2.6. NT was in his car with the door open about to get out. At the
moment, he was prepared to slap the door frame with his right hand. [His car
typically gives him an electrostatic shock when getting out, so he has acquired the
behavior of slapping the car so that the shock doesn’t sting or surprise him.]
One of NT’s doing of samples involved the act of writing. This example has
already been discussed in detail in Sensory Awareness section above. In sample 3.6, NT
was taking notes; however, he was only slightly aware of the act of writing but not at all
aware of the words he was writing or the words his professor was saying.
Unsymbolized Thinking
There were three samples that perhaps should be counted as being unsymbolized
thinking (13%). One sample of Unsymbolized Thinking has already been described in
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detail in Not Semantic Words section above. In sample 5.5, NT had been reading and the
notion of academic achievement was present in his experience without symbolic
representation. In this sample, there was some kind of “notion” present to him about how
academic achievement might fit into his paper. This notion did not involve words or
other symbols, and from that perspective might be said to be unsymbolized. However,
the unsymbolized thinking concept typically involves a more specific, differentiated
thought.
The other two samples that might be considered unsymbolized thinking were
similarly nonspecific. Sample 5.2 (described in detail in the Multiple Experience section)
involved “idly thinking about a bagel” without any form of symbolic representation in his
inner experience. However, typical unsymbolized thinking is more specific (what about
the bagel was being thought?). Similarly, at sample 4.4 (described in detail in the
Multiple Experience section) NT was thinking about the vivid sensory awarenesses in the
inner experience of schizophrenics, but there was no about-what in that thinking.
Thus, all three of these perhaps-unsymbolized-thinking seemed more like notwell-differentiated thinking than the more usual unsymbolized thinking of other DES
participants, which is typically as differentiated as, for example, inner speech.
Additionally, two or maybe three of these samples also involved multiple experience
including an unsymbolized thought and a sensory awareness (in sample 4.4), while,
simultaneously, attending to the sensory aspects of jars of brown caramel (the
brownness); in sample 5.2, NT was thinking of a cheese bagel while, simultaneously,
attending to the sensory aspects of a display of pastries (the golden brown color). It is
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concluded that to the extent that NT experience unsymbolized thinking, it was off of the
center of the target.
Emotion
NT’s samples had very little direct experience of a feeling (the direct experience
of emotion). There were two samples that, depending on how one understands things,
might be said to involve emotion (9%). Here are the samples:
Sample 4.5. NT was walking along a cross-walk. Before the sample, NT had
been thinking of a Bipolar participant, Suzy, in his research study who had
completed the research battery in 8 hours even though most people typically
complete the battery in 4/5 hours. NT had been thinking about how Suzy’s friend
will also participate in his study and how she is probably expecting to complete
the battery in 8 hours as well. NT was also thinking that his research project
involves such long batteries. At the moment, NT experienced a lingering negative
valence from the previous thought regarding the 8 hour research project battery.
He was also attending to the stripey whiteness of the cross-walk. He was drawn
to the whiteness of the lines. He was also attending to the cross-walkness of the
white stripes, indicating that it is a cross-walk. The negative valence, stripey
whiteness, and cross-walkness were all equal in his experience. NT was also
experiencing a motion of forwardness, however, this was less so in his
experience.
The “negative valence” in this example might be considered a feeling, but it has none of
the specificity that is often associated with DES reports of feeling.
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The second of NT’s samples that might be said to include emotion was sample
3.3, discussed in Doing Of section above, NT was experiencing an uplifting or light
feeling that had been left over from his laughing with his girlfriend prior to the moment
of the sample. However, it was not clear whether at the moment of this sample this was a
bodily uplifted/lightness (in which case DES would consider it a sensory awareness).
That is, the laughing might, a bit before the sample, have involved feeling, but the
experience of the feeling was now gone, and what remained was a bodily lightness.
Anticipation
Two of NT’s samples involved an anticipatory state (9%). In these samples, NT
was experiencing an anticipation of something about to happen. One example, sample
4.6, has already been described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above. NT was
hearing his professor speaking and anticipating something to come; however, whatever
that something was not in his experience at the moment of the sample. Here is the other
example:
Sample 4.1. NT had been leaving a message on Amy’s, his girlfriend, voicemail.
Before the moment of the sample, NT had said the word “maybe.” At the
moment, NT was experiencing a mental sensation of something about to happen.
It was as if his mind paused, waiting for the thoughts backed up in his mind to
move forward, and he was somehow experiencing the imminence of the
continuation of the sentence. He was also slightly experiencing the dark ground
in front of him, that is, the groundness was in his experience in an undifferentiated
way.

134

In this sample, NT was anticipating the rest of the sentence; however, whatever the rest
of the sentence was not in his awareness at the moment of the sample.
Inner Seeing
Inner seeing occurred twice in NT’s inner experience (9%). One of NT’s inner
seeing samples (sample 3.6 described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above)
involved the inner seeing of something that was related to external stimuli. In this
sample, NT was innerly seeing a double ring circle that was a representation of what his
professor was talking about at the moment (down-regulation).
NT’s other inner seeing sample was relevant to or a representation of an ongoing
thought he was having. Additionally, this inner seeing sample was a mental recreation of
something that NT had actually seen in the physical world. Here is the example:
Sample 2.5. NT had been wondering if he will still be in shape in seven years
when he turns 35. NT had then thought of his friend, Mike, who was 35 and in
shape. He had thought about the last time he saw Mike at a bar eating a pizza and
had wondered how he could eat a pizza and still be skinny. At the moment, NT
was innerly seeing a whole, round pizza sitting on a dark bar with a brown
wooden counter. He was also seeing the elevated portion of what was a stage.
The bar was wide with wide angles. There was nothing else and no one in the
bar. This was a recreation of something that had happened. NT was innerly
seeing this as he had seen it when it really happened except that the innerly seen
scene was simplified—it had no people at the bar, no people on the stage, and he
did not have a sense of being there at the moment—that is, his experience was of
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seeing a scene, not of being in the scene. The seeing was in color; however, NT
was not particularly attending to the colors.
Feeling
NT did not have any clear examples of feeling. In one sample, NT was
experience pressure (4%). Here is the example:
Sample 2.4. NT had been playing the game Star Craft 2 on the computer. At the
moment, he was experiencing the yellowness of the enemy base and the greenness
of some circles (a mass unit that he recognized to be his army). He was drawn to
the yellowness of the screen. This was the most central aspect of his experience.
He was also experiencing something like pressure—wanting to kill before he was
killed in the game, but this pressure was difficult to describe. He was also hearing
the sounds of the game. The hearing was the least salient aspect of his
experience.
The “pressure” in this sample might, in an extremely loose understanding of “feeling,” be
considered a feeling. Thus, NT had no clear-cut feelings (see Emotion section above),
and one sample that might be considered to be feeling if that term is given a broad or
loose definition.
Discussion
Overall, NT’s samples of inner experience suggest that he experiences sensory
awareness much of the time; also frequent were not semantic word experiences, multiple
experience, and doing of. Words were present only rarely in NT’s inner experience, and
his overall experience with words was unusual. NT did not have any samples of inner

136

speech, typically the most frequent form of words in experience. NT had two samples of
emotions; both involved the lingering of a previously triggered feeling.
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CHAPTER 10
“MM”
MM was an 18-year-old Ethiopian female who sampled with us throughout
October 2010. She received a laterality quotient of -67 on the EHI (EHI; Oldfield, 1971)
indicating that she is left-handed. MM received a Symptom Checklist-90-R GSI (SCL90-R; Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973) raw score of 1.53, which
converts to a T-score compared to adolescent nonpatients of 61, suggesting the lack of
clinically significant psychological distress. MM’s GSI score was higher than any of our
other subjects, necessitating the use of the adolescent nonpatient norms.
Characteristics of Inner Experience
MM sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total of 27 samples.
Because Sampling Day 1 is considered training for participants, samples from this day
are omitted. Additionally, because MM was sleeping during two of her samples on
Sampling Day 4 (samples 4.1 and 4.2) and chose to skip one (sample 4.5), those samples
are omitted as well. Thus 20 of MM’s samples will be considered as reflecting her inner
experience characteristics. The following aspects of her inner experience will be
discussed: sensory awareness, occurring in 12 samples (60%); unsymbolized thinking,
occurring in 7 samples (35%); not semantic words, occurring in 5 samples (25%); doing
of, occurring in 3 samples (15%); emotion, occurring in 3 samples (15%); infrequently
occurring characteristics; and noteworthy characteristics.
Sensory Awareness
Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring characteristic in MM’s
inner experience, occurring in 12 of her 20 samples (60%). Here are examples:
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Sample 2.2. MM had been looking at her index finger to see whether or not it is
clean. At the moment of the sample, she was seeing that her fingernail is slanted.
She was also experiencing a thoughtful recognition of the slantedness of the nail.
The thought hmm, slanted was present in her experience without words or images.
This is a parallel, but separate, thought present in her experience. All that is in
MM’s experience at the moment of the sample is seeing the slantedness of the
fingernail and recognizing that the fingernail is slanted.
Sample 5.6. MM’s Psychology instructor had been talking about a research
finding in which 76% of college males consented to bring a female back to their
room to have sex if asked. At the moment of the sample, MM was paying
attention to the laughter in the room. She was noticing the whole class laughing
(including herself). She was not, in her experience, differentiating between her
own laughter and the rest of the class’s laughter, rather she was experiencing the
class laughter as one. She was also seeing the back of the head of a male student
sitting in front of her.
Four of MM’s samples involved the sensory awareness of words or numbers.
Here is an example:
Sample 3.2. MM had been studying for her Psychology course and because of an
interruption and short conversation with her roommate, she had lost track of
where she was in the book. At the moment of the sample, MM’s searching for a
particular word (she could not remember the word during the interview but there
was a specific word involved) was in her experience. MM was seeing all the
words on the page. She was not seeing the sentences or meaning of the words, in
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her experience she was just seeing a bunch of disconnected words which were not
noticed for their meaning or for their contextual significance, but instead were just
a display of words. MM was searching for the particular word where she had left
off (and when she found it she would resume reading). She was not searching for
the meaning of the word or for the general content or topic where she had left off,
she was just looking for the word.
In this sample, MM was seeing words on a page but not attending to their meaning.
Instead, MM was attending to the display or appearance of the words. Here is another
example:
Sample 3.1. MM had been studying for her Psychology course. At the moment,
she was writing the word pseudo-forgetting. In her experience, she was
“watching the flow” of pseudo-forgetting, that is—she was engaged in the way
pseudo-forgetting was unfolding and being revealed on the page. This was a
visual watching of pseudo-forgetting appearing on the page. This experience was
not in any way about the meaning of pseudo-forgetting, or even the wordness of
pseudo-forgetting; it is about the way this visual thing pseudo-forgetting (which
happens to be a word) unfolds itself on the page.
In this sample, MM was seeing the words unfold on the page. She was not attending to
the words for their meaning, rather she was attending to the visual characteristics of the
words. Additionally, MM was experiencing herself as more of an observer of the
creation of the words rather than being the creator. Here is another example of the
sensory awareness of words/numbers:
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Sample 5.4. MM was walking through the dorms hallways slowly, on her way to
class. At the moment of the sample, MM was seeing a sign with numbers on a
door to her left. MM was drawn to the yellowness of the numbers and not the
meaning of the numbers. All that was in her experience was the yellowness of the
numbers.
In this sample, MM was attending to the yellowness of the numbers rather than the
numerical value or meaning of the numbers.
One of her samples involved the spreading of pain:
Sample 4.6. MM had just finished taking a shower. At the moment of the
sample, she was experiencing stomach pain. This felt as if a needle was poking
her in the stomach. She experienced the pain as oscillating. She was feeling the
pain in her stomach but the discomfort spreading throughout the trunk of her body
but not in her extremities.
In this sample, the sensory awareness was experienced as spreading throughout the trunk
of her body.
In one of her samples, MM was experiencing sensory awareness in a unique way:
Sample 4.4. MM was clicking buttons on her phone with her right thumb. At the
moment of the sample, her phone was vibrating. MM was experiencing the
feeling of the vibration on her right thumb. She was also hearing the vibration
through her thumb. It was as if she could hear the vibration through her thumb,
she was not hearing the vibration through her ears. Apparently MM was
repeatedly clicking the buttons so that she could feel/hear the vibration. MM was
also hearing a reggae song her friend, Barbara, was playing. MM also heard her
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roommate Katie saying, “Dude, I just learned ChapStick shouldn’t go in the
laundry.” The hearing and feeling of the vibration was the most salient in her
experience (an estimated 60/20/20).
MM was experiencing the vibration as being heard through the sensation of the vibration
on her thumb.
Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring phenomenon in MM’s
experience. The majority of her samples were typical sensory awareness examples. Four
of her samples involved the sensory awareness of words or numbers.
Unsymbolized Thinking
Unsymbolized thinking was the next most frequently occurring characteristic in
MM’s inner experience, occurring in seven of her samples (35%). Here is an example:
Sample 5.5. MM’s Psychology course instructor had been talking about how men
think about sex more frequently than women, but women suppress their thoughts
about sex because it is not socially acceptable. MM had read about this the night
before in her psychology book. At the moment of the sample, MM was listening
to the instructor and realized she had heard this before. This was a thought
without words, images, or any other symbolic representation.
Four of her unsymbolized thinking samples involved a thought about a stimulus.
Here are examples:
Sample 2.1. MM’s lights were off and she was trying to find her RebelCard. She
had been trying to distinguish between her RebelCard and Marlok card through
their textures. She expected the RebelCard would be more smooth and the
Marlok card would be more rough. At the moment of the sample, she was feeling
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the two cards at the same time with her left hand. She was feeling the smoothness
of both cards on her fingers. MM was also experiencing a thought process related
to but separate from the feeling of the cards. MM was thinking something along
the lines of What the hell, is this the Marlok card or the RebelCard? This notion
was present in MM’s experience without words, images, or any symbolic
representation.
Sample 2.5. MM had just completed entering a text message and was watching
her phone to see if it sent. At the moment of the sample, she was seeing the blue
dots moving on the screen indicating the text message is sending. MM was also
thinking don’t say message failed!! This was an intense thought present without
words, images, or any symbolic representation.
Sample 5.2. MM had been getting ready to go to class and wanted to change her
clothes in the bathroom but the bathroom was occupied. MM had grabbed her
clothes and was trying to find another place to change in privacy (so her
roommate and friend would not see her). At the moment of the sample, MM was
holding her clothes and looking towards her right at an area she could change. In
her experience, she was seeing the area where she might go and deciding if that is
a good place to change. This was a thought that did not involve words, images, or
any other symbolic representation.
Unsymbolized thinking was the second most frequently occurring phenomenon in
MM’s inner experience, occurring in 7 of her 20 samples. Four of these samples
involved some thought about an external stimulus.
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Not Semantic Words
In 5 of MM’s 20 samples (25%), words were present; however, MM was not
attending to the words for their meaning. Three examples have already been described in
detail in Sensory Awareness section above. In sample 3.1, MM was writing the word
pseudo-forgetting and rather than attending to the semantic meaning of the word, she was
“watching the flow” or unfolding of the word on the page. In sample 3.2, MM was
seeing a display of words on a page. She was not, however, attending to their meanings.
In sample 5.4, MM was attending to the yellowness of the numbers on a sign. The value
or meaning of the numbers were not in her experience. Here is another example:
Sample 3.3. MM was changing clothes in the bathroom and a song was playing
on the stereo in a room on the other side of the bathroom. At the moment of the
sample, MM was trying to remember what song it was. She was hearing the
melody of the song. The song had words but the words were not in MM’s
experience (as if she had actively stripped the words away leaving only the
melody, which is how she remembers songs). All she was attending to was the
melody. MM was searching her memory for the melody of that particular song,
as if many known melodies were “stored in her memory banks” and she would
eventually discover the one that matched the actually heard melody. This was not
a one-by-one search, but rather somehow a waiting for the memory to produce a
melody that matched the melody currently being heard.
In this sample, MM was hearing the melody of a song. Although the heard song did, in
fact, have words to it, MM was only attending to the melody of the song. Here is the
other example:
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Sample 2.3. MM was typing a colon and parenthesis (to make a smiley face) on
her phone. This was an automatic, bodily action with little experience.
In this sample, the meaning of the combination of the colon and parenthesis was not in
MM’s experience.
In these samples, words were present in various ways; however, in MM’s
experience, the words were ignored or stripped of their meaning.
Doing Of
In 3 of her 20 samples (15%), MM was involved in effortfully completing an
activity. Here is an example:
Sample 2.4. MM had been studying in the study room and three people entered
the room. The male had started to talk about animals and MM was trying not to
eavesdrop. At the moment, MM was instructing herself not to listen to him or pay
attention to his words. MM was actively involved in the ignoring of what he was
saying. The experience was of actively screening out the conversation, not of (for
example) trying to pay attention to something else.
In this sample, MM was concentrating on the blocking out of the conversation happening
in her company. Rather than focusing her attention elsewhere (i.e., her study material),
MM was actively involved in the blocking out of the conversation. Here are other
examples of actively doing:
Sample 2.6. MM had her head down in her biology book and was trying to take a
five minute nap. In her experience, she was actively involved in the task of
falling asleep. She was effortfully trying to fall asleep.
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Similar to sample 2.4, MM was actively involved in the trying to accomplish some task
or activity. Here is another example:
Sample 2.7. MM was eating spaghetti in her bed and attempting to keep the
spaghetti on her fork inside the plate. At the moment of the sample, she was
seeing a piece of spaghetti dangling from her fork (she was only seeing the
dangling spaghetti and not the fork). She was also trying to keep the spaghetti
inside her plate. This was a concentrated effort of keeping the spaghetti in the
plate.
Emotion
MM did not experience feelings in any of her samples. However, in three of her
samples (15%), there was some marginal presence of emotion. In these samples, there
was the presence of an emotion; however, MM was not directly experiencing the emotion
at the moment. In sample 5.6, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above,
MM was laughing. However, she was not experience a feeling at the moment. In two of
these samples, MM was talking out loud about emotion, but not directly feeling the
emotion at the moment. Here is an example:
Sample 5.1. MM had been talking to her friend, Hannah, about how MM tends to
be closed off when she is angry. At the moment of the sample, MM was talking
to Hannah; however, this was happening automatically and out of MM’s
experience. All that was in MM’s experience was somehow expressing to her
friend that she is closed off. Words are coming out, and what Hannah is doing is
coming in; however, all that is in MM’s awareness is conveying to Hannah that
MM is closed-off. MM does not feel closed-off at the moment.
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In this sample, MM was telling her friend about how she gets closed-off when she is
angry. However, MM was not feeling closed-off or angry at the moment. Here is the
other example:
Sample 5.3. MM had just changed her clothes and was looking in the mirror. She
was seeing her bra through her shirt. At the moment of the sample, the thought
that it would be embarrassing if other people saw her bra was present in her
experience. MM was not thinking of particular people, rather she was thinking
that she would be embarrassed if people in general saw. MM was not feeling
embarrassed at the moment, it was the likelihood of embarrassment that was
present to her. This thought was present without words, images, or any symbolic
representation (an instance of unsymbolized thinking). MM was also saying,
“this is so embarrassing” out loud with the intention of her roommate hearing.
The words were reflecting MM’s thought process in that she was not telling her
roommate that she was embarrassed, rather she was indicating to her roommate
that she would be embarrassed if people saw her like her roommate was seeing
her. The talking was happening automatically—that is, MM did not feel as if she
was driving the words, they words were just happening.
In this sample, MM was both thinking and telling her roommate that she would be
embarrassed if people saw her bra; however, MM was not feeling embarrassed at the
moment. MM did not have any other involvement or direct experience of feelings in her
samples.
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Infrequently Occurring Characteristics
Anticipation.
Two of MM’s inner experience samples involved anticipation of finding
something (10%). In sample 3.2, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section
above, MM was searching for a word on a page. In sample 3.3, described in detail in Not
Semantic section above, MM was searching her memory for the melody of a particular
song.
Multiple experience.
In two of MM’s samples, multiple and separate phenomenon were occurring
simultaneously (10%). In sample 4.4, described in Sensory Awareness section above,
MM was feeling/hearing the vibration of her phone and, unrelated to the vibration of the
phone, hearing a song and hearing her roommate talking. In sample 5.6, also described in
detail in Sensory Awareness section above, MM was attending to the laughter in the
classroom. She was also seeing the head of a male student sitting in front of her.
Inner hearing.
MM experienced inner hearing in one of her samples (5%). In this sample, MM
was innerly hearing the voice of someone else:
Sample 4.3. In bed but awake, MM had been thinking about her roommate,
Katie, telling MM about how Katie’s mom gets upset when Katie spends time at
her aunt’s house because Katie’s mom thinks they are starting a new family. At
the moment of the sample, MM was innerly hearing Katie say the words “I don’t
like Vegas” the way Katie’s mom had said them. The innerly heard words were
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of Katie mimicking her mother. This was an inner rehearing of something that
had happened before.
In this sample, MM was innerly hearing something she had heard before, something that
someone else had already said. The inner hearing of someone else’s voice is an unusual
phenomenon.
Just doing.
One of MM’s inner experience samples involved just doing (5%). In this sample,
MM was not actively engaged in any aspect of her inner or outer environment, rather she
was automatically completing an activity, outside of her awareness. In sample 2.3,
described in detail in Not Semantic Words section above, MM was typing a colon and
parenthesis (to make a smiley face) on her phone. There was nothing in her experience,
not the typing, not the smiley face, not the person on the receiving end of the message.
Nothing.
Noteworthy Characteristics
Dreams.
Two of MM’s samples occurred while dreaming (samples 4.1 and 4.2). These
samples were not counted as part of her inner experience.
Discussion
Overall MM seemed to be a motivated DES participant. She was interested in the
process of exploring inner experience as well as her own inner experience. MM’s inner
experience is mostly characterized by sensory awareness, unsymbolized thinking, and not
semantic words. MM did not have any samples of feelings or inner speech.
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CHAPTER 11
“MO”
MO was an 18-year-old Hispanic female who sampled with us throughout
October 2010. MO received a laterality quotient of -53 on the Edinburgh Handedness
Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971) indicating she is left-handed. She received a GSI raw
score of 0.37 (a T-score, compared to nonpatients, of 55) on the Symptom Checklist-90-R
(SCL-90-R; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973; Derogatis, 1994), suggesting the absence
of clinically significant psychological difficulties.
Characteristics of Inner Experience
MO sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total of 30 samples. Because
Sampling Day 1 is considered training for the participants, and because MO chose to skip
discussion of one sample (on Sampling Day 2), 23 of MO’s samples will be considered
when counting her inner experience characteristics. Sensory awareness, occurring
somewhere between 17 and 19 samples (74% and 83%), dominated her experience. No
other feature of her experience came close to the sensory awareness degree of salience:
unsymbolized thinking occurred in 3 or 4 samples (13% or 17%); inner speech occurred
in 2 samples (9%); inner hearing occurred in 2 samples (9%); inner seeing occurred in 2
samples (9%); feeling occurred in 2 samples (9%); and not semantic words occurred in 2
samples (9%).
Sensory Awareness
Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring characteristic in MO’s inner
experience and occurred substantially more than the other characteristics (the next
frequently occurring characteristic occurred four times); 17 of her 23 inner experience
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samples involved clear sensory awareness characteristics. In two of her samples, it was
difficult to definitively determine whether or not a sensory awareness existed. Thus the
count of her sensory awareness samples ranges from 17 to 19 (74% to 83%). The
frequency of her sensory awareness samples, on average, occurred 78% of the time
(18/23).
MO’s sensory awarenesses were remarkably specific and differentiated. Here is
an example:
Sample 2.6. MO’s bare feet were touching the floor. At the moment of the
sample, MO was experiencing constant coldness on the bottom surface of both
feet. She was experiencing more coldness on her toes. That is, there was a range
of coldness. She was not experiencing the floor as being cold. All that was in her
experience was the coldness of her feet.
In this sample, rather than experiencing the floor as being cold, MO was specifically
experiencing the bottom surface of her feet (not her whole foot) and her toes as being
cold. Here is another example:
Sample 4.4. MO was noticing that that the upper part of her back (in between her
shoulders) and the bottom surface of her feet (but not her toes) were warm. The
warmth in her back seemed to be deeper than the warmth in her feet. There was
nothing else in her experience.
In this sample, MO was experiencing a sensation in the specific areas of her upper back
and bottom surface of her feet. Additionally, there was specificity to the degree of
warmth—that is, MO was able to differentiate between the degree of warmth on her back,
which seemed to be deeper, than the warmth in her feet.
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In 12 of MO’s sensory awareness samples, including samples 2.6 and 4.4 just
described, MO’s experience was exclusively sensory awareness (in some cases multiple
sensory modalities). Here are other examples:
Sample 4.5. MO was tired. At the moment, she was experiencing pressure on the
back of her eyes and eyelids. The direction of the pressure seemed to be pushing
from the bottom of the back of her eyes up towards her eyelids.
Sample 5.5. MO had just bitten into a piece of ice. At the moment of the sample,
she was feeling the coldness on the left surface and left side of her tongue. She
also may have been feeling the texture of the ice. The coldness was most salient
in her experience (an estimated 90:10 compared to the texture).
As previously mentioned, in some of her samples (four), MO attended to multiple
sensory modalities. For example, in sample 4.6, she was both hearing and feeling:
Sample 4.6. She was hearing the sound of her air conditioning and feeling cold.
She was also noticing that the sound of the air conditioning is associated with the
coldness. This was a thought present without words, images, or any symbolic
representation.
Here are other examples:
Sample 2.3. MO was biting her lip. In her experience was both the action of the
biting and the pressure on her lip as a result of the biting. She was also tasting
metallic (which she later knew to be blood).
Sample 5.3. She was drinking pink lemonade through a straw. In her experience,
she was tasting the flavor and feeling the coldness of the pink lemonade in her
mouth. The tasting and cold feeling seemed to be part of the same experience.
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She was attending to the sensory qualities of the pink lemonade and not the pink
lemonade itself. She was also feeling the straw on the left side of her mouth,
though this was less salient in experience (an estimated 80:20).
On one occasion, MO had an imaginary sensory awareness. It seems as though
sensory awareness is such a salient part of MO’s inner experience that it does not only
occur as she surveys the external world, MO also attends to sensory stimuli she has
created. Here is the sample:
Sample 3.5. MO had been craving a salad with wontons. At the moment of the
sample, she was innerly hearing the crunching of a salad and wontons. The
crunching sound was as if she were eating a salad herself. She was also tasting a
salad. It was as if she were tasting the scent of the salad and not the salad
directly. The tasting seemed to be in her mouth, though she recognized she did
not actually have the taste of the salad in her mouth.
In this sample, MO had been craving a salad. At the moment of the sample, she was
experiencing the sensory characteristics associated with eating a salad (e.g., hearing of
the crunching and tasting) as if it were actually happening.
In four of her samples, MO was experiencing a growing or spreading of sensory
awareness. All four samples involved pain. In these samples, MO was experiencing the
spreading of the pain at the moment—that is, there was an awareness of the spreading at
the moment of the sample. Here are the examples:
Sample 2.5. MO had gotten a paper cut. At the moment of the sample, she was
experiencing pain on the tip of her left index finger as a result of the paper cut.
She was experiencing the pain across the tip of her finger (from side to side). The
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pain was differentiated such that it was less painful to the sides of the actual cut
and more painful on the cut itself.
Sample 4.2. MO had been trying to figure out where her headache was localized.
At the moment of the sample, she was noticing the pain pushing out in her
temples. The notion oh, its in my temples was also present. This was a thought
without words, images, or any other symbolic representation.
Sample 4.3. Her lips were chapped from the weather and she had been eating
Lays potato chips. At the moment, she was feeling a surge of pain on the left part
of her bottom lip. This pain was not instantaneous like a light switching on and
off, it was more of a gradual pain happening quickly.
Sample 5.6. MO had cut her left index finger over the weekend. Before the
sample, she had hit her left index finger against something. At the moment of the
sample, she was experiencing pain spreading throughout the entire cut, both
surface and depth, but the pain had not yet completely filled the cut yet. There
was nothing else in her experience.
In these samples, MO was experiencing movement or spreading of her sensory awareness
experiences.
Here are two examples where it was difficult for us to be confident whether MO
was experiencing a specific thematic sensory awareness:
Sample 2.1. She had been staring at her iced tea bottle. At the moment, she was
thirsty. She also may have been thinking that she was thirsty, but we were highly
skeptical. If it existed, it was a mental phenomenon, a knowing that she is thirsty
that was present without words, images, or any symbolic representation.
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In this sample, it is unclear if MO’s experience of being thirsty involved a sensory
awareness. It was difficult to determine if MO was experiencing the sensory aspects of
being thirsty and, if so, were they experienced as a function of being thirsty or simply for
the sensory qualities or both. Here is the other example:
Sample 5.2. She was hungry. At the moment, she was innerly saying “What
should I eat?” quickly. MO was also hearing her stomach growling. This was
more an auditory thing (90%) though she may have also felt the growling (10%).
In this sample, it is unclear whether the hearing of her stomach growling is attended for
its sensory qualities or for its meaning of being hungry.
Sensory awareness dominated MO’s inner experience, occurring at a much
higher frequency than the other characteristics. All of her sensory awareness samples
were specific and differentiated. In the majority of her samples (12), sensory awareness
was the only phenomenon.
Unsymbolized Thinking
Unsymbolized thinking, thinking without the presence of any words, images, or
any other symbolic representation, occurred in 3 or 4 of MO’s 23 samples (13 or 17%).
All of MO’s samples of unsymbolized thinking were related to or noticing a sensory
awareness. One example, sample 4.2, has already been described in detail in Sensory
Awareness section above. In this sample, MO was noting the location of her headache.
Here is another example:
Sample 5.1. MO was hearing a sound to the left of her from outside the room she
was in. At the moment, she was hearing the sound and was wondering what it
was. The wondering of what it was was more salient in her experience than the
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sound itself. She later recognized it to be a lawnmower but that was not in her
experience at the moment.
It was difficult determining if one sample included an unsymbolized thought.
Sample 2.1, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above, may or may not
have included an unsymbolized thinking. MO was thirsty and whether or not there was
an additional and separate thought about being thirsty is unclear.
Inner Speech
MO’s inner experience involved inner speech in two of her samples (9%). Both
of MO’s inner speech samples were in her own voice. Additionally, both samples
involved a question MO was asking herself. In sample 5.2, described in detail in Sensory
Awareness section above, MO was innerly saying, “What should I eat?” Here is the
other example:
Sample 4.1. MO was innerly saying, “Hmm, I wonder when this is going to
beep?
In this sample, similar to sample 4.1, MO was innerly asking herself a question.
MO’s inner speakings were similar in nature to her outer speakings. For example,
in one of her samples, MO was speaking aloud to herself. The speaking aloud to
herself had the same features as inner speaking except that the words were actually being
produced:
Sample 3.2. The beeper had not sounded for a while and MO was wondering if
the beeper was working. At the moment, MO was saying, “is this thing
working?” out loud to herself. MO was also experiencing confusion and humor.
The confusion and humor were both related to the words she was saying. The
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confusion was experienced as an asking of self the question. The humor was
experienced as a smiling while asking the question. This was a bodily humor
experienced in MO’s mouth and cheeks.
Inner Hearing
Inner hearing occurred twice in MO’s inner experience samples (9%). One of
MO’s inner hearing samples involved the repetition of the same innerly heard phrase:
Sample 3.6. She had been watching a video on anorexia in her Psychology
course. Before the moment of the sample, MO had been innerly seeing Joanna, a
character in the video she was watching about anorexia, standing against a white
background. MO had also been innerly saying the words could you imagine not
eating. The words MO was innerly speaking, could you imagine not eating,
appeared in the innerly seen image as she was saying them. The words appeared
written with an arch above Joanne. At the moment, MO was innerly seeing an
image with the words “Could you imagine not eating?” written in black lettering.
The words were written in an arch (upside down u). She was also innerly seeing
Joanne standing underneath the words, in the middle of the arch. She was seeing
Joanne’s whole body directed to the left. The image was seen in black, white, and
grey colors on a white background. MO was also innerly hearing her voice
repeating the words could you imagine not eating. She differentiated the innerly
heard words at the moment from the innerly spoken words before the sample.
The inner seeing was most salient in her experience (70:30).
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In this sample, MO was innerly hearing her voice repeat the words could you imagine not
eating. This sample was not counted as inner speech because the innerly spoken words
occurred before the moment of the sample.
MO’s other sample which was counted as inner hearing consisted of an imaginary
event that included inner hearing. In sample 3.5, described in detail in Sensory
Awareness section above, MO was innerly hearing herself eating a salad which was a
creation of her imagination—that is, she was not really eating a salad. She was innerly
hearing a crunching sound as if she were eating the salad wontons, though she was not
actually chewing anything. In both samples, the inner hearings were MO’s production—
that is, her innerly heard voice and her innerly heard chewing.
Inner Seeing
Inner seeing occurred in two of MO’s samples (9%). One of her inner seeing
samples involved a transition from one innerly seen image to another:
Sample 3.1. Her friend, Tracy, had been next to MO reading a magazine article
on Kenny Chesney. MO had been innerly seeing Kenny Chesney’s face. At the
moment, MO’s experience was in transition from innerly seeing Kenny Chesney’s
face to innerly seeing Kenny Chesney’s whole body. It was as if MO’s
experience was incorporating Kenny Chesney’s body into it. In her experience,
MO was focused on Kenny Chesney’s face, but she was also aware of the
presence of the rest of his body (though she was not attending to it). MO was
seeing Kenny Chesney in color with a green background. This was a still image.
MO’s other inner seeing sample involved innerly seeing words. In sample 3.6,
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described in detail in Inner Hearing section above, MO was innerly seeing an image with
the words “Could you imagine not eating?” written in black lettering in the shape of an
arch.
Feeling
MO had very little affect in her inner experience samples. In fact, only two of her
samples involved some form of affect or emotion. It was difficult determining if these
samples were experienced feelings. Depending on how they are counted, MO’s
experience of feelings ranged from 0% to 9%. Either way, she had very little experience
of emotion. In sample 3.2, described in detail in Inner Speech section above, MO was
experiencing confusion and humor, both related to the words she was saying aloud to
herself (“is this thing working?”). The confusion was experienced in the question and the
humor was experienced as smiling. Although confusion and humor were somehow
present, it is difficult to determine whether this confusion/humor should be considered a
feeling.
MO’s other feeling sample involved a mental feeling that had been leftover from
a previous moment:
Sample 3.3. MO had been wearing new jeans and her legs were tingling. At the
moment, MO was experiencing a tingling sensation from the knee to the hip areas
of both legs. She was experiencing the sensation only on the top surface of her
legs (from one side seam to the other). This sensation was a tingly, prickly
sensation as if she had “sequins” in her legs. At the moment, the sensation was
only experienced on the top layer of her skin. Before the moment of the sample,
she had been irritated about the tingling sensation. At the moment, she knew
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herself to still be irritated, however, to a much lesser degree. This was a mental
irritation. The tingling sensation was more salient in her experience than the
irritation.
It was clear that the tingling sensation was still present; it was clear that she had felt
irritated prior to the sample; it was clear that the sensation was still irritating; but whether
this irritation was actually felt at the moment of the sample was unclear.
Thus none of MO’s moments included a substantial experiential apprehension of
emotion. Whether humor or confusion (Sample 3.2) should be called an emotion is
questionable, and extent to which the irritation of Sample 3.3 was present is also
questionable. That is, none of MO’s samples included as a more-or-less dominant aspect
any of the experiences that are generally taken to be feelings: anxiety, anger, sadness, and
so on.
Not Semantic Words
In two of her samples, a symbol was present in MO’s experience; however, the
meaning or function of that symbol was not directly in her experience (9%). Here is the
first example:
Sample 3.4. MO had been taking a test. She was unsure of the details of her
inner experience at the moment of this sample because she could not turn away
from her test to note her experience. To her best recollection, MO had been
seeing an x written by her instructor on the exam sheet. At the moment of the
sample, MO was both seeing the x and noting the ugliness of the x. That is, she
was noticing the appearance of the x and not its function.
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In the other example, sample 3.6, discussed in detail in Inner Hearing section
above, MO was innerly seeing the words “Could you imagine not eating?” In this
example, the meaning of the words was in MO’s experience. However, the words were
innerly seen as written in an arch and the archedness of the words was at least as
important as the words themselves. That is, even when the meaning of the words are
present in her experience, MO also attends to or, in this case, creates some sensory
quality to the words (e.g., presented in an arch).
Discussion
MO seemed to be a motivated participant. She expressed interest in DES and
appeared to have gained clarity and self-awareness from the process. MO seems to
attend to the sensory aspects or mere presence of stimuli without additional
characteristics in her experience. Sensory awareness is her most frequently occurring
inner experience characteristic.
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CHAPTER 12
“KA”
KA was a 21-year-old Biracial (Middle Eastern/Caucasian/Black) female who
sampled with us in December 2010. KA received a laterality quotient of -53 on the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971) indicating she is left-handed.
She received a GSI raw score of 0.71 (a T-score, compared to nonpatients, of 61) on the
Symptom Checklist-90-R (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi,
1973), suggesting the absence of clinically significant psychological difficulties.
Characteristics of Inner Experience
KA sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total of 27 samples. Because
Sampling Day 1 is considered training for the participants and KA chose to skip two
samples, 21 of KA’s samples counts her inner experience characteristics. The following
characteristics will be discussed: inner seeing, occurring in 13 samples (62%); inner
hearing, occurring in 7 samples (33%); not semantic words, occurring in 5 samples
(24%); multiple experience, occurring in 4 samples (19%); inner speech, occurring in 3
samples (14%); doing of, occurring in 3 samples (14%); sensory awareness, occurring in
2 samples (10%); emotion, occurring in 2 samples (10%); infrequently occurring
characteristics; and noteworthy characteristics.
Inner Seeing
Inner seeing was the most frequently occurring phenomenon in KA’s inner
experience, occurring in 13 of KA’s 21 samples (62%). Five characteristics emerged in
KA’s inner seeing samples: 1) KA’s seeings “populated themselves”—that is, assembled
slowly; 2) KA saw a light coming from the left; 3) KA saw herself; 4) KA saw people
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other than herself; and 5) KA’s seeing was related to something ongoing in her external,
physical world.
Five of KA’s seeings involved the coming together or self assembly of the innerly
seen image. In these samples, KA’s innerly seen images did not appear whole and all at
once. Instead, these images populated or came together at the moment of the sample.
Here is an example:
Sample 2.2. KA was talking to her boyfriend, Sam, on the phone. Sam had said
he wanted to teach art. At the moment, KA was innerly seeing Sam as an art
instructor. She was seeing this from her own perspective, as if she was in the
classroom. Sam was standing, facing his left so KA was seeing the right side of
his face and body. Sam was moving his arms. There were other students in the
classroom to both sides of Sam so that he was in the center. KA had an art board
in front of her with a paper taped on it so that she was only seeing Sam’s thigh,
buttock, and upper body. KA was also seeing sunlight coming through from the
left. The seeing was detailed and in color (the tile was beige, the walls were
white, Sam’s hair was black). KA understood this to be a memory. It took KA a
few seconds to create the image, it did not appear at once. She was also still
hearing and attending to what Sam was saying but the image was most salient in
her experience.
In this sample, the image was not wholly in KA’s experience at once. Rather the image
took KA time to create. .
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Six of KA’s inner seeing samples involved innerly seeing light coming from the
left, including sample 2.2 just described. In these samples, KA was paying particular
attention to the light that was illuminating her seeing. Here is another example:
Sample 4.3. KA was finishing writing about sample 4.2 when the beep for
sample 4.3 sounded. In her experience she was innerly seeing her friend Ramona
and three other girls. It was as if KA was present in the scene and seeing the
other girls. KA was seeing the girls standing in a half circle at her middle school.
Ramona was positioned in exactly the same stance as she was in sample 4.2.
There was one girl, Tina, standing behind Ramona and two girls, Sarah and
Joanne, standing next to Ramona. Ramona and Tina were facing the same
direction towards Sarah and Joanne. Sarah and Joanne were both facing Ramona
and Tina. KA’s perspective was from beside Sarah and Joanne. KA was seeing
the girls from the hips up. Ramona was seen the most vividly though she was less
clear than she was in sample 4.2. Ramona was wearing a black tank top and black
bottoms. KA was also seeing concrete on the ground and a couple of trees. KA
saw the sunlight coming from the upper left of the scene. The writing was not in
KA’s experience at the moment of the sample.
In this sample, KA saw the sunlight coming from the upper left of the scene.
Two of KA’s inner seeing samples involved innerly seeing herself. Here are
examples:
Sample 3.2. This sample occurred shortly after sample 3.1 while KA was writing
down her experience from sample 3.1 in her notebook. At the moment of this
sample, KA was innerly seeing herself sitting and writing. She was seeing herself
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from the back such that she was seeing her back and the back of her head and hair
from the waist up. KA was seeing herself sitting on a bed though she was only
seeing the top of the bed. Her body was hunched over and she was writing. KA
was also seeing the TV in front of her. KA was wearing blue plaid pajamas but
she was not paying particular attention to the blueness or plaidness. She was
seeing this image slightly to the left. The seeing was dark but there was
illumination from the TV screen. All that KA was seen clearly was herself and
the TV, though she could not tell what was on the TV screen. There were other
items in the room but she could not identify what they were. KA referred to this
as a frozen image; whether that meant a still image or a moving image where
there was no motion was difficult to determine.
Sample 3.4. KA was innerly saying “I’m going to sleep” in her own voice. She
was also innerly seeing an image of herself sleeping. KA was seeing herself from
the waist up with her head lying on a white pillow. Her hands were clasped
together, prayer style, on the pillow and her head was on her hands with her eyes
closed. KA was seeing her head to the right and her body to the left. She was
seeing herself diagonally such that her body was angled towards her. KA was not
seeing a bed but her body was level. She was not seeing a lamp; however, there
was light coming from the left corner. KA was not seeing anything beyond
herself and the pillow. The bed and the room were not her own or anyone else’s
that she knows of. This image was called “frozen” as in sample 3.2.
In these samples, light was coming from the left as well.
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Seven of KA’s inner seeing samples involved seeing people other than herself.
Here is an example:
Sample 3.6. KA was driving. She had seen a billboard that had a picture of a DJ
and said “I’m a scam artist.” She had been innerly hearing “Scam artist, I don’t
get it” in her own voice referring to the billboard. At the moment, KA was
experiencing the tail end of that inner hearing. KA was also hearing a song and
innerly seeing the head of her ex-boyfriend. It was as if the notion of the scam
artist was leaving her experience and the song and ex-boyfriend were taking over.
The song and the inner seeing were somehow directly related. KA was seeing the
head of her ex-boyfriend diagonally such that his head was directed slightly to his
right (KA’s left). KA was unable to see the details of his face clearly as if his
face was covered by a cloudy or foggy glass. KA was able to see his shiny black
and spiked hair clearly. The inner image of KA’s ex-boyfriend’s head “populated
itself,” came together slowly in her experience, that is the pieces of this seeing
were flying into place. Despite happening slowly in KA’s experience, KA was
under the impression that if they could be clocked in the external world the
coming together of the pieces happened rapidly so that, at the moment of the
sample, KA was already seeing his whole head. KA was under the impression
that the population was done in the sense that the unclearly seen face of the exboyfriend would remain unclear.
In addition to being an inner seeing of a person other than herself, this sample also had
two other interesting characteristics: 1) the innerly seen image was unclear and 2) the
inner image came together slowly, that is the image did not appear all together at once in
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KA’s experience, rather, as her seeing took place, she saw the pieces of the image come
together or elaborate themselves.
In five of her samples, KA was seeing an image related to something ongoing in
the physical world at the moment. Here is an example:
Sample 4.4. KA had been intensely looking at a dream catcher directly in front of
her. KA was innerly seeing a dream catcher her boyfriend had drawn. The
innerly seen dream catcher initially appeared automatically; however, it quickly
became a produced version. KA was struggling to create the seeing of her
boyfriend’s dream catcher. This was a mental phenomenon, a trying to figure out
what she could do to create the seeing. As the struggle was occurring, the innerly
seen dream catcher was morphing into different versions. KA was innerly seeing
a dream catcher; however, the specific details were undefined. At the moment of
the sample, KA was at the tail end of her focusing on the real dream catcher and
the automatic version of the innerly seeing dream catcher had just turned into the
produced version.
In this sample, KA’s innerly seen image (a dream catcher drawn by her boyfriend) was
related to her seeing of an actual dream catcher in her environment.
One of KA’s inner seeing samples involved the inner seeing of a word. Here is
the example:
Sample 2.1. KA had been filling out the McNair Scholarship Application. At the
moment, she was shuffling the McNair Application papers. KA was attending to
the shuffling and making sure the papers were in the correct order. KA was also
innerly seeing the word “McNair.” KA was seeing the word in Times New
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Roman font against a black background. KA knew the background to be
rectangular; however, she was not seeing the borders of the rectangle. The letters
were white and had a black border with a red shadow. KA was attending to the
shuffling of the papers more (an estimated ration of 90:10).
One of KA’s inner seeing samples involved an inner seeing indicating a
sensation she was experiencing on her physical body. Here is the example:
Sample 2.6. KA was experiencing a pain sensation on the lower, right part of her
back. She was also innerly hearing “My back is strained.” This was in her own
voice. Simultaneous to the innerly heard words, KA saw a flash of a black
background with a reddish-orangeish slanted blob going across the background
indicating the area where her back is strained. The innerly seen image occurred
very quickly and ceased when the innerly heard words were completed.
The innerly seen flash was related to the sensation KA was experiencing in her back.
One of her inner seeing samples involved innerly seeing a picture. Here is the
example:
Sample 4.2. KA had been writing something about her friend, Ramona, from
middle school. At the moment, KA was innerly seeing an image of Ramona, a
boy named Sam, and herself. It was as if KA was looking at a picture of herself
with Ramona and Sam. KA was seeing Ramona to the left, Sam in the middle,
and KA to the right, seen in profile looking at the left. The seen KA was cut off
(she said it was cut off like at the edge of the visual field) such that all that was
seen was her hair and part of her nose. Ramona was standing with her body
directed forward and her face turned to the left. Ramona was the most vividly
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seen, followed by KA, and Sam last. KA was seeing them from the knees up.
KA did not innerly hear anything, though it appeared they were talking. Sam was
sitting on the hood of a car behind them and KA was leaning on it. The writing
was not in KA’s experience at the moment of the sample. The scene was
illuminated by light coming from the upper left; this light was part of KA’s
experience at the moment. The light seemed to come from a lamp post light, but
the lamp post itself was not seen.
Although the innerly seen image was like a picture, this sample involved three other inner
seeing characteristics described above, including light coming from the left, a seeing of
herself, and a seeing of others.
Inner Hearing
Seven of KA’s samples involved inner hearing (33%). All of KA’s inner hearing
samples consisted of her own voice. One example has already been discussed in Inner
Seeing section above. In sample 2.6, KA was innerly hearing “My back is strained” in
her own voice. Here is another example:
Sample 3.1. KA had been watching a scene from the show Family Guy, in which
Peter, a character, was trying to scare a bird out of his beard by playing loud
music. In her experience, she was innerly hearing “Could a bird really get scared
and leave?” in her own voice. KA was also attending to the show on the TV. KA
was laughing; however, as best we could ascertain that was not in her experience
at the moment.
In this example, KA’s innerly heard words involved a question or trying to understand
something that was ongoing in the external, physical world. This occurred three other
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times in KA’s inner hearing samples. In sample 3.6, discussed in detail in Inner Seeing
section above, KA was innerly hearing “Scam artist, I don’t get it” referring to a billboard
she had seen. Here is another example:
Sample 3.5. KA had been reading an article about vegans who cheat on their diet
by eating eggs, etc. At the moment, she was innerly hearing the phrases: 1)
“Vegan conferences? Where are those?”; 2) “How can you tell one’s cheated?”;
and 3) “Do they know you know?” KA was innerly hearing the phrases in her
own voice. The phrases were happening one after the other. In KA’s experience,
the phrases were heard in a normal, natural pace. However, she was under the
impression that if they could be clocked in the external world they were
happening so fast it seemed they all happened at the moment of the sample.
In this sample, KA was innerly hearing several phrases which she experienced as
happening one after the other. In sample 2.4, KA heard the same phrase repeated three
times but with different inflections each time:
Sample 2.4. KA had seen the words “DE contact form” on the computer screen.
KA was having a visual experience of “DE contact form” at the moment.
However, she was unsure if she was seeing the words on the screen, innerly
seeing the words, or innerly seeing the words AND seeing them on the screen at
the moment. KA was also innerly hearing DE contact form. The words were in
her own voice. The words were repeated three times with a different inflection
each time. The second time, the words were formed as a question. KA’s sense
was that the words were coming from the left side of her head.
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This sample of inner hearing is also unique for KA in that KA was experiencing the
words coming from the left side of her head.
One of KA’s samples involved simultaneously innerly hearing her innerly spoken
words:
Sample 5.1. KA had been sticking pictures in a frame. At the moment, she was
concentrating on the position of the picture. She was mentally making sure the
picture was straight on the glass. At the same time, KA was both innerly
speaking the words and simultaneously innerly hearing herself say “it hasn’t
beeped yet, of course on the last day it’s going to take forever.” KA referred to
herself as “hearing herself say” even though she confidently said she experienced
herself as saying the words as if into a tape recorder. We worked hard at
understanding what this meant, eventually agreeing with some confidence that
KA simultaneously experienced something like two KA’s, or two points of view,
one speaking and the other hearing herself speak. On those samples where KA
said she was just innerly hearing, she had the hearing KA but not the speaking
KA. KA said that when she speaks out loud (as to us in the interview room) she
is experiencing only the speaking and not hearing herself speak.
KA had difficulty conveying her experience at the moment of the sample. Although she
initially reported she was “speaking into a tape recorder,” KA consistently described this
inner dialogue as “hearing myself say.” When asked “is the experience primarily one of
hearing or primarily one of speaking?” she said “in this experience it’s primarily of
speaking”; however, she continued on to say “it’s almost like there’s two different
mes…two separate mind entities. The one that’s speaking and the one that’s
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hearing…I’m hearing it as I’m saying it.” Thus the investigators concluded, along with
KA, that this sample is both an example of inner speech and inner hearing.
Not Semantic Words
In five of KA’s samples (24%), words were somehow present; however, the
words themselves or meaning of the words were not in her experience. For example, in
sample 3.2 described in detail in Inner Seeing section above, KA was trying to formulate
words to write. In this sample, words did not come naturally to KA rather she had to put
forth effort. In sample 2.1, described in detail in Inner Seeing section above, KA was
innerly seeing the word “McNair.” The meaning of the word or what the word represents
was not in her experience, however. In samples 4.2 and 4.3, described in detail in Inner
Seeing section above, KA was writing; however, the writing was not in her experience at
the moment. Here is the other example:
Sample 4.6. KA had been writing in her journal. At the moment of the sample,
she was innerly seeing an image of herself in black space. There was nothing
behind her, to the sides of her, or beneath her. The innerly seen KA was facing
her left side. She was wearing a white banner with black writing that read, “I’m
the best.” The innerly seen KA had her hands on her hips. There was no light
source; however, the image was lit. There was nothing else in her experience.
Similar to samples 4.2 and 4.2, KA was writing in sample 4.6; however, the writing was
not in her experience at the moment.
Multiple Experience
Four of KA’s inner experience samples involved multiple experiences (19%). In
all samples, KA was attending to various, unrelated phenomena. Here is an example:
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Sample 5.3. KA had been looking at an advertisement for boots on the internet
and was seeing a picture of brown leather boots. The words next to the picture
said “style sophisticate.” At the moment, there were four separate experiences
happening quickly and sequentially in KA’s inner experience. First, KA was
innerly hearing the words “style sophisticate?” in her own voice. KA was innerly
seeing her friend Gina, seen from the waist up (KA was seeing Gina’s left side).
KA was seeing Gina’s black hair and face though Gina’s face was not fully
articulated; that is KA was not seeing the details of Gina’s face. Gina was
wearing a white top. There was a light background as if Gina was shopping or
something of the sort. The details of the background were not articulated. KA
was seeing this image at eye level. Third, KA innerly saw Gina’s boots and legs,
from the knees down. KA was seeing Gina’s legs in profile as well, apparently in
the same position as the upper seeing. Gina’s left foot was off the ground as if
she were walking. KA was mostly attending to the brown, knee high boots Gina
was wearing. There was a black background. This image was positioned lower
than the upper body image in KA’s experience—that is, KA looked more or less
straight ahead at the upper portion of Gina, but looked somewhat down at the foot
portion of Gina. The upper Gina and the lower Gina had the same body position,
as if KA had shifted her gaze from the upper part of the body to the lower part,
but that was not how KA experienced it. Instead, there was first a seeing of the
upper part, then a seeing of the lower part. Furthermore, the backgrounds of the
upper seeing (light) and lower seeing (dark) were not the same. KA herself found
this mixture of the same/different to be rather curious or remarkable. Fourth, KA
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innerly saw KA in a Steve Madden shoe store. The seen KA was seen standing to
the left and facing to the right, trying on brown boots (the same brown boots Gina
was wearing the previous innerly seen image, which were also the same boots
seen in the internet advertisement). KA was seeing the profile of KA; she was
seeing the right side of her body. The seen KA was wearing jeans, a black jacket
and boots, and her right leg was off the ground as if she was posing. The real KA
was also innerly hearing the imaginary KA say, “I don’t like these.” In real KA’s
experience, she was only innerly hearing the words. The innerly heard words
were more salient than the inner seeing of imaginary KA.
In this sample, KA was attending to multiple and separate experiences simultaneously.
She was innerly hearing the words “style sophisticate?” in her own voice, innerly seeing
her friend, innerly seeing her friend’s boots and legs, innerly seeing herself (KA) in a
Steve Madden shoe store, and innerly hearing her imaginary self say, “I don’t like these.”
Inner Speech
KA’s inner experience involved inner speech in three of her samples (14%). All
of KA’s inner speech samples were in her own voice. One sample has already been
described in the Inner Seeing section above. In sample 3.4, KA was innerly saying “I’m
going to sleep” in her own voice while she was innerly seeing an image of herself
sleeping. Another example, sample 5.1, has already been described in detail in Inner
Hearing section above. In this sample KA was simultaneously innerly saying and innerly
hearing the phrase “it hasn’t beeped yet, of course on the last day it’s going to take
forever.” Here is KA’s other sample of inner speech:
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Sample 3.3. KA had been looking at her boyfriend, Kyle. At the moment of the
sample, she was innerly saying “I love him so much.” KA was saying this in her
own voice. She was also experiencing a ticklish/tingling butterflies sensation in
the middle of her stomach, inside her body.
KA consistently said that the “I love him so much” was understood as being said, rather
than heard as in sample 3.1. However, she also consistently referred to this expression as
“I heard myself say” (or maybe it was “I heard myself to say”). The investigators pressed
her on the distinction between hearing and saying, and she was confident and believable
that 3.3 was more said than heard and 3.1 was more heard than said. RTH was not sure
that that distinction is the same as, for example, his own.
Doing Of
Three of KA’s inner experience samples (14%) involved the effortful, directed
completion of an activity. These examples have already been discussed above. In
sample 2.1, described in detail in Inner Seeing section, KA was attending to the shuffling
of papers and making sure the papers were in the correct order. In sample 4.4, described
in detail in Inner Seeing section above, KA was trying to create an innerly seen image of
a dream catcher her boyfriend had drawn. This was the only sample of inner seeing in
which an attempt to create an inner image occurred. In sample 5.1, described in detail in
Inner Hearing section, KA was concentrating on positioning a picture straight in a frame.
In this example, KA was trying to create an innerly seen image.
Sensory Awareness
KA’s inner experience consisted of two sensory awareness samples (10%). Both
examples have already been described in detail above. In sample 2.6, described in Inner
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Seeing section above, KA was experiencing a pain sensation on the lower, right part of
her back. In sample 3.3, described in Inner Speech section above, KA was experiencing
a ticklish/tingling butterflies sensation in the middle of her stomach. The investigators
worked hard but unsuccessfully at trying to discern whether this was a feeling (love) that
manifested itself in part by the butterflies; or whether the love was a fact of KA at the
time, but not of KA’s experience; and the experience was of butterflies, which on
retrospection was understood to be related to love. Her characterization of this seemed to
be more consistent with the latter interpretation, that love was ongoing but not directly or
clearly in experience.
Emotion
Emotions occurred infrequently in KA’s inner experience. In two of her samples,
there was the presence of an emotion; however, KA was not directly experiencing the
emotion at the moment (10%). In sample 3.1, described in detail in Inner Hearing section
above, KA was watching a scene from the show Family Guy and laughing. Despite her
laughter at the moment, KA was not directly experiencing an emotion. In KA’s other
sample of emotion, sample 3.3 discussed in Inner Speech and Sensory Awareness
sections above, KA was not feeling love; however, she was innerly saying “I love him so
much” and experiencing a ticklish/tingling butterflies sensation in the middle of her
stomach. In KA’s experience, love was ongoing but not directly in her experience.
Infrequently Occurring Characteristics
Feeling.
KA only had one sample of feeling (5%). Here is the example:
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Sample 5.5. KA was setting the alarm and opening the door to her house. This
was happening automatically. She was also experiencing a mental stress.
This sample involved a mental feeling—that is, KA did not describe any aspects of the
feeling other than that it was a mental experience
Just doing.
In one of KA’s inner experience samples (5%), she was simply engaged in the
automaticity of an activity, there was nothing else in her experience:
Sample 4.4. KA was watching TV and was absorbed in the television show she
was watching. There was nothing else in her experience.
Nothing.
In one of KA’s samples (5%), there was nothing in her experience. Unlike the
Just Doing section above, in this sample KA was neither absorbed in any activity nor
attending to any stimuli:
Sample 2.5. KA had nothing in her experience.
Noteworthy Characteristics
Leftness.
Seven of KA’s inner seeing samples involved a leftness attribute (33%). For
example, in three of her inner seeing samples, a light source was coming from the left. In
three of her inner seeing samples, KA was innerly seeing herself where the innerly seen
KA was facing the left. In sample 2.4, described in detail in Inner Hearing section above,
KA was innerly hearing “DE contact form” and had a sense that the words were coming
from the left side of her head.
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Words.
KA had substantially more inner hearing samples than inner speaking (33%
compared to 14%). Additionally, in one of KA’s samples, she experienced words both
innerly heard and innerly spoken (sample 5.3 described in Inner Hearing section in
detail). KA’s inner experience included samples in which she used inner speech to aid in
her understanding of external stimuli, these samples were described in detail in Inner
Speech section. Outside of her innerly heard or spoken words, KA did not have any other
experience of words.
Discussion
Overall, KA seemed to be a motivated DES participant. She was interested in the
process of exploring inner experience as well as her own inner experience. KA’s inner
experience is mostly characterized by inner seeing and inner hearing. KA only had one
sample of feeling.
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CHAPTER 13
“JS”
JS was a 19-year-old Caucasian female who sampled with us in September and
October 2010. JS received a laterality quotient of -50 on the Edinburgh Handedness
Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971), indicating she is left-handed. She received a GSI raw
score of 0.511 (a T-score, compared to nonpatients, of 58) on the Symptom Checklist-90R (SCL-90; Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973), suggesting the absence
of clinically significant psychological difficulties.
Characteristics of Inner Experience
JS sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total 30 samples. Because
Sampling Day 1 is considered training for the participants, 24 of JS’s samples count
towards her inner experience characteristics. The following characteristics will be
discussed: sensory awareness, occurring in 5 samples (21%); inner seeing, occurring in 5
samples (21%); words present, occurring in 4 samples (17%); not semantic words,
occurring in 3 samples (13%); happening of, occurring in 3 samples (13%); anticipation,
occurring in 2 samples (8%); listening with comprehension, occurring in 2 samples (8%);
and infrequently occurring characteristics.
Sensory Awareness
No feature of JS’s inner experience occurred at a high frequency. Sensory
awareness and inner seeing were the most frequently occurring characteristics in JS’s
inner experience, each occurring in five of her samples (21%). Four of her samples were
typical examples of sensory awareness. Here are the examples:
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Sample 2.4. JS was looking at a picture on her phone her boss had sent her of JS
and four others wearing colorful Hawaiian lei necklaces made of flowers. At the
moment of the sample, she was just focused on the orange, yellow, green, and
blue colors of the flowers on one person’s lei in the picture (the person standing
closest to the picture taker).
Sample 4.2. JS was having a conversation with her friend, Tammy, as they were
waiting at the CVS pharmacy drive-thru. JS was sitting in the passenger seat and
Tammy was in the driver’s seat. At the moment of the sample, JS was
experiencing the car shaking as a result of her friend moving her leg. JS was
feeling the whole car shaking (not her body shaking in the car). She was hearing
Tammy talk and registering what she was saying, but that was not in her
experience at the moment of the sample. Her eyes were aimed at Tammy’s leg but
that was not in her experience at the moment of the sample. All that was in her
experience was the shaking of the car.
Sample 4.4. JS was watching a scene of the movie The Last Song in which the
two main characters were talking on the beach. She was mostly attending to the
movie’s music. She was drawn to the sound of the music and not the significance
of the music. JS was also attending to the dialogue of the movie although this
was much less in her experience than the music.
Sample 5.3. JS had been watching a TV show and the screen zoomed in on two
female characters hugging. At the moment of the sample, JS was noticing the
light brownness of one of the characters’ eye color. JS was focused on the
brownness of the eyes and not the eyes themselves.
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One of her samples involved the sensory awareness of an innerly seen image:
Sample 2.2. JS was reading about the Mechanics in Plato’s and Aristotle’s
cosmology. At the moment of the sample, she was innerly seeing her dad’s auto
mechanic shop, seeing the garage with the orange garage door almost, but not
complete, open, seeing a man working on a car inside the garage. The seeing was
in color although, the colors were dull. Despite the dullness of the colors,
something about the orangeness of the garage door stood out to her. The innerly
seen image was blurry, not in focus. She was seeing the garage straight ahead, as
if she was really there. The seeing was in motion but nothing was moving at the
moment of the sample. Note that the inner seeing illustrated the word
“mechanics” which had a different meaning from Plato’s use that she was reading
in her notes, as if the seeing was connected to the word itself, not to the meaning
of the word in context.
In this sample, JS was innerly seeing her father’s auto mechanic shop and was drawn to
the orangeness of the garage door.
Inner Seeing
JS experienced inner seeing in five of her samples (21%). Four of her five innerly
seen images were seen as blurry and in dull colors. One example, sample 2.2, has already
been described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above. In this sample, JS was
innerly seeing her father’s auto mechanic shop in dull colors. Additionally, the innerly
seen image was blurry. Here is another example:
Sample 2.6. JS had been looking at an older picture of herself and her friend, Jim,
who moved to New Hampshire. At the moment of the sample, she was
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wondering how Jim is doing in New Hampshire with regard to his employment.
She was also innerly seeing a narrow, empty highway going straight ahead, which
she took to be an illustration of New Hampshire, although she had never been in
New Hampshire. She was seeing grass closer to the road and trees in the distance.
The seeing was blurry and in color; however, the colors were dull, similar to all
the other inner seeings on this day (samples 2.1 and 2.2). The seeing was still like
a snapshot in the sense that she did not have a sense of herself being there.
JS’s innerly seen images also had variability in the degree of dullness in the
colors. In sample 5.6, the colors were so dull it was almost like a black and white seeing:
Sample 5.6. JS had been talking to her friend, John, who works at the Vans store.
At the moment of the sample, she was innerly seeing the Vans store. She was
seeing the whole store and parts of the surrounding stores. She was seeing the
store as if she were standing in front of it. The inner seeing was blurry, but the
Vans store was less blurry than the other stores. She was seeing the store in dull
colors, almost as if it were a black and white image with some dull colors. The
seeing was a moving image.
Two of her inner seeing samples involved the seeing of motion. In sample 2.2,
described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above, JS was innerly seeing her
father’s auto mechanic shop. The seeing was in motion; however, nothing was moving at
the moment of the sample. The other example is sample 5.6, just described.
One of her inner seeing samples was seen from an aerial perspective:
Sample 2.1. JS had been reading what her friend wrote on Facebook regarding
leaving the mall. At the moment of the sample, she was innerly seeing the Guess
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store in the mall. She was seeing the Guess store from an aerial perspective (one
which she had never taken, and which is impossible in reality to take). The seeing
was blurry, not in focus. Although the seeing was in color, the colors were dull
and less vibrant than in reality. She also had some sense that she was going to the
mall on Sunday.
Similar to the examples described above, this sample was also innerly seen as blurry and
in dull colors.
One of her inner seeing samples involved innerly seeing a word:
Sample 2.3. JS had been searching through her notes for something about the
Greek polis. She had come to a sentence with the word “polis” in it before the
sample. At the moment of the sample, she was innerly seeing the word “polis” as
if it stood out from the other words, and was saying “polis” in inner speech. This
speech was somehow extended in time in a way that external speech cannot be. It
was as if she had said “polis” a few seconds ago and was still saying it, not in any
drawn out way (not “pooolllliiiiis”) and not repetitive (not “polis polis polis”),
and not an echo. She was innerly saying polis, which seemed to have the same
vocal characteristics of external speech, and yet was extended in time.
Words Present
Four of JS’s inner experience samples involved the presence of words (17%) that
did not have any perceptual characteristics. In these samples, specific words or letters
were present in her experience; however, the actual words were not seen or spoken or
heard or read—the words were simply there. Here are examples:
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Sample 4.1. JS had just finished reading a text message her friend, Patricia, had
sent her asking, “Who said that, Danny?” At the moment of the sample, JS was
thinking the words “Ha ha, how did you know” which was what she was about to
type in response to the text. The words came sequentially; that is, they were
present one after the other in JS’s experience. However, they were not
experienced as innerly heard or said and did not have any other voice
characteristics. They were also not experienced as innerly seen. Thus these exact
words were experienced as being produced without any of the characteristics
typically associated with word production, hearing, or seeing.
Sample 5.4. JS had been talking on the phone and just said bye. At the moment
of the sample, the word bye was still present in her experience without any
perceptual representation. That is, bye was somehow present, but it was not
spoken, heard, or seen.
In one of these samples, a name was present:
Sample 5.2. JS was scrolling through her touch screen cellular phone, searching
for her friend’s name, Rita, in her contact list. At the moment of the sample, the
name Rita was present in her experience without being articulated. JS was aware
of the name Rita and was looking for it but had not yet found it. JS was also
seeing the names in her phone as she scrolled through them. The physical act of
scrolling was not in her experience.
Not Semantic Words
In three of her samples, JS was not experiencing the meaning of the words present
in her experience at the moment (13%). In sample 2.3, described in detail in the Inner
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Seeing section above, JS was both innerly seeing and innerly saying the word “polis.”
However, the meaning of the word “polis” was not in her experience at the moment. The
seeing and saying of the word continued in her experience after the semantic value of the
word had passed. Sample 2.2, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section above,
seems related to the non-semantic topic. In that sample, JS was reading about Aristotle’s
“mechanics,” meaning the science of physics, but at the same time innerly seeing her
father’s automobile mechanic shop. Thus the relationship between the inner seeing and
the outer context was through a clang association, rather than a semantic association.
Here is the other example:
Sample 5.5. JS was watching a baseball game on TV that was between innings
and had heard the announcer say the word Minnesota. At the moment of the
sample, she continued to hear the announcer’s articulation of the word Minnesota
even though it was no longer being said and no longer had any specific meaning.
She was also seeing the pitcher on the screen warming up on the pitcher’s mound.
Happening Of
In some of the other participants, the investigators noticed a characteristic
described as the “happening of” experience: action that is occurring without a sense of
being produced or created. There were three samples (13%) where JS did not experience
herself as being the agent of her actions. Here is an example:
Sample 3.4. JS was walking down the aisle in the grocery store when her mom
had asked her if she could get rice. At the moment of the sample, JS was saying
“brown?” This questioning word seemed to be rolling out unbidden; it was not as
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if JS had the sense of wondering what kind of rice to buy, not as if there was an
inner seeing of rice packages, and so on.
In this sample, JS’s saying “brown?” The questioning word seemed to be rolling out.
Here is another example:
Sample 3.2. JS and her mom were driving to the store; mom was driving. JS had
just finished telling her mom she wanted to wait for her in the car. At the moment
of the sample, she was looking at her mom as she was driving. She was idly
seeing her mom but not paying particular attention to any feature of her mom.
Sample 4.6. JS had been conversing with her friend, Barbara. Barbara had said
something funny and both Barbara and JS had started laughing. JS’s laugh was
somewhat amplified because she always found the manner of Barbara’s laugh
annoying, so that seemed to contribute to an increase in JS’s own laughter, even
though none of that was directly in her experience. At the moment of the sample,
JS was simply laughing. There was nothing else in her experience, not the
content of their conversation nor Barbara’s annoying laugh.
Anticipation
Two of JS’s samples (8%) involved anticipating finding something. In sample
5.2, described in detail in Words Present section above, JS was searching for her friend’s
name, Rita, in her contact list on her touch screen phone. Here is the other example:
Sample 4.3. JS was preparing to continue watching the movie, The Last Song,
that she had seen before until a certain point (she had not seen the end). At the
moment of the sample, she was fast forwarding the movie to find the part she had
not seen. In her experience, JS was somehow processing the duration of the fast
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forward (she was intermittently stopping the DVD to see whether she had already
seen that part). JS was also seeing her friend, Tammy, standing to the right of her
folding clothes. JS was more focused on the folding of the clothes than any
particular aspect of Tammy. JS’s report of seeing Tammy during the expositional
interview involved gesturing with her left hand to her left side as if she had seen
Tammy folding clothes to her left at the moment of the sample.
In this sample, JS was searching for the part of the movie she had not seen.
Listening With Comprehension
In two of her inner experience samples (8%), JS was listening with
comprehension. In these samples, JS was comprehending the words spoken to her. Here
are the samples:
Sample 3.1. JS had been getting ready to go to the grocery store with her mom.
At the moment of the sample, she was hearing her mom say, “should we leave
him in or out?” regarding their dog. JS was listening and absorbing what her
mom was saying. There was nothing else in her experience.
Sample 3.3. JS was at the grocery store with her mom. JS was walking ahead of
her mom. At the moment of the sample, JS was hearing her mom say to her,
“slow down!” in an angry tone. JS was listening and absorbing what her mom
was saying. There was nothing else in her experience.
Infrequently Occurring Characteristics
JS had six characteristics that each occurred once (4%) in her inner experience.
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Focus on words (rather than sentences).
In one of her samples, JS was focused on a word rather than a sentence. In
sample 2.3, described in detail in Inner Seeing section above, JS was innerly seeing the
word “polis” (part of a sentence). JS was not attending to the rest of the sentence.
“Polis” was the only word in her experience at the moment.
Emotion.
JS did not experience any feelings in any of her samples. However, during one
sample, there may have been an ongoing emotion. In sample 4.6, described in detail in
Happening Of section above, JS was laughing in an amplified way at something funny
her friend had said; however, she was not directly experiencing a feeling (e.g., happy,
humorous, annoyed) at the moment.
Doing of.
In one of her samples, JS was planfully involved in the completion of an activity.
Here is the example:
Sample 5.1. JS was text messaging her friend and, at the moment of the sample,
was texting the word class. Before the sample, JS had thought the letter c and
then pushed the key c in her phone, followed by thinking the letter l and then
pushing the key l in her phone, followed by thinking the letter a and then pushing
the key a in her phone. In her experience, JS was thinking the letter ss. The
letters ss were present in her experience as a unit. She was not innerly saying ss,
innerly hearing ss, or innerly seeing ss. JS was confident that in this experience
there was an explicit thinking followed by a texting of each letter; think-textthink-text-think-text.
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Inner Speech.
JS experienced inner speech in one sample. In sample 2.3, described in detail in
Inner Seeing section above, JS was innerly saying the word “polis.” In her experience,
the innerly spoken word seemed to be extended in time in a way that external speech is
incapable of, and had no meaning whatsoever.
Reading with comprehension.
In one of JS’s samples, she was reading with comprehension. Here is the
example:
Sample 4.5. JS was reading the text message, “Are you home yet?” her mom had
just sent her. In her experience, she was simultaneously looking at the text
message and recognizing the meaning.
Unsymbolized thinking.
Unsymbolized thinking occurred once in JS’s inner experience samples. Here is
the example:
Sample 3.5. JS was outside with her mom while her mom was cooking burgers
on the grill. At the moment of the sample, JS was hearing her mom say “flip it”
with regard to the burgers. JS was thinking, without words or images or other
symbols, that she needed to go get the spatula and then flip the burgers. Even
though this thought described a sequence of actions, the thought itself was not
sequential—the notion of getting the spatula and then flipping was all present at
the same time. JS was not sure whether there was also an inner seeing at the
moment of the sample. It seems likely that this is a presupposition: that she
always thinks in images.
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Discussion
Overall, JS’s samples of inner experience suggest that she is experiencing sensory
awareness and inner seeing much of the time. Words were present only rarely in her
inner experience, and, when they were present, her overall experience with them was
unusual. JS had one sample of inner speech, one of the most frequent forms of words in
experience. JS did not have any samples that included feelings.
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CHAPTER 14
“TS”
TS was a 35-year-old Caucasian male who sampled with us in May and June
2011. TS received a laterality quotient of -45 on the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory
(EHI; Oldfield, 1971) indicating that he is moderately left-handed. He received a GSI
raw score of 0.316 (a T-score, compared to nonpatients, of 55) on the Symptom
Checklist-90-R (SCL-90; Derogatis, 1994; Derogatis, Lipman, & Covi, 1973), suggesting
the absence of clinically significant psychological difficulties.
Characteristics of Inner Experience
TS sampled on five separate occasions, collecting a total of 28 samples. Because
Sampling Day 1 is considered training for participants, samples from this day were
omitted and 24 of TS’s samples were considered as reflecting his inner experience
characteristics. The following characteristics of his inner experience will be discussed:
sensory awareness, occurring in 17 samples (71%); multiple experience, occurring in 16
samples (67%); feeling, occurring in 11 samples (46%); inner seeing, occurring in 3
samples (13%); doing of, occurring in 3 samples (13%); anticipation, occurring in 3
samples (13%); emotion; occurring in 2 samples (8%); not semantic words, occurring in
2 samples (8%); and unsymbolized thinking, occurring in 1 sample (4%).
Sensory Awareness
Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring characteristic in TS’s inner
experience, occurring in 17 of TS’s samples (71%). Here is an example:
Sample 5.4. TS was sitting on his couch eating a sandwich. At the moment of the
sample, he was seeing his living room though he was not paying attention to any
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particular aspect of the living room. He was feeling the sandwich in his left hand;
this was a pressure against his hand, not the feeling of the roughness or softness of
the bread. He was also feeling pressure in his cheeks, roof of mouth, and weight
on his tongue from a bite of sandwich in his mouth. He was also tasting the
saltiness and sweetness of the corned beef on pumpernickel of the sandwich.
In this sample, TS was experiencing multiple sensory awareness aspects all related to the
act of eating his sandwich. In fact, all that was in his awareness was the sensory aspects
of this activity. Including sample 5.4, TS had four samples in which sensory awareness
was the only phenomenon present in his inner experience—that is, TS was not paying
attention to anything other than the sensory aspects of his inner or outer environment.
Here is another example:
Sample 2.2. TS was in the bathroom getting ready for the day. He had been
positioning a contact lens onto the middle finger of his left hand with his right
hand in preparation for inserting it into his eye. At the moment of the sample, he
was feeling the contact lens on his left middle finger. He was also seeing the
contact lens; simultaneously, he was also seeing the mirror, sink, and other items
on the bathroom counter. These other items were as individually distinctly seen
as was the contect lens; they were not merely part of the background of the
contact lens activity. Thus, even though he was performing a very localized task
(positioning the contact lens), he was also simultaneously seeing as part of his
direct experience much that was irrelevant to the task.
Five of TS’s sensory awareness samples involved the sensory awareness of
words. Here is an example:
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Sample 2.1. TS was on the social networking site Facebook on his computer. He
was clicking on the link profile with the intention of removing an unflattering
picture of himself. At the moment, he was trying to complete the aforementioned
task. There was an active, conscious trying to get it done in his experience. That
is, he was not idly or automatically accomplishing the task. He was also seeing
the word profile on the computer screen, the rest of the computer, and the desk
surrounding. The word profile was the center of his visual experience though he
was not attending to the word for its meaning; that is, profile is seen as a visual
object rather than a semantic word. He was also seeing all the irrelevant-to-thetask stuff on the computer screen. He was also feeling the mouse in his right
hand. He was interested in the feeling of the mouse in his hand rather than
manipulating the mouse.
In this sample, TS was not interested in the word profile for its meaning.
One of TS’s sensory awareness samples involved the seeing of nothing. In this
sample, TS was having a visual experience; however, the experience was of seeing
blackness which happened to be an absence of light or nothing. Here is the sample:
Sample 4.2. TS had just lain down on the couch and closed his eyes. At the
moment, he was seeing a fuzzy blackness that uniformly filled his visual field,
like a black screen; however, he described the blackness as like an absence of
light. He experienced himself to be seeing something (the blackness) though
there was nothing to be seen. That is, he experienced himself to be seeing but not
seeing anything. He was also experiencing a mental relief/relaxation/good
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feeling. This mental relief/relaxation/good feeling was ongoing in his direct
experience but not felt bodily.
In this sample, TS experienced a sensory awareness even when there was “nothing to be
seen.”
Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring phenomenon in TS’s inner
experience. In such situations, it is reasonable to ask whether TS simply uses a language
that sounds like sensory awareness rather than sensory awareness being a frequent
phenomenon. The investigators note that during the expositional interviews, he
confidently distinguished between experiences that did and did not include sensory
awareness. Here is an example that does not contain sensory awareness:
Sample 3.5. TS was sitting at his desk with his eyes directed at his desk, though
he was not seeing the desk at the moment. He had been thinking about how he
does not plan on telling his parents about his upcoming motorcycle trip until he
returns from the trip. He had been (and perhaps still was) wondering what he will
tell his parents when he returns from the trip—wondering how he will say it—but
it seems that this wondering, while perhaps cognitively ongoing, was not
experienced at the moment. At the moment, he was experiencing a rising sense of
obligation, a mental experience that could not be further described. He also may
have been experiencing an awareness of the ongoing thought process regarding
how and what he will tell his parents, but he was not experiencing the thought
itself.
In this sample, TS’s eyes were aimed at the desk, but he was not seeing the desk at the
moment.
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Multiple Experience
Sixteen of TS’s samples involved multiple experiences (67%). In these samples,
TS was attending to a welter of environmental stimuli (inner and outer) despite the
relevancy to the target of his experience at the moment. Here is an example:
Sample 3.1. TS was brushing his teeth. At the moment, he was tasting the minty
flavor of the toothpaste; feeling the bristles of the toothbrush in his mouth; feeling
the hard plastic of the toothbrush in his mouth; and feeling the hard plastic of the
toothbrush in his left hand. The act of brushing his teeth was not in his
experience. He was also seeing the bathroom mirror, his reflection in the mirror,
counter, and surrounding wall. He was attending to the visual seeing at a low
level. He was not paying attention to any particular aspect of the bathroom. All
the sensory aspects of this—both the physical sensations and the visual—were
understood to be somehow unified; one thing with several aspects.
In this sample, similar to other samples of TS’s inner experience, TS was not interested in
any one aspect of brushing his teeth. Rather, he was interested in multiple sensations that
were coming at him equally more or less. Similarly, TS was attending to multiple visual
stimuli, granted at a low level in this particular example, rather than focusing on one
relevant visual stimulus. This is consistent across TS’s inner experience. The same can
be said of TS’s feeling samples, discussed below. Rather than directly experiencing one
salient feeling, a variety of emotions, both positive and negative, come at TS. After
weighing all of them, he is able to say whether the overall experience was negative or
positive, depending on the weight of each. It is as if TS experiences the ingredients that
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make up his inner and outer environments and present themselves to him rather than
seeking out a stimulus to focus on and experience.
Six of TS’ multiple experience samples include one or more sensory awareness
along with a feeling. The other combinations of multiple experiences occurred with
lower frequency. Here is an example of sensory awareness/feeling:
Sample 4.4. TS was sitting on the couch, changing the channels. At the moment,
he was feeling the controller sitting on his right hand and feeling his right thumb
resting on the up-channel button. At the same time, he was seeing the TV
program, an episode of South Park. TS was not directly attending to the South
Park scene, but rather he was attending to the visual aspects of the South Park
display. He was also, but somewhat less distinctly, seeing the rest of the TV
screen, the TV cabinet, and the adjacent parts of the living room. He was
enjoying the South Park episode, which he had been watching for perhaps a
minute as he channel surfed, and he was experiencing in some way this enjoyment
even though he was particularly attending to the visual aspect of South Park
rather than its story line or content. He was also experiencing a mental
indecisiveness and curiosity--he was curious about what else was on TV. The
investigators questioned him carefully about the degree to which the off-center
visual characteristics (TV cabinet, living room, etc.) were present, and as
carefully as could be ascertained, he was indeed directly experiencing these
things. It was not merely that they were present and could be looked at in
response to the beep.
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In this example, TS was feeling the controller (sensory awareness), feeling his right
thumb resting on a button (sensory awareness), seeing the visual presentation of the TV
(sensory awareness), and experiencing a mental indecisiveness or curiosity (feeling). He
was attending to separate experiences (the feeling of the controller and his thumb, the
visual presentation of the show, and a mental indecisiveness/curiosity) simultaneously.
Feeling
Eleven of TS’s samples (46%) involved his experience of feeling. None of TS’s
samples of feeling involved a physical representation of the feeling. Six of his samples
involved mentally experiencing the feeling. Here is an example:
Sample 5.5. TS was sitting on the couch. He was debating on whether or not he
should apply for another job or call it a night, but this cognitive debate was not in
his experience. At the moment, he was seeing his living room. He was also
experiencing a mental state of tension and indecisiveness. [It was his sense that
this tension/indecisiveness arose from his cognitive debate, but that is an
inference.]
Including sample 5.5, just described, there were five samples where TS was
experiencing some kind of mental tension or pressure. Here are other examples:
Sample 3.3. TS was sitting at his desk, looking out the window. He was
experiencing a sense of indecisiveness or tension, a mental pressure about having
to make a decision. The indecisiveness/tension/pressure was regarding whether
or not he should wait until his next oil change to check his brakes, but this content
(the brakes) was not directly in his experience at the moment. [It was as if the
brake-decision process was taking place somewhere in TS outside of his
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awareness, leaving in its wake, so to speak, the indecisiveness/tension/pressure
which was directly experienced.] He was also seeing (directly in his experience)
the window, shades, and surrounding wall in his bedroom.
Sample 3.6. TS was sitting at his desk. At the moment of the sample, he was
seeing the words St. Francis U written in red ink on a notepad. TS was seeing the
words both for their sensory qualities (red ink against a white background) and as
a reminder of wanting to apply to schools. TS was also seeing the rest of the
notepad, the desk, and rest of the bedroom at the same time. He was also
experiencing a mental pressure of needing to complete certain tasks today.
Sample 5.2. TS was driving on South Eastern towards a grocery store,
Albertsons. He saw through his windshield the street, cars ahead, and stores. He
simultaneously saw the instruments and window inside the cabin of his vehicle.
He was not focused on any particular aspect of the seeing; in particular, he was
not seeing the street or the cars with any more focus or attention than the objects
inside the car. He was also hearing the humming of his jeep. He was also feeling
the pressure of the steering wheel against his hand; this was a felt pressure on his
hand, not a sensation of the steering wheel itself. He was experiencing a mental
sense of tension and impatience.
Similar to TS’s other feeling samples discussed below, it is not clear whether tension and
pressure should be called feelings. Certainly they are not typical of the feelings that other
DES participants experience.
There were four samples where TS seemed to be undergoing a simultaneous
collection of unintegrated positive and negative states that were perhaps slightly
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differentiated, but which do no cohere or coalesce into a feeling or a feeling that DES
finds in other subjects. Here are examples:
Sample 2.5. TS was sitting at his desk. At the moment, he was innerly seeing a
photograph of his girlfriend, Carla. That is, he was not innerly seeing Carla— he
was seeing a photograph of Carla. He was seeing Carla’s head from the neck up.
Carla’s head was slightly tilted to her right such that he was seeing the left side of
her face. He was seeing this in color. He was seeing the neckline of her yellow
shirt, blue sky, and a little bit of clouds. The innerly seen Carla-photograph was,
as far as he could tell, an accurate representation of the real photograph. He was
also experiencing an undifferentiated multitude of positive and negative mental
emotions including uncertainty, attraction, pressure to make a decision regarding
the relationship, ambivalence, and a sense of security. The valence of this
experiencing was, on balance, positive, but the individual ingredients were both
positive and negative. He did not experience any of the feelings separately or
distinctly, but rather felt an undifferentiated valenced something that could be said
to include uncertainty, attraction, pressure to make a decision regarding the
relationship, ambivalence, and a sense of security.
Sample 4.5. TS was sitting at his desk submitting a job application to the
University of Limerick in Ireland. At the moment of the sample, he was focused
on the word Limerick as it was displayed on the screen. However, this focus was
not on the word “Limerick” but on the visual display “Limerick.” That is, he was
not seeing a word; he was seeing a visual display. He was also seeing the rest of
the webpage, computer, desk, and rest of his room to a lesser degree. He was
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experiencing a host of positive and negative sensations related to the potential of
living and working in Ireland, which he described as including apprehension and
excitement. Overall, the sensation was more excitement and apprehension thus
the general sensation was more positive.
Sample 5.3. TS was sitting at his desk looking at the computer screen. At the
moment of the sample, he was focused on the biesieda part of the e-mail address
michael.biesieda@unlv.edu. He was still seeing the rest of the e-mail address, the
computer screen, desk, and part of his bedroom; however, biesieda was central in
his visual experience. He was not attending to biesieda as a word or name or
email address; rather he was attending to its visual presentation. To a lesser
degree, he was attending to the blackness of the letters against the white
background. He was also experiencing a sense of happiness, relief, uncertainty,
and the urge to get answers to questions, all one “ball” of experience with those
aspects. Some of these aspects were positive, some negative; the overall sense
was more positive than negative.
There does not seem to be a clear answer to the question of whether these experiences
should be called emotional. The samples contain bits of things that might be called
emotion or feeling (uncertainty, attraction, etc.), but even those are not unequivocally an
emotion: should uncertainty, attraction, pressure to make a decision be called emotions?
And even if they are called emotions, they are not coherent emotions or even several
coherent emotions, much less coherent feelings—his experiences are more like the
ingredients of emotion/feeling rather than the emotion or feeling itself. And even if it is
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accepted that they are feelings, they are only a minor aspect of his experience, typically
the third or less salient aspect.
There were three samples where TS was experiencing some kind of uncertainty,
interest, or anticipation. Here are the samples:
Sample 2.6. TS was sitting at his desk, applying for jobs. At the moment of the
sample, TS was apprehending where he will be living and what he will be doing.
This was not a cognitive process, however. TS was experiencing a sense of
uncertainty, opportunity, and anticipation. This seemed to be a mush of emotions
that were, taken together, more positive than negative.
Sample 3.2. TS was lying on his bed, reading a book. At the moment, he was
seeing the word Kolya, the name of a male character in the book. He was also
seeing the words surrounding Kolya, the rest of the book, and his room. The
word Kolya was clear. The visual seeing became progressively less clear the
further removed from Kolya. He was not attending to the word Kolya in context,
and, at the moment, he was unaware of the rest of the sentence, paragraph, etc.
He was also wondering what Kolya was going to do next. This sensation
involved an interest and curiosity surrounding what will happen next with the
character. This was a state of curiosity and interest rather than a cognitive
thought process.
Sample 4.4. TS was sitting on the couch, changing the channels. At the moment,
he was feeling the controller sitting on his right hand and feeling his right thumb
resting on the up-channel button. At the same time, he was seeing the TV
program, an episode of South Park. TS was not directly attending to the South
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Park scene, but rather he was attending to the visual aspects of the South Park
display. He was also, but somewhat less distinctly, seeing the rest of the TV
screen, the TV cabinet, and the adjacent parts of the living room. He was
enjoying the South Park episode, which he had been watching for perhaps a
minute as he channel surfed, and he was experiencing in some way this enjoyment
even though he was particularly attending to the visual aspect of South Park
rather than its story line or content. He was also experiencing a mental
indecisiveness and curiosity--he was curious about what else was on TV. The
investigators questioned him carefully about the degree to which the off-center
visual characteristics (TV cabinet, living room etc.) were present, and as carefully
as could be ascertained, he was indeed directly experiencing these things. It was
not merely that they were present and could be looked at in response to the beep.
Here again, it is not clear whether we should call uncertainty, interest, or anticipation
feelings or emotions. Certainly they are not typical of the feelings that other DES
participants experience.
There were two samples where TS was experiencing happiness or a good feeling.
One of those was just described: at sample 4.4 he was enjoying the South Park episode.
In sample 4.2, described in detail in Sensory Awareness section, TS was seeing
blackness. He was also experiencing a mental relief/relaxation/good feeling.
Inner Seeing
TS’s inner experience featured inner seeing in three of his samples (13%). One
example, in sample 2.5, has already been described in Emotion section above. In this
example, TS was innerly seeing a photograph of his girlfriend Carla. He was seeing
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Carla’s head from the neck up. In the innerly seen photograph, Carla’s head was tilted
and TS was seeing the left side of her face. It is worth emphasizing that TS was not
seeing Carla; he was seeing a photograph of Carla. Here is another example:
Sample 3.4. TS was sitting at his desk with a pair of jeans draped over his legs.
He had been thinking of how to sew the hole in the crotch of these jeans. At the
moment, he was seeing the physical jeans, his legs, the chair he was sitting on,
and the carpet. At the same time, he was seeing an imaginary needle in his left
hand and green thread dangling from the thread. He was also seeing a few
imaginary strands of green thread sewn into his real blue jeans as if he were
halfway done sewing them. The strands were seen as messy and uneven. He was
unable to differentiate whether there was an explicit, additional thought process
regarding how to sew the jeans or if the imaginary needle and thread represented
such thought process.
In this sample, TS was projecting an innerly seen or imaginary image onto the physical
world. His seeing involved a mixture of seeing the external world and inner seeing
combined together into one coherent seeing. Although TS has a small percentage of
inner seeing in his experience, when he does experience inner seeing, it is as if he blends
his inner images with his outer world.
Doing Of
In three samples of TS’s inner experience (13%), TS was experientially involved
in the deliberating and directing of the mental processes or physical actions. This
phenomenon is called “doing of.” One example has already been discussed in Sensory
Awareness section above. In sample 2.2, TS was concentrating on the task of putting a
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contact lens in his eye. He was consciously adjusting the lens with his right hand. Here
is another example:
Sample 5.1. TS was walking towards his mailbox, outside in his apartment
complex, to get his mail. At the moment, he was seeing the street, mailboxes
ahead, apartment buildings, Sunset Road, and the airport; he saw all these
simultaneously in his direct experience. He was also experiencing motion or his
movement through space. He was feeling directed pressure on the bottom of his
feet as part of the motion, feeling the contribution of his feet to his motion. That
is, he was not merely moving through space; he was directly experiencing that
movement.
Anticipation
Three of TS’s samples of involved an anticipatory state (13%). One, sample 2.3,
discussed in the Emotion section below, involved anticipating feeling carefree, but not
actually experiencing the carefree-ness. Here is another example:
Sample 4.3. TS was standing in his kitchen raising a shot glass of whiskey in his
left hand. In his experience, he was feeling the shot glass in his left hand, but he
was not paying any particular attention to any of its aspects—not, for example, to
the smoothness or hardness, or coldness of the shot glass. He was also seeing the
yellowish-brownish liquid inside the shot glass, which he knew to be whiskey.
He was more attending to the yellowish-brownish of the liquid than to its
whiskeyness. He was also anticipating the sensory aspects of the about-to-takeplace drink: the sweet taste, the feel of the liquid, the burning sensation, etc.
There seemed to be some evaluation of these sensations. Some were positive
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(taste, feel, etc.) and some were negative (burn). The positive and negative
anticipated sensations were bundled up together and the resulting anticipation
was, “on balance,” more positive than negative.
One of TS’s anticipation samples involved some kind of searching. In this
sample, TS was actively involved in looking for some specific thing. This looking was
more than a sensory awareness or perceptual experience of seeing the stimuli. Here is the
example:
Sample 4.1. TS was sitting on the couch reading a book. At the moment, he was
seeing the word aberration. He was focused on that word but was also seeing the
sentence of which it was a part, “What aberration?” including the quotation
marks, question mark, and What were in his experience to a lesser degree. He
was also seeing the blackness of the print against the yellowish-white pages of the
book, the rest of the book, and his legs, couch, and carpet. The seeing decreased
in focus the further away from aberration. Equal or perhaps slightly more in his
experience he was also “mentally scanning” or recalling what the definition of the
word aberration is. This involved a recalling of the dictionary-type definition of
aberration as well as what that word meant in the present context (more on the
definition). This scanning was a mental search or waiting-for, not a visual
process.
This is the only occasion in which explicit words with meaning appeared in TS’s inner
experience. In this sample, TS was seeing the word aberration and mentally scanning for
the definition. When TS does, for whatever reason, call for the meaning of a word he
seems to actively seek out and search for the definition.
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Thus TS on occasion anticipated feeling, finding, or sensing something.
Emotion
In DES (and many others’) terminology, “emotion” refers to an ongoing process
that might be called affective, and typically includes sadness, anxiety, fear, anger, and so
on. “Feeling” is the experience of emotion. Emotional processes may well be occurring
but are outside of direct experience; those are emotions but not feelings. TS had two
samples (8%) which might be said to involve emotion, depending on how the term
“emotion” is defined, but none which might uncontroversially be said to include feeling
(see Feeling section above). Here is an example:
Sample 2.3. TS was innerly seeing a motorcycle as if he were sitting on it, seeing
the gas tank, instruments, his forearms, hands, (straight) highway, and
surrounding desert. The intricacies of the motorcycle were seen clearly but not
greatly detailed. He was innerly seeing this in color (the motorcycle was grey).
He was also anticipating feeling carefree and thrilled, but the carefree-ness and
thrilled-ness were not experienced. That is, he was directly experiencing
anticipation, and the anticipation was of feeling carefree and thrilled, but he was
not feeling carefree or thrilled.
In this sample, TS was anticipating a feeling but he was not directly experiencing that
feeling at that moment.
TS’s other sample of emotion involved the recollection of a feeling though he was
not directly experiencing the feeling at the moment:
Sample 4.6. TS was lying on the couch, watching the movie Star Wars on TV.
He was seeing the space craft and desert on the TV screen. He was also seeing
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the rest of the TV and living room within his visual field. He was also recalling
having experienced a sense of excitement, being challenged, competition,
winning, and frustration during a time he played the video game version of the
movie. He was not directly experiencing those sensations at the moment, he was
recalling having experienced them.
This sample is, in a sense, opposite from his anticipation of a feeling sample. Rather than
having his attention directed at the future, his attention is focused on the past. In both
samples, however, the notion of a feeling is present though TS is not directly
experiencing a feeling.
Not Semantic Words
Words were present in five of TS’s inner experience samples. In all five samples,
TS was attending to the visual characteristics of the words. In two of these samples (8%),
TS was only attending to the visual presentation of the word and not attending to the
word in context or for meaning. One example has already been described in detail in
Sensory Awareness section above. In sample 2.1, TS was seeing the word profile on the
computer screen. TS was not attending to the word for its meaning. Here is the other
example:
Sample 5.6. TS was sitting on his couch with a map of Washington on his lap.
He had been planning his upcoming trip and trying to decide on a path to take. At
the moment, the notion that surface streets have a long list of directional changes
which aren’t easy to memorize and difficult to look up when on a motorcycle was
present to him without words, images, or any other symbolic presentation. He
was also seeing the word Seattle on the map, the words and lines on the rest of the
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map, his legs, couch, and carpet around him. The word Seattle was central in his
visual experience; however, he was not attending to the wordness of the word.
Rather it was as if he was seeing a visual display which happened to involve
semantic symbols.
In these samples, it is as if TS is able to separate words from their meaning and attend to
their visual display. At any given moment, words in TS’s experience do not appear to
hold communicative characteristics; they are viewed as objects rather than semantic
carriers. Meaning sometimes seemed to pass through TS without his paying much if any
attention to it.
Unsymbolized Thinking
Unsymbolized thinking occurred in one of TS’s samples (4%). This example has
already been described in detail in Not Semantic Words section above. In sample 5.6, the
notion that that surface streets have a long list of directional changes was present without
words, images, or any other symbolic representation.
Discussion
Overall, TS’s samples of inner experience suggest that he experiences sensory
awareness (71%), multiple experience (67%), and feeling (46%) much of the time. It is
noteworthy to mention that, although TS experienced feeling much of the time, his
samples of feeling are not typical samples that other DES participants experience. Words
occurred only rarely in TS’s inner experience, and his overall experience with words was
unusual. Meaning did not seem directly connected to words, that is meaning could be
absent when words were present.
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CHAPTER 15
ACROSS-PARTICIPANTS RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The previous 10 chapters were dedicated to describing the experience of the 10
participants (AH, BP, CL, DH, NT, MM, MO, KA, JS, TS). Each chapter provided an
idiographic description of each participants’ inner experience. In this chapter, the
collection of samples across all participants will be considered and the characteristics,
patterns, and tendencies that emerged will be discussed.
The present study was designed with three objectives in mind: 1) to explore the
inner experience of left-handers; 2) compare the inner experience of the 10 left-handed
participants to the inner experience of the left-handed participants in Mizrachi (2010);
and 3) to compare the inner experience of left-handers to the inner experience of the
general population. The investigators were interested in the inner experience of lefthanders not because they themselves are left-handed (both of the two investigators
happen to be right-handed); however, given the research surrounding implications of
left-handedness, the investigators were interested in possible inner experiential
differences between left- and right-handers. Results are divided into five sections. The
first section presents the participants’ frequently occurring characteristics. The second
section discusses other observations found across participants. The third section reviews
the present results compared to the literature. The fourth section reviews the overall
findings of the present study. The last section of this chapter discusses the limitations of
this study and directions for future research.
The across-participants results are based on a total of 217 samples of inner
experience from 10 left-handed participants. Their characteristics are shown in Table 2.
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The table is arranged by participants’ scores on the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory
(EHI), a quantitative assessment of handedness administered to evaluate handedness
laterality. As evidenced by the participants’ EHI scores ranging from -100 (strongly left
handed) to -45 (moderately left-handed), all of the participants were moderately to
strongly left-handed. As can be seen in Table 2, degree of laterality, at least within this
fairly narrow range of laterality, does not seem to impact frequency of characteristics of
inner experience in the 10 participants. Therefore, the results discussed below apply to
the left-handed participants as a group, not merely to the more extremely left-handed
participants. Nonetheless, the table is arranged by decreasing EHI scores.
Table 2
Frequently occurring or otherwise noteworthy characteristics of inner experience
Characteristic

AH

BP

CL

DH

NT

EHI
Age
Gender
Number of
samples
Sensory
Awarenessb
Multiple
Experience
Inner Seeing

-100
18
M
20
9%
14
70%
6
40%
2
10%
3
15%
13
65%
4
20%
3
15%
0
0%
3
15%
4
20%

-75
18
F
20
9%
5
25%
1
5%
0
0%
5
25%
3
15%
8
40%
0
0%
1
5%
2
10%
0
0%

-75
18
F
18
8%
7
39%
1
6%
6
33%
1
6%
1
6%
2
11%
6
33%
0
0%
1
6%
2
11%

-73
18
M
24
11%
11
46%
4
17%
9
38%
4
17%
7
29%
7
29%
1
4%
3
13%
1
4%
3
13%

-68
28
M
23
11%
16
70%
10
43%
2
9%
10
43%
3
13%
0
0%
1
4%
8
35%
0
0%
2
9%

Not Semantic
Words
Unsymbolized
Thinking
Inner Speech
Feeling
Doing Of
Inner Hearing
Emotion

Participant
MM
MO
-67
18
F
20
9%
12
60%
2
10%
0
0%
5
25%
7
35%
0
0%
0
0%
3
14%
1
5%
0
0%

a

-53
18
F
23
11%
18
78%
0
0%
2
9%
2
9%
4
17%
2
9%
2
9%
0
0%
2
9%
0
0%

KA

JS

TS

All

-53
21
F
21
9%
2
10%
4
19%
13
62%
5
24%
0
0%
3
14%
1
14%
3
14%
7
33%
1
5%

-50
19
F
24
11%
5
21%
0
0%
5
21%
3
15%
1
4%
1
4%
0
0%
1
4%
0
0%
1
4%

-45
35
M
24
11%
17
71%
16
67%
3
13%
2
8%
1
4%
0
0%
11
46%
3
13%
0
0%
2
8%

-66
21.1
217
100%
107
49%
44
20%
42
19%
40
18%
40
18%
27
12%
25
12%
22
10%
17
8%
15
7%
b

Comparisona
Mizr. H&H
2008
2010
-74.5
18.5
101
100%
35%
16%
24%

34%

5%c
20%

22%

9%

26%

4%

26%

8%
4%
5%c

Note. Frequencies from Mizrachi (2010) and Heavey and Hurlburt (2008). Main
characteristics from Heavey & Hurlburt (2008) are in bold face. cFrequencies of Not
Semantic Words and Emotion were not reported in Mizrachi (2010), italicized
frequencies presented in table were reconstructed from her data.
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22%

As shown in Table 2, each participant contributed approximately ten percent of
the total number of samples: AH contributed 20 of these samples (9%), BP 20 (9%), CL
18 (8%), DH 24 (11%), NT 23 (11%), MM 20 (9%), MO 23 (11%), KA 21 (9%), JS 24
(11%), and TS 24 (11%). Sampling began in September 2010 and was completed in June
2011.
Three participants completed sampling within one month of beginning
participation (MM, KA, and MO) and seven participants completed sampling within two
months (AH, CL, JS, NT, BP, DH, and TS). Each participant participated in five
sampling days, collecting an average of five (range: three to seven) samples on each of
those days. Within 24 hours of collecting samples, each participant participated in an
expositional interview; thus there were five expositional interviews per participant. Data
from the first sampling day and its expositional interview was excluded from the
idiographic analysis for each participant as well as from the collective pool of samples
across all participants; therefore four sampling days and expositional interviews were
included in the results and discussion.
Frequently Occurring Characteristics
The frequently occurring characteristics of the inner experience of the participants
are presented in Table 2 in descending order. The rightmost column of Table 2 shows for
comparison the frequencies of the main five characteristics reported by Heavey and
Hurlburt (2008). The main five characteristics reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008)
are shown in bold face in Table 2: sensory awareness, unsymbolized thinking, inner
seeing, feeling, and inner speech. Overall, the findings of the present study suggest that
the characteristics of inner experience in left-handers are quantitatively and qualitatively
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different from the characteristics of inner experience in the general population, as
described by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).
The results of the present study exploring the inner experience of left-handers are
in agreement with the results of Mizrachi (2010), which also explored the innerexperience of left-handers. Both found sensory awareness in left-handers to occur nearly
twice as much as the frequency reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) in the general
population. Similarly, the present study and Mizrachi (2010) both found about a 20%
frequency of inner seeing in their left-handers, which is slightly more than half that
reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008). The present study and Mizrachi (2010) both
found unsymbolized thinking occurring around a frequency of 20% in left-handers, as did
Heavey and Hurlburt (2008). Inner speech occurred at a frequency of around 10% in
both the present study and Mizrachi (2010), less than half of the frequency of inner
speech reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008). The frequency of feeling in both the
present study and Mizrachi (2010) was less than half the frequency found in Heavey and
Hurlburt (2008). Thus it is concluded that the inner experience of left-handers differs
from the inner experience of the general population, as described by Heavey and Hurlburt
(2008).
Sensory Awareness
Sensory awareness is the experience of paying particular attention to some
sensory aspect of the internal or external environment. In such experiences, participants
do not merely attend to an object or stimulus for its functional use, they directly focus
experientially on some particular sensory quality of the object. As shown in Table 2,
sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring characteristic of inner experience
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across participants in the present study (49%), and all 10 subjects experienced it at some
point in their sampling. Moreover, sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring
characteristic in 8 of 10 participants’ inner experience (MO, TS, NT, AH, MM, DH, CL,
JS). Thus sensory awareness was the highest frequency experiential category both across
participants and within most participants. There was variability in sensory awareness
frequency across participants, ranging from 10% to 78%.
This result replicates the finding of Mizrachi’s (2010) study of left-handers:
sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring phenomenon there as well, where it
occurred at a frequency of 22%. Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring
characteristic in 3 of her 6 participants’ inner experience (Mizrachi, 2010). On the other
hand, sensory awareness was the least frequent of the main five characteristics (tied with
unsymbolized thinking) in Heavey and Hurlburt’s stratified random sample (Heavey &
Hurlburt, 2008). Although sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring
characteristic across participants, one participant, KA, reported only two sensory
awareness samples in her inner experience. Of the 10 participants, KA was the only
participant who had substantially fewer sensory awareness samples than did the average
participant in Heavey and Hurlburt (2008). KA’s inner experience differed from the
other nine participants in three other ways. She was the only participant who did not
have any samples of unsymbolized thinking, and she experienced both inner seeing and
inner hearing more than did the other participants. Of the female participants, KA
experienced multiple experience substantially more than did the others.
The majority of instances of sensory awareness described by participants were
similar in nature and content to those reported by Heavey and Hurlburt’s general
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population (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). However, three noteworthy patterns of sensory
awareness emerged in participants’ inner experience samples: sensory awareness of
words or letters; spreading of sensory awareness; and sensory awareness of an imaginary
stimulus.
Five participants (TS, BP, NT, DH, AH) had samples of the sensory awareness of
words and/or letters (total of 20 out of 107 sensory awareness samples). TS, BP, and NT
all had five samples of sensory awareness of words. DH had three samples, and AH had
two. In these samples, the participants were attending to the visual or auditory
characteristics of seen or heard words rather than attending to the meaning of those
words. For example, in sample 5.1, NT was seeing fuzzy black shapes against a white
background. Those fuzzy shapes happened to be letters in a textbook; however, he was
not recognizing them as letters at the moment. This is an example of attending to the
visual qualities of seen words. In sample 4.1, BP’s grandmother was talking. At the
moment of the sample, BP was hearing the vocal/auditory characteristics of her
grandmother’s voice; what the grandmother was saying (that she did not want Sarah
Palin’s daughter to be on Dancing with the Stars any more) was not in her experience.
As mentioned before, the participants were not attending to the functional quality or
semantic meaning of the letters and words in these samples, they were instead
experiencing their sensory quality.
The sensory awareness of words was also found in Mizrachi’s (2010) left-handed
participants. For example, one of Mizrachi’s (2010) participants, NH, was attending to
the sensory aspect of the letter “F” in the word “Forever.” Sensory awareness of words
was not reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008). It is Hurlburt’s impression (personal

214

communication, 2010) that sensory awarenesses of words are rare in the general
population. See also the Not Semantic Words section below.
Three participants’ sensory awareness samples involved the experienced
spreading of a sensory phenomenon (total of 11 samples). Six of AH’s sensory
awareness samples involved movement or spreading. For example, in sample 4.5, AH
was experiencing throbbing originating in the inner portion of his head and extending
outwards towards his skull. MO experienced spreading of sensory awareness in four of
her samples, all four of which involved pain. For example, in sample 4.2, MO was
feeling a surge of pain on the left part of her bottom lip. MM also experienced the
spreading of pain in one of her samples. For example, in sample 4.6, she was
experiencing oscillating stomach pain and discomfort spreading throughout the trunk of
her body. In these samples, the participants’ were attending to some internal sensation
that, at the moment, involved some type of movement.
The third characteristic that emerged in five participants’ sensory awareness
samples was the sensory awareness of imaginary stimuli (CL, AH, JS, MO, NT) for a
total of seven samples. CL and AH both had two samples of sensory awareness of
imaginary stimuli. JS, MO, and NT all had one sample. In these samples, the
participants were attending to the sensory qualities of some imaginary stimulus. Each
sample involves an inner seeing, inner hearing, or imaginary tasting. For example, in
sample 2.3, CL was attending to the ugliness of the whitish/yellowish wall color of an
innerly seen classroom. In sample 2.1, AH was innerly hearing an imaginary, “faded
version” of a text message notification sound, and he was particularly attending to the
faded sensory aspects of this sound. In sample 3.5, MO was tasting a salad; however, she
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was not actually eating a salad and did not have any part of a salad in her mouth at the
moment.
Thus the first general conclusion, the result of replication but with the caveat that
the present findings are based on small samples, is that sensory awareness is a frequent
phenomenon in left-handers, more frequent than in right-handers. The instances of
sensory awareness of words or significance for words suggest that left-handers may have
an unusual way of dealing with letters or words in their experience. The instances of
spreading of sensory awareness suggest that sensory awareness in left-handers is specific
and differentiated. Lastly, sensory awareness of imaginary phenomenon may suggest
that sensory awareness is so central in the inner experience of left-handers that it also
occurs during imaginary experiences. This finding applies to most but not all lefthanders.
Multiple Experience
Multiple experience consists of two or more separate, different, but simultaneous
experiences. Multiple experience occurred at a relatively high frequency across
participants (20%), with eight participants experiencing samples of multiple experience.
Mizrachi (2010) found a similar frequency of multiple experience in her left-handed
participants (16%) (Mizrachi, 2010). Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) did not provide a
specific frequency for multiple experience except to say that no characteristic other than
the main five had a frequency higher than 3%. Thus it is tentatively concluded that lefthanded participants may have a higher frequency of multiple experience than do those in
the general population.

216

As mentioned above, 8 of 10 participants had samples of multiple experience in
their samples. TS’s inner experience included the most frequent multiple experience
samples. Fourteen of his 16 multiple experience samples involved sensory awarenesses,
five of which involved multiple sensory awarenesses. For example, in sample 5.4, TS
was feeling the pressure of a sandwich against his left hand. He was also feeling pressure
in his cheeks, roof of mouth, and weight on his tongue from a bite of sandwich in his
mouth. He was also tasting the saltiness and sweetness of the corned beef on
pumpernickel of the sandwich. The most frequently occurring combination of his
multiple experience samples included one or more sensory awarenesses along with an
emotion. For example, in sample 4.5, TS was focused on the word Limerick as it
displayed on his computer screen. He was attending to the word’s visual characteristics
and not the meaning of the word. He was also experiencing a host of positive and
negative sensations related to the potential of living and working in Ireland. TS’s inner
experience stood out from the other participants in that he also experienced substantially
more feeling than the other participants (see Feeling and Emotion section below). His
feeling samples make up nearly half the total feeling samples in the study. TS also
experienced not semantic words with a lower frequency than the other participants.
NT’s inner experience featured multiple experience in 10 of his samples. Nine of
his samples involved sensory awarenesses, three of which involved multiple sensory
awarenesses. For example, in sample 4.4, NT was chewing a pastry. In his experience
was the sweetness and chewyness of the pastry. He was also simultaneously looking at
jars of brown caramel and experiencing the brownness of the jars. He was also thinking
about the vivid sensory awarenesses in the inner experience of schizophrenics (a thought
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without any symbolic representation). Thus there were three separate strands of
experience present simultaneously.
AH also had a high frequency of multiple experience in his samples. Four of his
six multiple experience samples involved sensory awareness. For example, in sample
3.5, he was drawn to the gloomy, gray colors of the clouds. He also smelled the rain. He
was also feeling relaxed and calm. He may also have been thinking, I love this weather.
The rest of the participants experienced multiple experience substantially less than TS,
NT, and AH, with a frequency of 19% or less.
The frequency of multiple experience in the present study and Mizrachi’s (2010)
left-handed participants (20% and 16%, respectively) compared to the frequency of 3%
or less in Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) leads to the tentative conclusion that left-handers’
inner experience includes more multiple experience than the general population. This
finding applies to most but not all left-handers.
Inner Seeing
Inner seeing is the experience of innerly seeing things that are not immediately
present in the external environment. As shown in Table 2, inner seeing was the third
most frequently occurring characteristic of inner experience across participants (19%).
Similar to the present findings, Mizrachi (2010) found an inner seeing frequency
of 24% in her left-handed participants. The frequency of inner seeing in the present study
is roughly half the overall inner seeing frequency of 34% found in Heavey and Hurlburt’s
participants (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). Furthermore, inner seeing was the most
frequently occurring main characteristic in Heavey and Hurlburt’s participants (Heavey
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& Hurlburt, 2008). Thus inner seeing appears to occur less frequently in left-handers
than the general population, as reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).
In the present study, eight participants experienced inner seeing at some point in
their sampling (KA, DH, CL, JS, TS, AH, MO, NT). Some samples of inner seeing were
similar to Heavey and Hurlburt’s sample (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). Some inner
seeings were of things previously seen in actuality (similar to Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008);
some were of things not previously seen (similar to Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008).
The left-handed participants in this study did not experience inner seeing much of
the time; however, one participant (KA) did experience inner seeing frequently. KA’s
inner seeing frequency of 62% is triple the average frequency of 19% found across lefthanded participants and double the inner seeing frequency of 34% found in Heavey and
Hurlburt’s participants (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). Even though KA experienced many
inner seeing samples, her samples were not straightforward.
Two noteworthy and atypical characteristics emerged in KA’s inner seeing
samples: 1) her seeings “populated themselves” or assembled slowly; and 2) she saw
light coming from the left. For example, in sample 3.6, KA was innerly seeing the head
of her ex-boyfriend diagonally such that his head was directed slightly to his right (KA’s
left). She was unable to see the details of his face clearly as if his face was covered by a
cloudy or foggy glass. The inner image of KA’s ex-boyfriend’s head “populated itself,”
came together slowly in her experience—that is, the image did not appear all together at
once in KA’s experience. Despite happening slowly in KA’s experience, KA was under
the impression that if they could be clocked in the external world the coming together of
the pieces happened so rapidly so that, at the moment of the sample, KA was already

219

seeing his whole head. KA was also under the impression that the population was done
and the unclearly seen face of the ex-boyfriend would remain unclear. In sample 4.2, KA
was innerly seeing an image of her friend Ramona, a boy named Sam, and herself. The
scene was illuminated by light coming from the upper left; the light was part of KA’s
experience at the moment. The light seemed to come from a lamp post light, but the
lamp post itself was not seen. As previously mentioned, KA’s inner experience also
differed from the other participants’ in that she was the only participant who did not
experience unsymbolized thinking. Among the female participants, KA experienced
multiple experience substantially more.
As evidenced by the differences in frequencies between left-handers and the
general population reported above, inner seeing occurs at a substantially lower frequency
in left-handers. And, when inner seeing does occur, it occurs differently from the inner
seeing found in the general population. For example, KA who experienced the highest
frequency of inner seeing samples did not have typical and straightforward samples of
inner seeing. Rather her samples involved a slow assembling of the inner image. The
occurrence of not fully developed innerly seen images was also found in three other
participants’ inner experience samples.
Including KA, four participants’ (KA, JS, DH, MO) inner seeing samples
involved an incomplete image, including a not fully developed innerly seen image or
some type of coming together of the image. In these samples, participants were not
immediately seeing an image the way most people see it, the inner image was incomplete
in some way. Either the inner image had not completely formed in experience (KA, MO)
or the colors of the inner image were somehow incomplete (JS, DH). The images in

220

these samples took time to form. As discussed above, four of KA’s inner seeing samples
involved a slow assembling or coming together of the innerly seen image.
Four of JS’s samples involved innerly seeing images in dull colors. For example,
in sample 2.1, she was innerly seeing the Guess store in the mall. The seeing was in
color; however, the colors were dull and less vibrant than in reality. There was also range
in the degree of dullness of color in JS’s samples. For example, the image in sample 5.6
(a Vans store) was so dull it was almost like a black and white seeing. In these samples,
the innerly seen images do not appear in full, vibrant colors. Rather, it is as if extra time
and energy is needed to build the colors—that is, it takes effort and time to build up her
visual experience.
Similar to JS’s dull images, DH had one inner seeing sample that was
incompletely colored. In sample 5.6, DH was innerly seeing a scene from the movie
Saving Private Ryan in which a man in a green suit laying on top of another man trying to
stab him with a knife. The only colors DH was seeing were the green uniforms and the
pale white faces of the men. The whiteness of their faces was unrealistic and more pale
in nature than what would be in real life. It was as if the seeing was incompletely
colored, not that he was focused on the incompleteness but that most of the scene was in
black and white except for the green of the uniforms.
MO had one inner seeing sample that involved a transition from one innerly seen
image to another. In sample 3.1, MO had been innerly seeing Kenny Chesney’s face. At
the moment of the sample, MO’s experience was in transition from innerly seeing Kenny
Chesney’s face to innerly seeing Kenny Chesney’s whole body. It was as if MO’s
experience was incorporating Kenny Chesney’s body into it.
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Two participants experienced inner seeing of words (MO and JS). For example,
in sample 3.6, MO was innerly seeing an image with the words “Could you imagine not
eating?” written in black lettering in an arch. In sample 2.3, JS had been searching
through her notes for something about the Greek polis. Before the sample, she had come
to a sentence with the word “polis.” At the moment of the sample, she was innerly seeing
the word “polis” as it stood out from the other words.
Similar to the inner seeing frequency of 19% in the present study, Mizrachi
(2010) found an overall inner seeing frequency of 24% in her left-handed participants.
Mizrachi (2010) did not report a slow coming together or dullness in color of innerly seen
images in her left-handed participants; however, she did report inner seeing involving
words or parts of words in two of her participants. It is Hurlburt’s impression (personal
communication, 2010) that the inner seeing of words is rare in the general population.
The frequency and quality of inner seeing in the present study along with
Mizrachi’s (2010) suggest that inner seeing may be a somewhat less frequent
characteristic in left-handers than in the general population. The nonimmediate, slow
coming together of images and the presence of words or symbols in the inner seeing of
left-handed participants suggests left-handers may have an uncommon slow building of
experience and unusual experience with words.
Not Semantic Words
In many samples (40 out of 217), words were present at the moment of the sample
but were not attended to for their meaning. This phenomenon, which the investigators
called not semantic words, was the fourth most frequently occurring characteristic in the
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participants (18%). This category includes the sensory awareness of words that was
discussed in the previous section.
Mizrachi (2010) did not identify a not semantic words category in her study.
However, she did provide high fidelity written descriptions of each of her participants’
samples of inner experience. These descriptions from Mizrachi (2010) were reviewed
and reconsidered to examine if the not-semantic-words phenomenon occurred there as
well. After review of the samples, a frequency of 5% of not semantic words was
discovered across Mizrachi’s participants, as best can be reconstructed from the written
descriptions (which may well be lower than the actual percentage that might have been
identified from the interviews themselves). Examples will be discussed below. Heavey
and Hurlburt (2008) did not mention instances of not semantic words, and the codebook
Heavey and Hurlburt (2010) provided does not mention not semantic words (Heavey &
Hurlburt, 2008; Heavey & Hurlburt, 2010).
In the not semantic words samples, participants were attending to words;
however, the words were not attended to for their semantic nature at the moment. For
example, in sample 3.1, NT was attending to the sensory qualities of a road sign (dull
silver color, white color, and black etchings within a metal square). Even though NT’s
eyes were aimed at the sign, the words did not penetrate his experience. He was not
attending to the signness, postness, wordness, or letterness of the sign. All that was in his
experience was the silverness, whiteness, and blackness of the etchings (which happened
to be letters). In sample 5.4, BP was listening to her professor talk about the government
being a hard job. In her experience, BP was tracking the vocal expression patterns of the
words he was saying. She was not tracking the meaning of the words. She had somehow
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zeroed in on the words “hard job” but recognized them as objects of emphasis and not for
content. In these samples, and the rest of the not semantic words samples, the meanings
of the words were not in the participants’ experience no matter their presentation (written,
heard, read, or thought).
As mentioned above, upon review of Mizrachi’s (2010) data, a frequency of not
semantic words of 5% was discovered. These samples were similar in nature to the not
semantic words samples from the present study. For example, one participant, KC, was
seeing the written words “guitar hero” on her paper calendar. She was attending to the
visual presentation of the words and taking in some aspect of the shape of the words. She
was interested in the words for their sensory quality and not for their meaning or
function. In one sample, NH was reading an essay and was focused on the letter “F” in
the word “Forever.” He was paying particular attention to the letter “F” which appeared
to be larger than the other letters. Even though he was reading, the meaning was not in
his experience at the moment (Mizrachi, 2010).
Thus the next general conclusion, with the caveat that the present findings are
based on small samples, is that not semantic words is a frequent phenomenon in lefthanders, more frequent than in the general population. This finding applies to most but
not all left-handers.
Unsymbolized Thinking
Unsymbolized thinking, the experience of thinking without the presence of words,
images, or any other experienced symbols, was the fifth most frequently occurring main
characteristic across participants (18%). Nine participants (AH, MM, DH, MO, BP, NT,
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CL, JS, TS) experienced it. Unsymbolized thinking was not the most frequently
occurring characteristic in any participants’ inner experience.
Similar to the present results, Mizrachi (2010) reported an overall unsymbolized
thinking frequency of 20% in her left-handed participants (Mizrachi, 2010). Heavey and
Hurlburt (2008) reported an overall unsymbolized thinking frequency of 22%.
Unsymbolized thinking (along with sensory awareness) was the least frequently
occurring of the main characteristics in Heavey and Hurlburt’s sample (Heavey &
Hurlburt, 2008). The present findings suggest that left-handers experience unsymbolized
thinking at a frequency relatively equivalent to the general population.
The majority of the unsymbolized thinking samples in the participants were
straightforward and similar to Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) participants. However, one
participant experienced unusual unsymbolized thinking samples. Although AH
experienced unsymbolized thinking frequently and substantially more than the other
participants, he did not have any clear and typical examples of unsymbolized thinking.
His unsymbolized thinking samples were either secondary to something else (usually
sensory awareness), included the presence of multiple possibilities, or involved some idea
of what to do next. For example, in sample 2.4, AH was looking for a pair of pants. At
the moment of the sample, he was wondering where could they possibly be? This was a
thought experienced without words or images. There was a notion present of the places
they could be (in his closet, in his mother’s house, in his father’s house, and so on);
however, the specific places were not present in his experience at the moment.
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One participant, KA, did not experience unsymbolized thinking. As discussed in
Inner Seeing section above, the majority of KA’s samples consisted of inner seeing
(62%) which she experienced more than the other participants.
The frequency of unsymbolized thinking in the participants is similar to the
frequencies reported in Mizrachi (2010) and Heavey and Hurlburt (2008), suggesting lefthanders experience unsymbolized thinking at about the same rate as the general
population. Although the present findings are both quantitatively and qualitatively
consistent with Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) study, it is important to mention that,
whereas in Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) sample, sensory awareness and unsymbolized
thinking were the least frequent characteristics among their main five, they both are
among the most frequently occurring of the main characteristics in this study and
Mizrachi’s (2010).
Feeling and Emotion
Feeling and emotion are discussed in this section. Emotion is a process whereas
feeling is an experience. For example, in 15 of the participants’ samples, emotions
(affective processes) were ongoing, as noted by the immediately occurring retrospection;
however, they were occurring outside of direct experience (7%). Unlike emotion,
“feeling” is direct affective experience. Thus, samples that involved emotion without the
direct affective experience were labeled “emotion,” whereas samples that involved the
direct experience of emotion were labeled “feeling” and were not counted as emotion.
Feeling occurred nearly twice as much as did emotion in the participants (12%).
However, both feeling and emotion occurred infrequently.
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Although the frequency of feeling is slightly higher in the present left-handed
participants than Mizrachi’s (2010), the present findings are consistent with Mizrachi
(2010) in that feeling occurred infrequently in both studies. Mizrachi (2010) found a 4%
frequency of feeling in her participants. Mizrachi (2010) did not identify a separate
category of Emotion; however, review of Mizrachi’s (2010) data shows that 3 of her 6
left-handed participants described emotional samples similar to the emotion samples
described in this study, as best can be reconstructed (5%). These samples were not
feelings as DES (and many others) use the term—that is, the participants were not
actually experiencing an emotion at the moment. There were, however, emotional
aspects to the experience (Mizrachi, 2010).
Unlike the low frequency of feeling found in the present study and Mizrachi’s
(2010), Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) found a frequency of 26% of feeling in their
participants. The left-handed participants in the present study experienced feeling less
than half of Heavey and Hurlburt’s participants (2010). Additionally, Heavey and
Hurlburt (2008) did not report instances of emotion. Thus it is tentatively concluded that
left-handers experience feeling substantially less than the general population and, in some
cases, left-handers have a unique experience with emotion—that is, emotion may be
ongoing without their direct experience of it.
Seven participants (TS, CL, AH, MO, DH, KA, NT) had samples of feeling in
their inner experience. TS experienced feeling substantially more than the other
participants. His 11 feeling samples make up nearly half of the 25 total samples of
feeling. Seven of his samples involved a mental experience of the feeling. For example,
in sample 5.5, he was sitting on the couch and debating on whether or not he should
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apply for another job. At the moment, he was experiencing a mental state of tension and
indecisiveness. Four of his feeling samples involved the balancing of positive and
negative feelings. In these samples, he was experiencing a multitude of feelings which,
on balance, were either positive or negative. For example, in sample 2.5, he was innerly
seeing a photograph of his girlfriend. He was also experiencing an undifferentiated
multitude of positive and negative mental emotions, including uncertainty, attraction,
pressure to make a decision regarding the relationship, ambivalence, and a sense of
security. The valence of his experience was, on balance, positive but the ingredients
were both positive and negative. None of his samples involved a physical representation
of the feeling.
Although TS had a lot of feeling samples, his feeling samples were not
straightforward. It was difficult to determine whether or not his experience involved a
true feeling. Rather than experiencing a salient feeling, TS seemed to be influenced by a
collection of unintegrated emotional states that were somehow differentiated. In terms of
outstanding characteristics, in addition to feeling, TS experienced multiple experience
more than the other participants.
Second to TS, CL also experienced feeling substantially more than the other
participants. Her feeling samples make up about one-quarter the total feeling samples
across the participants (6 of 25 total feeling samples). Four of her feeling samples were
experienced mentally. For example, in sample 2.1, CL was worried. This was a
powerful mental experience that was contained within the mental realm. CL understood
herself to be feeling and not thinking. Her other two feeling samples involved a bodily
experience of the feeling. For example, in sample 2.4, she was experiencing relief
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through the release of tension from her upper body, as if a weight had been lifted off of
her shoulders. Aside from her elevated frequency of feeling, CL’s inner experience did
not exhibit other outstanding characteristics.
The rest of the participants experienced feeling infrequently, 15% or less.
Including TS and CL’s samples, four characteristics emerged in the 25 feeling samples.
Fifteen of the samples were experienced mentally. For example, in sample 5.5, KA was
experiencing mental stress. She was also setting the alarm and opening the door to her
house, which was happening automatically. Four of the feeling samples were
experienced bodily. For example, in sample 2.3, AH was feeling nervous which he
experienced as multiple tingling sensations along and near his spine. Four of the samples
involved a multitude of feelings. For example, in sample 4.2, TS was experiencing a
mental relief/relaxation/good feeling. One feeling sample was related to words spoken
out loud. In sample 3.2, MO was experiencing confusion and humor, both related to the
words “is this thing working?” she was saying out loud to herself. The confusion was
experienced in the question and humor was experienced as smiling.
As mentioned above, 15 participants’ samples involved emotions or ongoing
affective processes that where occurring outside direct experience (7%). Six of the
emotion samples involved speaking with an emphatic tone. Four of those six were AH’s
emotion samples, where words were innerly present (either spoken or heard) with an
emphatic tone. Despite the emphatic tone, AH was not directly experiencing the emotion
at the moment. For example, in sample 3.1, he was innerly saying “He’s escaping!” with
an emphatic tone, though he was not experiencing an emotion at the moment. Two of
DH’s samples also involved an emphatic tone. In both samples, DH was innerly
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speaking. For example, in sample 3.2, DH was innerly saying, “Why aren’t you!?!?” in a
powerful, almost yelling, tone which represented frustration though he was not feeling
frustrated at the moment.
The remaining nine samples of emotion involved a variety of characteristics,
including the following: thinking an emotion but not feeling it (e.g., in sample 3.2, DH
was thinking how sad, though he was not feeling sad at the moment); conveying an
emotion through words but not feeling it (e.g., in sample 3.3, KA was innerly saying “I
love him so much” but she was not experiencing love or loving feelings at the moment);
laughing with no experience of feeling; emotion suspended in time (e.g., in sample 4.1,
CL had been overtaken by a wave of pure fear, at the moment she was in a suspended,
frozen state); a lingering experience of emotion from a previous moment (e.g., in sample
3.3, NT was experiencing a lingering negative valence from a thought he had previously);
anticipating a feeling (e.g., in sample 2.3, TS was anticipating feeling carefree and
thrilled, but the carefree-ness and thrilled-ness were not in his experience); a recollection
of a feeling (e.g., in sample 4.6, TS was recalling having experienced a sense of
excitement, being challenged, competition, winning, and frustration though he was not
experiencing those sensations at the moment).
Both the left-handed participants in the present study and Mizrachi’s (2010)
experienced feeling at a substantially lower frequency than that reported by Heavey and
Hurlburt. Even if the frequencies of feeling and emotion in the present study are counted
together (25 + 15 = 40 of 217 samples, or 18%), the frequency is still less than the 26%
frequency of feeling alone reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).
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Samples of feeling in the present study were infrequent. Furthermore, at times,
left-handers may have ongoing affect that is not directly in their experience. The low
frequency of feeling in this study, the low frequency in Mizrachi’s (2010), along with the
much higher frequency in the general population (Heavey and Hurlburt, 2008), leads to a
speculation that feeling is infrequent in the inner experience of left-handers. It is
emphasized that this speculation is based on very few participants and is need of
additional investigation. In a preliminary study such as this, there is no way of knowing
whether emotion is merely an accidental or random occurrence or a robust characteristic
of the inner experience of left-handed individuals.
Inner Speech
Inner speech was the sixth most frequently occurring characteristic of inner
experience across participants, occurring in seven participants’ samples (BP, DH, AH,
KA, CL, MO, JS). Inner speech was the most frequently occurring characteristic in one
participant, BP, who experienced it more than did any of the other participants.
The inner speech frequency of 12% in this study is similar to Mizrachi’s (2010),
who also found inner speech to occur at a relatively low frequency (9%) (Mizrachi,
2010). These inner speech frequencies are substantially lower than the frequency of 26%
found in Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) study. Thus, it is tentatively concluded that inner
speech occurs substantially less in left-handers than the general population.
Of the 10 participants, only two (BP, DH) experienced inner speech with a
frequency of greater than the inner speech average reported by Heavey and Hurlburt
(2008). All of BP’s inner speech samples were typical examples similar to those
described by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008). All samples were in her own voice and
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involved some inner comment or question. For example, in sample 2.4, BP was innerly
saying, “I was focusing on the wrong triangle.” BP’s inner experience did not differ
substantially from the other participants aside from her inner speech frequency.
Second to BP, DH also experienced inner speech frequently. All of DH’s samples
were in his own voice as well. However, 2 of his 7 inner speech samples had an unusual
characteristic. In these samples, his inner speech was just happening. For example, in
sample 4.3, DH was innerly saying, “50 vision” (meaning that 50% of his attention had
been aimed at the image); however, the inner speaking was happening automatically.
That is, he had little or no experience of the creation of the speaking (even though the
speaking itself was in his experience). The remaining five participants experienced inner
speech in four or less of their inner experience samples.
There were four unique characteristics that emerged across the inner speech
samples of our left-handed participants. Four participants (AH, DH, KA, CL) had inner
speech samples that involved an emotion or emphatic tone, for a total of nine samples.
For example, in sample 5.6, DH was innerly saying, “You’re nuts” in an irritated,
comical way. Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) samples have emotion in their inner
speakings as well; however, considering our left-handed participants experience feeling
substantially less than Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) participants, it is remarkable that,
despite the low frequency of feeling, left-handed participants have emotion in their inner
speakings.
Four participants’ inner speech samples involved some commentary on a bodily
process (AH, KA, CL, MO). All four participants had one sample of this phenomenon.
In these samples, the participants were actively surveying and commenting on a bodily
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process rather than automatically integrating the process as part of their experience. For
example, in sample 3.3, AH was saying “I’m hungry!” and feeling his lower abdomen
grumbling, moving around, and tingling. Rather than automatically processing the
grumbling of his abdomen, AH commented on the process. It is Hurlburt’s impression
that it is unusual to have inner speech that comments on bodily processes (Hurlburt,
personal communication, 2013).
Two participants (BP, KA) each had one sample in which there was an inner
speech and inner hearing simultaneously occurring. For example, in sample 5.1, KA was
simultaneously innerly saying and innerly hearing the phrase “it hasn’t beeped yet, of
course on the last day its going to take forever.” Unlike KA’s sample, BP’s inner
speaking and inner hearing were not related. She was innerly saying, “I know the beeper
is about to go off” and innerly hearing a Brian McKnight song.
Two participants (DH, JS) had inner speakings in which the meanings of the
innerly said words were not in their experience at the moment. In both samples, the
innerly said word/s had unique characteristics. In sample 5.3, DH was saying “H e Flare”
(as in helium flare). Before the sample, he had been repeating the words. At the
moment, he was saying one unit of the “H e Flare” repetitions. He was attending more to
the sound of the words. In sample 2.3, JS was innerly seeing and innerly saying the word
“polis.” In her experience, the word had no meaning whatsoever. This sample was also
unique because the innerly spoken word seemed to be extended in time in a way that
external speech is incapable of.
Thus, the phenomenological characteristics of inner speech described by
participants in the present study were in some instances similar to but in some instances
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different from those reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) in that the inner speech
samples in the present study were experienced to be like outer speech except they were
happening internally and were experienced as being in of the participants’ own voice.
However, the content of the inner speech samples in the present study was quite narrow
or restricted by comparison to everyday non-left-handed inner speech (Hurlburt, personal
communication, 2010): mostly it was simple and directly related to the participants’
ongoing experiences. For example, CL was innerly saying “I’m sneezing” in sample 3.1
as she was sneezing; KA was saying “I’m going to sleep” in sample 3.4; and MO was
innerly saying “What should I eat?” in sample 5.2 in response to his physical sensation of
hunger.
The prevalence of inner speech across left-handed participants in the present
study, and the left-handed participants in Mizrachi (2010), suggests that left-handers
experience inner speech less frequently than does the general population, and the
complexity or floridness of the inner speech may be less in left-handers (Mizrachi, 2010).
It should be recognized that some of the participants in Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008)
sample may have been left handed— Heavey and Hurlburt did not collect that
information.
Doing Of
Doing of involves the concentrated, intentional doing of some action. In these
samples, participants were actively, specifically, focusedly involved in the doing of some
action or activity. That is, the action or activity that we call doing of were not
experienced as automatically happening. Doing of was the eighth most frequently
occurring characteristic across our participants (10%).
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Mizrachi (2010) described a similar phenomenon, in which she termed
concentrated doing, in her left-handed participants with a frequency of 8%. Doing
of/concentrated doing are not well-established DES categories of inner experience and
were not reported in Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) participants. However, this kind of
experience of doing seems related to what Hurlburt (1993) called the doing of
understanding which involves a deliberate and active experiential reaching out in an
attempt to understand the meaning of information received (Hurlburt, 1993).
Seven participants in the present study (NT, MM, DH, KA, TS, BP, JS)
experienced doing of. Doing of was not the dominant experience in any participants’
inner experience but it occurred quite frequently in NT’s inner experience, who
experienced it substantially more than the other participants. For example, in sample 3.6,
NT was writing notes and experienced a recognition of the act of writing. He was not
experiencing the words that he was writing, however. NT also experienced not semantic
words more than the other participants. Doing of occurred rather infrequently in the rest
of the participants, with a frequency of 15% or less.
Two characteristics emerged in the doing of samples. The majority of the doing
of samples involved some experiential bodily movement. For example, in sample 3.1,
BP was experiencing the act of typing. She was aware of the act of typing with the
intention of creating the words on the screen. Five doing of samples involved words. For
example, in her only sample of doing of (sample 5.1), JS was text messaging her friend
the word class. Before the sample, she had thought the letter c and then pushed the key c
in her phone, followed by the letter l, and then the letter a. At the moment of the sample,
JS was thinking the letters ss as a unit. She was not innerly saying ss, innerly hearing ss,
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or innerly seeing ss. She was confident that in this experience there was an explicit
thinking followed by a texting of each letter; think-text-think-text-think-text.
Inner Hearing
Inner hearing is an established DES characteristic. Inner hearing involves
attending to auditory characteristics occurring innerly. Inner hearing was the ninth most
frequently occurring characteristic in participants’ inner experience (8%). Seven
participants experience inner hearing (KA, AH, BP, MO, CL, DH, MM). Inner hearing
was not the dominant characteristic in any participants’ experience, though it occurred
relatively frequently in KA’s experience.
Similar to the present finding, inner hearing occurred at a frequency of 4% in
Mizrachi (2010). Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) did not specifically report the frequency of
inner hearing in their participants other than reporting that no characteristic other than the
main five had a frequency of higher than 3% (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008). Thus, it is
tentatively concluded that left-handers experience inner hearing somewhat more than the
general population.
KA experienced inner hearing substantially more than did the other participants.
Her seven samples make up almost half of the total 17 inner hearing samples. All of
KA’s inner hearing samples consisted of her own voice. Four of her samples involved an
attempt to understand the external world. For example, in sample 3.6, she was innerly
hearing “Scam artist, I don’t get it” referring to a billboard she had seen. Two of KA’s
samples involved multiple phrases. One involved innerly hearing three different phrases:
1) “Vegan conferences? Where are those?”; 2) “How can you tell one’s cheated?”; and 3)
“Do they know you know?” The innerly heard phrases were happening one after the
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other. In KA’s experience, they were happening in a normal, natural pace. However, if
they could be clocked in the external world, they were happening so fast it seemed like
they all happened at the moment. Her other sample involved repetition of the same
phrase. One sample involved innerly hearing her innerly spoken words. In sample 5.1,
she innerly heard herself saying “it hasn’t beeped yet, of course on the last day it’s going
to take forever.” KA referred to the phenomenon as “hearing [herself] say.” One of her
samples involved some commentary on a bodily sensation. In sample 2.6, she was
innerly hearing “My back is strained” in her own voice. KA’s inner experience differed
from the other participants in that she also experienced inner seeing substantially more
than the others and she was the only participant who did not experience unsymbolized
thinking.
Seven characteristics emerged across the inner hearing samples of participants,
including the following: three were heard in the participants’ own voice; two samples
involved innerly hearing a tune; two samples involved a rehearing of something that had
been heard earlier; one sample involved a simultaneous inner hearing and inner speaking;
one sample involved an emphatic tone; one sample involved repetition; and one sample
involved innerly hearing the voice of someone else.
Other Observations
In addition to the most frequently occurring characteristics, additional
observations about the inner experience of left-handed participants were made. Like the
observations above, all these observations should be considered tentative, exploratory.
All require corroboration by additional phenomenological observation and/or validation
by so-called objective procedures.
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Anticipation
Seven participants (CL, JS, MM, NT, TS, AH, MO) experienced anticipation, for
a total of 15 samples (7%). In these samples, the participants were anticipating
something happening or anticipating finding something.
Mizrachi’s (2010) left-handed participants had samples involving anticipation to
find something (Mizrachi labeled these “searching”) with a frequency of 10% (Mizrachi,
2010). Anticipation is not an established category of inner experience. Heavey and
Hurlburt (2008) did not mention instances of anticipation (or searching), and the
Codebook Heavey and Hurlburt (2010) provide does not mention anticipation (or
searching) (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008; Heavey & Hurlburt, 2010).
In six of the anticipation samples in the present study, the participants were
anticipating finding something and experientially involved in searching. In three of these
samples, the participants were searching for words or definitions. For example, in sample
4.1, TS was “mentally scanning” or recalling the definition of aberration. The rest of
these samples involved internal or external searching. For example, in sample 3.3, MM
was searching her memory for the melody of a particular song (internal searching). In
sample 5.2, CL was experientially searching her closet for a particular pair of shoes
(external searching).
In four of the anticipation samples, the participants were anticipating some
sensory stimulus (e.g., seeing, hearing, tasting, etc.). For example, in sample 4.3, TS was
anticipating the sensory aspects of whiskey (the taste, feel of the liquid, burning
sensation, etc.). He was not tasting the whiskey, feeling the liquid, or feeling the burning
sensation of the whiskey at the moment.
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In two of the anticipation samples, the participants’ experience was paused,
suspended, or frozen in time. For example, in sample 4.1, a wave of fear had overtaken
CL. At the moment of the sample, she was frozen, waiting for something to happen. The
fear was suspended at the moment so that, at the exact moment of the sample, nothing is
experienced. In sample 4.1, NT had been leaving his girlfriend a voicemail message.
Before the sample, he had said the word “maybe.” At the moment, his mind was paused,
waiting for the thoughts backed up in his mind to move forward. He was experiencing a
mental sensation of something about to happen.
Two samples involved anticipation of something to come. In sample 4.6, NT was
hearing his professor speaking and anticipating something to come. In sample 2.2, AH
was thinking about what he had to do next. This involved some sense that he had a lot of
homework to do. One sample involved anticipating a feeling, but not experiencing the
feeling at the moment. In sample 2.3, TS was anticipating feeling carefree but he was not
actually feeling carefree at the moment.
The present study and Mizrachi (2010) both reported a frequency of anticipation
around 10%. Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) did not report samples of anticipation in their
participants’ inner experience. It is of course possible that anticipation is merely an
occasionally occurring event that happened to be caught in flight by the random beep,
with no particular significance for left-handed individuals.
Happening Of
Happening of occurred in four (JS, BP, DH, CL) of the participants’ inner
experience samples, for a total of nine samples (4%). In these samples, the participants
had no creation investment in the experience—that is, the experience was just

239

happening—in situations where most people experience some sense of agency. In six of
the samples, words or some other form of communication was involved. For example, in
sample 3.3, she was thinking I started it this morning. The words were presenting
themselves to BP and, experientially, she was not creating them. The rest of the samples
involved a visual experience. For example, in sample 2.2, BP was waiting for the
solution of a math problem to visually appear. She was not actively involved in creating
the solution.
Mizrachi (2010) reported the happening of phenomenon occurring in 4 or 5 of her
participants’ 101 samples (4%). For example, Mizrachi reported one participant (FM)
experienced the Happening of Speaking, in which he was saying words out loud without
those words being directly in his experience (Mizrachi, 2010). Heavey and Hurlburt
(2008) did not report happening of in their participants.
Words Present
Three participants (JS, BP, CL) had samples in which specific words or letters
were present; however, the words and/or letters did not have any perceptual
characteristics—that is, they were not innerly seen, heard, said, or read. For example, in
sample 3.3, the words I started it this morning were sequentially presenting themselves to
BP; however the words were not innerly spoken, innerly heard, or innerly seen. The
investigators referred to this phenomenon as “words present.” Words present was found
in seven samples (3%).
Although words present were relatively infrequent, JS experienced it more than
the other participants. Her four words present samples make up over half of the total
words present samples (4 of 7).
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Five of the words present samples were similar to the example provided above.
Two of the words present samples were unique. One sample involved specific visual
characteristics. In sample 5.3, the words pink elephant were present in CL’s experience
with visual characteristics; however, despite their visual characteristics, the words were
not innerly seen, innerly heard, or innerly said. One sample involved a lingering word.
In sample 5.4, JS had been talking on the phone and just said bye. At the moment of the
sample, the word (bye) was still present in her experience without any presentation.
Mizrachi (2010) and Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) did not report instances of
words present in their samples (Mizrachi, 2010; Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008).
Results Compared to the Literature
The present study found that the inner experience of left-handers is different from
the inner experience of the general population. This section will compare the results of
this study to the relevant literature on left-handers’ experience. More specifically, the
experience of left-handers as discovered in this study compared to the literature on lefthanders’ experience will be discussed.
Handedness effects have been explored in relation to divergent and convergent
thinking. In 1995, Coren explored divergent thinking as a function of handedness. Coren
(1995) described divergent thinking as involving the “consideration of several different
directions, alternatives, or information sources” (Coren, 1995, p. 313). Divergent
thinking is hypothesized to enable the development or consideration of novel solutions
and is often considered as a large factor of creativity, and is differentiated from
convergent thinking, the use of existing knowledge and rules to come to a single
conclusion (Coren, 1995). After completion of four experiments (Alternate Uses and
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Handedness; Object Synthesis and Handedness; Ideational Flexibility and Handedness;
Convergent Thinking and Handedness), Coren reported a divergent thinking advantage in
left-handed males by comparison to right-handed males. Coren reported a linear
relationship between degree of left-handedness and divergent thinking scores in males.
He reported these results may explain the number of left-handed mathematicians, chess
masters, architects, and artists. He stated that, in addition to spatial ability, strong
divergent thinking skills are likely a commonality among these activities. He reported
there were no significant findings between handedness and divergent thinking in females.
In terms of convergent thinking, Coren reported a small advantage for right-handers.
Thus he concluded that improved divergent thinking skills are associated with sinistrality,
being left-handed, in males (Coren, 1995).
Coren’s (1995) finding might be extrapolated as suggesting that left-handers,
primarily males, tend to think in more unconventional ways and consider more
possibilities when problem solving than do right-handers. When compared to Heavey
and Hurlburt’s (2008) participants, left-handed participants in the present study did
exhibit such thinking styles. For example, multiple experience was the third most
frequently occurring characteristic in the present study (20%). In these samples, two or
more separate but simultaneous experiences were present. Heavey and Hurlburt (2008)
did not report such a high frequency of multiple experience in their participants’ inner
experience. The frequency of multiple experience in left-handed participants’ inner
experience suggests atypical thinking styles and cognitive flexibility. All four of the lefthanded male participants in the present study experienced multiple experience with a
frequency of greater than 15%. Only one female subject, KA, experienced it with a
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frequency of 15% or higher. Using Coren’s (1995) definition, the samples of multiple,
simultaneous and separate experiences can be considered divergent thinking. This
notion, and the notions to follow, should be considered speculative and does not have
corroborating evidence at this point.
In 1998, McNamara, Clark, and Hartmann investigated the characteristics of
dreams as a function of handedness. Student volunteers from introductory psychology
courses were asked to complete a questionnaire, including informed consent and the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory, and write a description of a recent dream on a blank
page. Only 109 of the 420 students who completed the questionnaire described a recent
dream. The authors reported that, of the volunteers who completed the questionnaires,
left-handers were more likely than right-handers to report a dream (79 of 359 righthanders in total sample reported a dream, 22%; 30 of 61 left-handers in total sample
reported a dream, 49%). The authors found that the dream reports of left-handers
included more high imagery nouns and more affective words than did the dreams of
right-handers. Additionally, the authors reported that more left-handers described their
dreams as not accurately reflecting their everyday life. That is, right-handers’ dreams
reflected their everyday lives in a more realistic way. The authors conclude that the
dream reports of left-handers were more characteristic of right hemispheric related
cognitive activity, including more high imagery nouns and more affective words than the
dream reports of right-handers (McNamara, Clark, & Hartmann, 1998).
McNamara et al.’s (1998) findings might be extrapolated as suggesting that the
dreams of left-handers may involve more imagery and affective states than do the dreams
of right-handers, and then further extrapolated as suggesting that the overall inner
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experience of left-handers may involve more imagery and affective states than does the
experience of right-handers. Participants in this study experienced inner seeing at a
frequency of 19%. Similarly, Mizrachi (2010) reported her left-handed participants
experienced inner seeing at a frequency of 24%. However, that frequency was lower than
the frequency of inner seeing (34%) Heavey and Hurlburt (2008) reported in the general
population (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008); thus the difference between left- and righthanders imagery is in the opposite direction as might be speculated on the basis of
McNamara et al.’s (1998) study. Regarding emotion, the present study suggests a large
difference between left-handers and the general population but in the opposite direction
suggested by McNamara et al. (1998): participants in this study experienced feelings far
less frequently (12%) than did Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) subjects (26%). Similarly,
Mizrachi (2010) reported a low frequency of feeling in her left-handed participants (4%).
McNamara et al. (1998) reported that left-handers were more likely to report that the
content of their dreams were not an accurate reflection of their daily life-experience than
were right-handers (McNamara et al., 1998), so the extrapolations described above may
not be valid. It may be that left-handers are actually emotional but do not directly
experience feelings in their inner experience—that is, they undergo affective states but
have very little feeling in their inner experience. Another explanation for the discrepancy
between McNamara et al.’s (1998) finding and the findings of the present study relates to
the theory of wish-fulfillment. According to Freud, the dream represents a fulfilled wish
or takes the place of some action in life (Freud, 1900). It can be extrapolated from this
that dreams may represent a phenomenon that is suppressed in waking life. The results of
the present study could then be interpreted as showing that left-handers, who might have
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ongoing emotion but suppress the experience of it, experience that emotion in dreams
instead. An alternative explanation is that McNamara et al.’s participants did not
carefully distinguish between the experience of emotion and emotional state.
In 2013, Schredl, Beaton, Henley-Einion, and Blagrove examined the relationship
between dream recall and handedness in adolescents and adults. Unlike McNamara et al.
(1998) the authors reported that right-handers and mixed-handers have a higher
frequency of dream recall than do left-handers. However, they reported that handedness
effects were more prominent in adolescents and were not significant in adults (Schredl,
Beaton, Henley-Einion, & Blagrove, 2013). Considering the role of attention in memory,
this result can be extrapolated to imply that left-handers may have less recall of dreams
due to a lack of experiential involvement during dreams. This result can be further
extrapolated, in light of McNamara et al.’s (1998) findings to suggest that left-handers
have less experiential involvement during high imagery and affective states than righthanders. That is, imagery and affect may be ongoing in left-handers (e.g., during
dreams); however, they have less direct experience of them. This extrapolation is
consistent with the findings of the current study in which left-handed participants
experienced inner seeing and feeling less than the general population. Additionally, the
presence of ongoing affective states (emotion) was found in participants’ samples without
direct experiential involvement. It is also noteworthy to mention that Schredl et al.
(2013) reported the handedness effect in dream recall was not found to be significant in
adults. This may be extrapolated to imply that the handedness effects change over time.
During the sampling phase, seven participants (AH, BP, CL, DH, MM, MO, JS) were
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either 18 or 19 years-old, KA was 21, NT was 28, and TS was 35. Thus, some of the
present findings may be influenced by differences in age.
Notably, the dream studies used verbal reports. It may be that left-handers
perform differently in that mode of responding. Thus extrapolations made from the
aforementioned dream studies may not be accurate due to the effects of verbal reports.
For example, it may be that left-handers would more effectively report or recall dreams
through a different mean such as drawing.
In 2010, Beratis, Rabavilas, Papadimitriou, and Papageorgiou investigated the
effects of handedness on the Stroop interference effect using the Stroop Color Word
Task. The Stroop effect has been suggested as providing evidence of verbal inhibition,
which involves using an atypical response and suppressing an overlearned one (automatic
reading) (Beratis, Rabavilas, Papadimitriou, & Papageorgiou, 2010). The authors
reported that selective attention is involved in the Stroop task—that is, attending to color
versus orthography (Beratis et al., 2010). The authors administered two tasks to the
subjects, a neutral condition and an incongruent condition. In the neutral condition, the
subjects were asked to name the ink color of strings of Xs (neutral stimuli), quickly and
accurately. In the incongruent condition, the subjects were asked to name the ink color of
incongruously named color words, quickly and accurately. The difficulty posed in the
incongruent condition is referred to as the Stroop interference effect (Beratis et al., 2010).
With regard to high functioning individuals, the authors reported a greater Stroop
interference effect in right-handers than left-handers. Thus, left-handed individuals
perform better on the Stroop task (Beratis et al., 2010). It might be speculated that lefthanders have an advantage when completing the Stroop task because they have less
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experienced connection to the semantic nature of words than do right-handers. A lack of,
or less strong, attachment to the semantic nature of worded phenomenon may decrease
their interference effect. Furthermore, participants in this study had a much stronger
connection to colors in general (e.g., sensory awareness). This may also favor lefthanders during the Stroop task in that they may have more interest in sensory aspects,
like color, as opposed to the semantic nature of the stimulus. All 10 participants in this
study reported samples of not semantic words, for a total of 40 samples. Twenty of these
samples involved the sensory awareness of words and/or letters. For example, in sample
4.4, BP was looking at a list of songs on the computer screen as the songs were being
downloaded. BP was attending to the visual characteristics of the display—that is, she
was absorbed in how the list looked. Mizrachi (2010) also reported sensory awareness of
words in 2 of her 6 subjects, for a total of three samples. Considering Heavey and
Hurlburt (2008) did not report instances of sensory awareness of words/letters in their
samples (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008), it may be tentatively concluded that the sensory
awareness of words and/or letters is a characteristic of the left-handed experience.
Inner Experience: Summary
Main Five Characteristics
Sensory awareness was the most frequently occurring of the five main
characteristics in the present study, occurring at a frequency of 49%. This finding is
consistent with Mizrachi’s (2010) report of 35% sensory awareness in her left-handed
participants. Participants in this study experienced sensory awareness substantially more
than the frequency of 22% in the general population as reported by Heavey and Hurlburt
(2008). The majority of sensory awareness samples in this study were similar to those
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reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008); however, three noteworthy patterns emerged,
including the following: sensory awareness of words or letters; spreading of sensory
awareness; and sensory awareness of an imaginary stimulus. Thus, the present results
suggest that sensory awareness may be more frequent in left-handers than in the general
population. This finding is consistent with Mizrachi (2010).
Inner seeing was the next most frequently occurring main characteristic in the
present study, occurring at a frequency of 19%. This is consistent with Mizrachi’s (2010)
report of 24% inner seeing samples in her left-handed participants. Left-handers
experienced inner seeing less than the 34% in the general population reported by Heavey
and Hurlburt (2008). Most of the participants’ inner seeing samples in the present study
were similar to Heavey and Hurlburt’s sample (Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008); however,
there were two noteworthy characteristics, including experiencing the creating of imagery
and inner seeing of words. Thus it is concluded that inner seeing occurs less frequently
in left-handers than the general population.
Unsymbolized thinking occurred at a frequency of 18% in the present study. This
is consistent with Mizrachi’s (2010) report of a frequency of 20% in her left-handed
participants. The rate of unsymbolized thinking in the present study was about the same
as the 22% reported in the general population by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008). The
majority of the unsymbolized thinking samples in the present study were straightforward
and similar to Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) participants. However, one participant (AH)
experienced unusual unsymbolized thinking samples. AH did not have any clear and
typical examples of unsymbolized thinking. His unsymbolized thinking samples were
either secondary to something else (primarily sensory awareness), included the presence
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of multiple possibilities, or involved some idea of what to do next. Unsymbolized
thinking appears to occur at a similar frequency between left-handers and the general
population.
Inner speech occurred at a frequency of 12% in the present study. This is
consistent with the frequency of 9% found in Mizrachi’s (2010) left-handed participants.
This is substantially lower than Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) finding of 26%. In
addition to inner speech, participants in this study experienced inner hearing. Inner
hearing is an established DES characteristic. Inner hearing involves attending to the
auditory characteristics occurring innerly. Inner hearing occurred in 8% of the inner
experience samples. Even when taken together, inner speech and inner hearing constitute
20% of the overall inner experience samples. This figure is still lower than Heavey and
Hurlburt’s (2008) finding of 26%.
Feeling was the least frequently occurring of the main five characteristics found in
the present study (12%). This is comparable to Mizrachi’s (2010) infrequent occurrence
of feeling in her left-handed participants (4%). Participants in this study experienced
feeling at a much lower frequency than the 26% reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).
Participants expressed emotions through the tone of their speech, and understood that
some of their thoughts are emotionally valenced, rather than actually experiencing an
emotion. In 15 samples, an ongoing, affective state was present; however, the
participants were not directly experiencing the feeling at the moment. Thus these
ongoing, affective states, termed “emotion” by the investigators, occurred at a frequency
of 7%. Even when the emotion and feeling samples are combined, the combined
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frequency of 18% is still less than the 26% of feeling reported by Heavey and Hurlburt
(2008).
Other Characteristics
In addition to the findings of the main five characteristics, other characteristics
emerged across the left-handed participants in the present study. Left-handed
participants’ inner experience frequently included multiple experience (multiple, separate
and simultaneous experiences) and not semantic worded experiences. Participants also
had a relatively high frequency of doing of (carefully and concentratedly engaged in a
physical activity). Other characteristics that emerged included anticipation and
happening of.
Words and Lack of Meaning in Experience
A pattern that emerged across participants was the low frequency of words
present. Additionally, when words were experienced, they had atypical presentations.
For example, they were not explicitly attended to for their function or meaning. In 40 of
217 samples (18%), a unique presentation of words was present. In these samples, words
were somehow present; however, the participants were not attending to the meaning of
the words in their experience. This phenomenon, termed not semantic words, was the
fourth most frequently occurring characteristic in the participants’ inner experience. It
occurred in all 10 subjects.
Among the not semantic words samples was the sensory awareness of words. In
these samples it was as if the awareness of the subjects specifically ignored the meaning
of the words in favor of their sensory aspects. Five subjects (TS, BP, NT, DH, AH)
reported samples of sensory awareness for words each for a total of 20 samples (9%).
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With all the usual caveats regarding small sample size, it does appear that left-handed
participants experience words in ways much different from the general population: less
frequent overall, and instances where the meaning of words is stripped away from
Slow Building of Experience
A characteristic that emerged across left-handed participants’ inner experience
samples included a slow building of experience. That is, participants in the present study
seemed to have a hard time manufacturing their inner experience. Examples of this were
seen in all of the main five characteristics: sensory awareness (e.g., spreading of
sensation in body); inner seeing (e.g., inner image populating itself, dullness of colors,
transition from one image to another); unsymbolized thinking (e.g., multiple options
though the specific options not present in experience); inner speech (e.g., commenting on
bodily experiences); emotion/feeling (e.g., empathic tone but no feeling, positive and
negative valence simultaneously occurring). In these samples, it is as if the ingredients of
the experience are present; however, they are not integrated—that is, the phenomenon
was not complete at the time of appearance. Thus, these samples captured the
participants in their attempt to integrate their experience.
Discussion
The present study found that sensory awareness, multiple experience, inner
seeing, not semantic words, and unsymbolized thinking are frequent characteristics of
left-handers’ inner experience. Inner speech and feeling (the experience of emotion)
were found to be infrequent characteristic in the experience of left-handers. Additionally,
the present study suggests that left-handers experience words and meaning differently
than the general population, supporting a right-hemispheric involvement regarding
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linguistic ability. The present study is preliminary and exploratory in nature and requires
further investigation.
Study Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
The process of Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) yields inevitable study
limitations. One of the major limitations of the present study is the small sample size
(N=10). DES studies are time and labor intensive both for the participants and
investigators. Participants are asked to wear the beeper and collect beeps for period
intervals of three hours on five separate occasions. They are also asked to meet in the
DES lab on the UNLV campus within 24 hours of each beep collection interview for a 1hour long expositional interview. The sampling phase alone results in a dedication of 20
hours from each participant. The investigators are involved in coordinating the meetings,
introducing the method, training the subject, conducting the expositional interviews,
digitizing the interviews, writing narrative descriptions of each sample, coding the
samples, writing idiographic narrative descriptions of the inner experience of each
participant, and writing a narrative description of the characteristics that emerged across
participants. This time consuming and labor intensive process makes it difficult to collect
data on larger sample sizes. It is noteworthy to mention, however, that this study is a
replication of an earlier study of six participants (Mizrachi, 2010). Thus, there are 16
left-handed participants across both studies. The findings of the present study are similar
to the findings in Mizrachi’s (2010) study.
The nature of DES regarding small sample sizes contributes to the second
limitation of this study. Because of the small sample sizes, statistically significant
conclusions cannot be drawn from the data. In addition, data from the present study are
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the samples of inner experience. These samples cannot easily be collapsed into numbers
and analyzed. Frequency counts of characteristics that occurred within participants and
across participants were taken; however, a larger sample of left-handers would be needed
to conduct tests of statistical significance. It may be possible that the characteristics of
the participants that were attributed to left-handedness may be due, by chance, to some
other common characteristic.
The third limitation of the present study involves the possibility that the
investigators inaccurately or incorrectly captured the participants’ experience. One of the
potential contributors involves presuppositions. For example, it is possible that prior
knowledge or belief systems interfered with the investigators’ apprehension of the
participants’ experience. The use of two investigators who probably do not share the
same presuppositions is a way of limiting this likelihood. The possibility of incorrectly
apprehending the participants’ experience may also be due to the participants’
presuppositions. It is possible that the participants presented their individual samples in a
way that is consistent with their own belief systems about themselves. In addition, even
if the experiences were apprehended accurately, they may have been categorized
idiosyncratically.
The fourth limitation of the present study related to the fact that the investigators
were not blind to the handedness of the participants. As mentioned before, this study is a
replication of a Master’s thesis (Mizrachi, 2010) and prior knowledge of the results of
Mizrachi (2010) may have influenced the investigators’ apprehension of the participants’
inner experience. However, the emergence of novel phenomena (e.g., not semantic
words) in this study when compared to Mizrachi (2010) suggests that the investigators
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were not narrowly apprehending the inner experience of the left-handed participants in
this study based on the results of Mizrachi (2010).
The fifth limitation of the present study relates to the fact that DES is an
exploratory procedure. The aim of this study was to explore the samples of inner
experience of left-handers. The rationale for this approach was that by applying DES to
left-handers as a group characteristics of inner experience that were not previously
discovered may emerge. Prior to conducting this study, there was only one study
exploring or describing the inner experience of left-handers (Mizrachi, 2010). Because of
the exploratory nature of the present study, no hypotheses were made at the outset.
Two investigators, a student and her advisor (Hurlburt, the originator of DES),
collected the data together and reviewed the data independently and together. Despite
this, the present study may have benefited from review from an additional rater. Thus,
the sixth limitation of this study is the lack of interrater reliability. Although interrater
reliability was not directly measured in this study, interrater reliability has been evaluated
among DES investigators. Hurlburt and Heavey (2002) reported that interrater reliability
for 19-sample averages ranges from .92 to .98 (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2002).
The findings in the present suggest that more research on left-handers’ inner
experience using DES would be worthwhile. Research exploring the inner experience of
left-handers while taking into consideration hemispheric specialization in the brain might
shed light on how the left and right cerebral hemispheres contribute to inner experience.
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APPENDIX A
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE
ID:_________
Demographic Information
1.

Name ...................................................................................................................

2.

Date of birth ........................................................................................................

3.

Sex (Male / Female)............................................................................................

4.

Address ...............................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................

5.

Email address ......................................................................................................

6.

Home phone number...........................................................................................

7.

Cell phone number..............................................................................................

8.

Preferred phone number......................................................................................

9.

Race/ethnicity .....................................................................................................

10.

Marital status.......................................................................................................

11.

What is your current level of education? ............................................................

12.

Are you employed? .............................................................................................

13.

Which hand do you use to write with? (Right / Left) ........................................

14.

Would you be interested in participating in the next phase of this study for
research credits? (Yes / No) ...............................................................................

15.

Please provide the name and telephone number of a person who would know
how to contact you in the future if you moved
Name ...................................................................................................................
Phone number .....................................................................................................
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APPENDIX B
PARTICIPANTS’ SAMPLES
The following sample summaries were not included in the individual chapters:
AH’s Samples (see Chapter 5)
Sampling Day 1
September 17, 2010
Sample 1.1. At the moment of the sample, AH had just begun to read a text message from his friend on his
phone. During the expositional interview, AH was unsure about what was in his experience at the moment
of the sample.
Sample 1.2. AH was driving and a semi-truck, with dust coming off the top of it, was coming in the
opposite direction on the same road. The investigators were unable to determine with any confidence at all
what he was experiencing at the moment of the sample. Perhaps at the moment of the sample he was
seeing the dust, mostly focused on the dust itself; perhaps he was mostly experiencing a thought about the
dust hitting his car like, oh damn, the dust is going to hit my car. If there was such a thought, he seemed
confident that it was not experienced in words; that is, he seemed confident that inner words did not play a
role in his experience at the moment of the sample. He may have also been frustrated by the fact that his
car was going to get dirty, but that was not clear. The dust, or the thought or feeling thereabout, may have
had a negative valence, but whether that was experientially present at the moment of the beep is unknown.
He was also visually seeing the dust, but was unable to describe that experience further.
Sample 1.3. AH was using the internet on his phone and was about to click the log-in button for MySpace.
At the moment of the sample, he was eager to log-on. He described the eagerness as a feeling of being
overjoyed to read his messages, but whether this was a thought or feeling or something else was not
entirely clear. He denied experiencing any bodily sensations related to the eagerness.
Sampling Day 2
September 24, 2010
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 2 were included in Chapter 5.
Sample 2.1. Refer to page 71.
Sample 2.2. Refer to page 75.
Sample 2.3. Refer to page 80.
Sample 2.4. Refer to page 74.
Sampling Day 3
October 1, 2010
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 3 were included in Chapter 5.
Sample 3.1. Refer to page 78.
Sample 3.2. Refer to page 75.
Sample 3.3. Refer to page 69.
Sample 3.4. Refer to page 70.
Sample 3.5. Refer to page 70.
Sample 3.6. Refer to page 73.
Sampling Day 4
October 8, 2010
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 4 were included in Chapter 5.
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Sample 4.1.
Sample 4.2.
Sample 4.3.
Sample 4.4.
Sample 4.5.

Refer to page 76.
Refer to page 71.
Refer to page 77.
Refer to page 83.
Refer to page 69.

Sampling Day 5
October 15, 2010
Sample 5.1. Refer to page 79.
Sample 5.2. Refer to page 73.
Sample 5.3. Occurred while AH was going to the bathroom. He declined to discuss this sample, saying it
was embarrassing.
Sample 5.4. Refer to page 69.
Sample 5.5. Refer to page 79.
Sample 5.6. Refer to page 74.
BP’s Samples (see Chapter 6)
Sampling Day 1
October 28, 2010
Sample 1.1. BP had been watching TV. At the moment of the sample, she was flipping through the
channels and innerly saying, “Does it still come on?” referring to the show Arthur.
Sample 1.2. BP was on Twitter and had read an update declaring Coke as better than Pepsi. At the
moment of the sample, BP was thinking that Pepsi is better than Coke. This was a thought without words,
images, or any symbolic representation.
Sample 1.3. BP was innerly singing the song Weight of my Tears. She was also innerly hearing the music
to the song. It was as if she was singing along with the music. The music was an accurate replay of the
song.
Sample 1.4. BP was reading her dad’s Facebook status. She was taking in the words of the status but the
meaning had not yet come to her. In her experience, she was just reading the words of the page. She was
not gathering the meaning of the words as she was reading. It was her understanding that, after reading the
words, the meaning would present itself to her though this was not in her experience at the moment of the
sample. All that was in her experience was reading the words.
Sample 1.5. BP had read her ex-boyfriend’s status on MySpace and had just finished typing in her own
status update as a response. The last part of her status was yes, I went there. At the moment of the sample,
the notion that she had gone there was in her experience without words. The meaning of the rest of her
status was also present but not as salient as the notion that she gone there. There were no words, images, or
any other symbolic representation in BP’s experience.
Sampling Day 2
November 2, 2010
Sample 2.1.
Sample 2.2.
Sample 2.3.
Sample 2.4.

Refer to page 92.
Refer to page 86.
Refer to page 91.
Refer to page 85.
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Sample 2.5. BP was walking on campus. At the moment of the sample, she was innerly saying “I hope I
don’t see anyone that I know.”
Sample 2.6. Refer to page 85.
Sampling Day 3
November 4, 2010
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 3 were included in Chapter 6.
Sample 3.1. Refer to page 89.
Sample 3.2. Refer to page 92.
Sample 3.3. Refer to page 90.
Sampling Day 4
November 9, 2010
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 4 were included in Chapter 6.
Sample 4.1. Refer to page 87.
Sample 4.2. Refer to page 85.
Sample 4.3. Refer to page 93.
Sample 4.4. Refer to page 87.
Sample 4.5. Refer to page 89.
Sample 4.6. Refer to page 89.
Sampling Day 5
November 17, 2010
Sample 5.1. Refer to page 85.
Sample 5.2. BP had been thinking that she needs to study for her Psychology test. At the moment of the
sample, she was innerly saying “Today and tomorrow is homework day.” There was nothing else in her
experience.
Sample 5.3. Refer to page 87.
Sample 5.4. Refer to page 87.
Sample 5.5. Refer to page 85.
Sample 5.6. BP was innerly saying, “Why is he still talking about the same thing?” referring to her teacher.
There was nothing else in her experience.
CL’s Samples (see Chapter 7)
Sampling Day 1
September 16, 2010
Sample 1.1. CL had just finished typing the words “Chicken Fingers, Traffic,” as part of the title for her
English class essay. At the moment of the sample, she was trying to come up with the third and final word
for the title. The notion of chicken fingers, traffic, and blank was present to her at the moment of the
sample. It was as if she was waiting for something to fill in the blank. She was also skimming through the
ideas of the paper inside her head to find an important word to fill in the blank. The skimming did not
involve innerly seeing or reciting the essay. She was also experiencing mental frustration at not being able
to come up with a word.
Sample 1.2. CL was urinating and wondering if Jesse James also adopted Sandra Bullock’s child or if she
adopted him alone. At the moment of the sample, she was innerly seeing Jesse James and Sandra Bullock
sitting across from each other on a long table. CL was seeing this as if she was sitting at the head of the
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table. Jesse James was sitting on the left and Sandra Bullock on the right. There was a woman presumed
to be an attorney sitting next to Sandra Bullock and a man also presumed to be an attorney sitting next to
Jesse James. CL was aware of the presence of these additional persons but she did not really acknowledge
them. The inner seeing was in color. Sandra Bullock was wearing navy blue, Jesse James was wearing
black, and there was a circle crest on the unattractive tan colored walls. There was a background notion of
disgust present. The urinating was not in her experience at the moment of the sample.
Sample 1.3. CL was typing a text message to her sister and feeling annoyed at her sister. At the moment of
the sample, she was experiencing annoyance as a physical sensation from her abdomen up to the top of her
head. This sensation was deep inside her body. She was experiencing the same sensation in the trunk of
her body and her head. She also experienced slight tension in her body. The typing of the text message
was not in her experience at the moment of the sample.
Sampling Day 2
September 21, 2010
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 2 were included in Chapter 7.
Sample 2.1. Refer to page 97.
Sample 2.2. Refer to page 98.
Sample 2.3. Refer to page 96.
Sample 2.4. Refer to page 99.
Sample 2.5. Refer to page 107.
Sampling Day 3
September 23, 2010
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 3 were included in Chapter 7.
Sample 3.1. Refer to page 96.
Sample 3.2. Refer to page 96.
Sample 3.3. Refer to page 100.
Sample 3.4. Refer to page 98.
Sampling Day 4
September 28, 2013
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 4 were included in Chapter 7.
Sample 4.1. Refer to page 103.
Sample 4.2. Refer to page 97.
Sample 4.3. Refer to page 102.
Sample 4.4. Refer to page 104.
Sampling Day 5
October 7, 2010
Sample 5.1. Refer to page 99.
Sample 5.2. Refer to page 102.
Sample 5.3. Refer to page 105.
Sample 5.4. CL had been clicking the lock button on her iPhone with her pointer finger on her left hand.
At the moment of the sample, she was seeing the picture on the screen of her iPhone of her with two of her
friends. She was taking in the whole picture and not paying particular attention to any aspect of the picture,
a mostly idle seeing that indicated the phone was working with no messages. She was also seeing her
phone. The clicking of the lock button was happening automatically and not in her experience.
Sample 5.5. Refer to page 101.
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DH’s Samples (see Chapter 8)
Sampling Day 1
October 19, 2010
Sample 1.1. DH was waiting for the home page on his computer to load. At the moment of the sample, he
was seeing the whiteness of the screen. He was also experiencing some anticipation of the page to come.
The whiteness of the screen was more in his experience than the anticipation (an estimated ratio of 60:40).
Sample 1.2. DH was lying on the couch, focused on the spinning fan on the ceiling. In his experience was
the motion of the fan. He was captured by the spinningness or blurry circleness of the fan.
Sample 1.3. DH was watching ultimate fighting on TV. All that was in his experience was the fighting
action on the TV. He was following along what was happening on the screen.
Sample 1.4. DH was watching ultimate fighting on TV. All that was in his experience was the fighting
happening on the TV.
Sample 1.5. DH had been making a left turn. At the moment of the sample, he was noticing the
illumination of a street speed sign. He was attending to the sign for its brightness and not its speed
regulation quality. All that was in his experience was the illuminated speeding sign.
Sample 1.6. DH had been watching a TV show and the movie Valkyrie starring Tom Cruise was
mentioned. At the moment of the sample, DH was innerly seeing a black and white image of Tom Cruise
wearing Nazi WWII type attire. He was seeing Tom Cruise’s body directed to the left but Tom’s head was
facing DH’s perspective (Tom Cruise’s head was facing left in comparison to his body). This was a still
image as if it was a snapshot of Tom Cruise; however, it did not involve a border or frame. DH was not
seeing anything in the background.
Sampling Day 2
October 21, 2010
Sample 2.1. Refer to page 114.
Sample 2.2. DH was watching TV and a woman had just said she was fabulous. At the moment of the
sample, DH was innerly saying, “yeah right.”
Sample 2.3. DH had paused the TV until his mother returned and there was an old woman on the screen.
At the moment of the sample, DH was noticing the wrinkles on the face of the old woman and her bright
blue eyes. He was attending to the wrinkles more (an estimated 60:40).
Sample 2.4. Refer to page 111.
Sample 2.5. Refer to page 115.
Sample 2.6. Refer to page 108.
Sampling Day 3
October 26, 2010
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 3 were included in Chapter 8.
Sample 3.1. Refer to page 113.
Sample 3.2. Refer to page 116.
Sample 3.3. Refer to page 109.
Sample 3.4. Refer to page 110.
Sample 3.5. Refer to page 113.
Sample 3.6. Refer to page 111.
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Sampling Day 4
October 28, 2010
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 4 were included in Chapter 8.
Sample 4.1. Refer to page 119.
Sample 4.2. Refer to page 118.
Sample 4.3. Refer to page 117.
Sample 4.4. Refer to page 112.
Sample 4.5. Refer to page 120.
Sample 4.6. Refer to page 121.
Sampling Day 5
November 2, 2010
Sample 5.1. Refer to page 115.
Sample 5.2. Refer to page 110.
Sample 5.3. Refer to page 115.
Sample 5.4. DH had just finished watching Pay Per View previews and was sitting on his couch looking
away from the TV. At the moment of the sample, he was thinking that the movie Gladiator is a good
movie. He was also innerly seeing a man holding a sword with his right hand. The sword was pointing
down at an angle towards DH’s perspective. The man was in a coliseum; however, DH was mostly
attending to the man and not the coliseum. He was also seeing the sand on the ground and the man’s
shadow directed towards DH’s perspective. The man was facing forward towards DH and his head was
tilted downwards. The seeing was a still shot in sepia color. DH was unsure if it was the cover shot of the
movie. The thinking that the movie Gladiator was good ant the inner seeing were separate experiences.
Sample 5.6. Refer to page 112.
NT’s Samples (see Chapter 9)
Sampling Day 1
January 20, 2011
Sample 1.1. NT was driving and making a right turn onto Eastern Avenue. At the moment of the sample,
he was visually monitoring the passing cars. He also had some sense of the cars behind him, involving a
sense of felt pressure or arousal of not wanting to crash. He was also hearing a familiar song on the radio
and anticipating the next beat of the song.
Sample 1.2. At the moment of the sample, NT was positioning his notebook onto the steering wheel. He
was also attending to the yellowness of a car in front of him.
Sample 1.3. NT was experiencing a sense of relaxation in his waist area (the front and sides of his waist).
He was seeing the whiteness of his computer screen fading out. He was interested in the whiteness of the
screen. He was also hearing his computer chime, indicating Windows was logging on. He was interested
in the chimeness, and not the computerness, of the sound.
Sample 1.4. NT was typing a question in an e-mail to his professor. At the moment of the sample, he was
experiencing power as a physical rush in his shoulders, arms, and hands. He was also seeing the words he
was typing appearing on the computer screen. The powerness was more salient in his experience (an
estimated 95:5).
Sampling Day 2
January 25, 2011
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Sample 2.1. NT was at a bar with his friend Shawna. At the moment of the sample, he was pointing at a
chicken strip with his right hand. He was experiencing the sensation of his wrist moving, sort of flopping
up and down as he rocked his finger back and forth as part of the repeated pointing at the strip. He was
also seeing his right hand pointing and a part of the chicken strip basket. He was also experiencing a sense
of direction or intention to give Shawna the chicken strip. Shawna was speaking at the moment of the
sample, but he was not experiencing that.
Sample 2.2.
Sample 2.3.
Sample 2.4.
Sample 2.5.
Sample 2.6.

Refer to page 124.
Refer to page 129.
Refer to page 136.
Refer to page 135.
Refer to page 131.

Sampling Day 3
January 27, 2011
Sample 3.1. Refer to page 124.
Sample 3.2. NT was talking to Amy, his girlfriend, about a casino in Las Vegas he thinks is classy and not
very noisy, Vdara. NT was speaking at the moment of the sample. He was just talking about the Vdara,
and had no experience beyond that. He was not experiencing himself as directing the words coming out of
his mouth, rather the words were flowing out. NT was conveying to Amy that Vdara is a nice casino, but
the actual words NT was uttering were not in his experience.
Sample 3.3.
Sample 3.4.
Sample 3.5.
Sample 3.6.

Refer to page 131.
Refer to page 124.
Refer to page 126.
Refer to page 125.

Sampling Day 4
February 1, 2011
Sample 4.1. Refer to page 134.
Sample 4.2. NT was at a café looking at the drinks in the refrigerator. At the moment of the sample, he
was seeing the rows of Odwalla bottles. In his experience, he was seeing the green and beige bottles, he
was attending to the bottleness of the green and beige bottles and not so much interested in the colors. He
was also seeing intersecting white light rays illuminating the bottles. [He was not certain whether the rays
were actually physically present. He had visual experience of them, but perhaps they were fabricated from
the light and shadow portion of the bottles.]
Sample 4.3.
Sample 4.4.
Sample 4.5.
Sample 4.6.

Refer to page 126.
Refer to page 129.
Refer to page 133.
Refer to page 127.

Sampling Day 5
February 3, 2011
Sample 5.1. Refer to page 126.
Sample 5.2. Refer to page 130.
Sample 5.3. Refer to page 130.
Sample 5.4. NT was in class. He was experiencing a low level awareness of the sounds and sights in class;
however, the sounds and sights were not present in his experience for what they were. That is, they were
experienced in a sensory way. The sounds were voices talking, but the voiceness or the words being
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spoken was not present—rather, he heard something like a hum or undifferentiated sound. The seeing was
similarly undifferentiated. There was nothing else in his experience.
Sample 5.5. Refer to page 128.
MM’s Samples (see Chapter 10)
Sampling Day 1
October 6, 2010
Sample 1.1. MM was on the computer website for her French homework. She was entering her username
on the sign in screen. In her experience, she was making sure she was spelling her name correctly. This
involved a concentrated watching of the letters appearing on the screen. MM was attending to the visual
presentation of the letters on the screen, making sure the spelling was accurate.
Sample 1.2. MM’s roommate, Erica, had been telling MM she would take a nap the same time MM does.
At the moment of the sample, MM was innerly saying, “she sleeps too much.” The inner speech was in
MM's own voice. MM was also tracking what Erica was saying and her eyes were aimed at Erica eating a
sausage; however, this was not in her experience at the moment of the sample. All that was in her
experience was her inner speech.
Sample 1.3. MM had been doing her French homework. At the moment of the sample, she was writing the
word “l’huile” (French for “oil”). In her experience, MM was seeing the messiness of the word and
thinking that her handwriting is messy. MM’s thoughts consisted of the idea that she writes messy;
however, this thought did not involve words, images, or any other symbolic representation. The meaning
of the word was apparently not present to her at the moment of the sample.
Sample 1.4. MM had been studying French vocabulary about automobiles, looking at a picture of an
automobile in her French course book. At the moment of the sample, MM was searching her memory for a
way to relate the part of the car she was seeing and the corresponding English word. In her experience, she
was trying to figure out if the French
word and English counterpart had any letters in common, as if the similarity of letters would provide the
key to translation. [MM reported that in general she experiences words letter by letter sequencing and
typically isolates individual letters from the rest of the word. For example, she often counts the number of
letters in words; for example, in encountering this sentence, she would think 3 – 7- 3 – 5 – 6 – 3 – 6 – 2 – 7
– 2 – 5 and so on.]
Sampling Day 2
October 8, 2010
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 2 were included in Chapter 10.
Sample 2.1. Refer to page 142.
Sample 2.2. Refer to page 139.
Sample 2.3. Refer to page 145.
Sample 2.4. Refer to page 145.
Sample 2.5. Refer to page 143.
Sample 2.6. Refer to page 145.
Sample 2.7. Refer to page 146.
Sampling Day 3
October 13, 2010
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 3 were included in Chapter 10.
Sample 3.1. Refer to page 139.
Sample 3.2. Refer to page 139.
Sample 3.3. Refer to page 144.
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Sampling Day 4
October 15, 2010
Sample 4.1. MM was sleeping. She had been dreaming about her and her brother, Caleb. In her dream,
MM had spit her gum out and it landed in Caleb’s nose. At the moment of the sample, in her dream, MM
was seeing her brother’s face as he was screaming and MM was laughing out loud.
Sample 4.2. MM was sleeping. In her dream, MM was sitting at her desk tapping a pencil and humming.
The humming was a random kind of thing—not a melody. All that was in her experience at the moment of
the sample was the tapping of the pencil and the humming.
Sample 4.3. In bed but awake. MM had been thinking about her roommate, Katie, telling MM about how
Katie’s mother gets upset when Katie spends time at her aunt’s house because Katie’s mother thinks they
are starting a new family. At the moment of the sample, MM was innerly hearing Katie say the words “I
don’t like Vegas” the way Katie’s mother had said them. The innerly heard words were of Katie
mimicking her mother. This was an inner rehearing of something that had happened before.
Sample 4.4. Refer to page 141.
Sample 4.5. MM chose to skip this sample.
Sample 4.6. Refer to page 141.
Sampling Day 5
October 20, 2010
Sample 5.1.
Sample 5.2.
Sample 5.3.
Sample 5.4.
Sample 5.5.
Sample 5.6.

Refer to page 146.
Refer to page 143.
Refer to page 147.
Refer to page 141.
Refer to page 142.
Refer to page 139.

Sample 5.7. MM’s Psychology instructor had been talking about research finding in which 75% of males
consented to bring a female back to their room to have sex if asked. MM was waiting for her instructor to
say what the percentage of females would bring a male back to their room for sex if asked. MM had read
about the study the night before so she knew the percentage was zero. At the moment of the sample, MM
was waiting for her instructor to say the answer. This was a mental waiting and impatience. The concept
zero was also somehow present in MM’s experience without words, images, or any other symbolic
representation.
MO’s Samples (see Chapter 11)
Sampling Day 1
October 12, 2010
Sample 1.1. MO had been running late to class. She had just opened her classroom door and taken two
steps in. At the moment of the sample, she was seeing the student teacher teaching the class. She was
experiencing a visual noticing of the teacher. There may have been other aspects; thinking the student
teacher was cool, that it would be a fun class, nervous about being late, looking for a place to sit, etc. MO
wasn’t sure.
Sample 1.2. MO was hearing the repetitive, intervallic tapping of a pen to her right side. The noise was
annoying, but MO was not sure whether the annoyance was experienced.
Sample 1.3. MO’s teacher had been talking about civil rights and had said the name Ruther B. Hayes. At
the moment of the sample, MO was innerly saying “who would name their kid Ruther?” The inner speech
was drawn out and in her own voice, just as she would have said it out loud.
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Sample 1.4. MO was in class seeing her friend Lita look quizzically at her. MO was wondering why Lita
was looking at her in that quizzical way. This notion was present in MO’s experience without words,
images, or any symbolic representation. It turned out that MO’s beeper had sounded but she did not hear it,
even though she was using the earphone, and even though the beep was loud enough through the back of
the earphone that Lita could hear it. Lita’s quizzical look therefore turned out to be about the beep which
MO had not yet heard.
Sample 1.5. MO was still in class and her beeper had again sounded but she had not heard it yet. Her
friend, Lita, had heard the beep and looked at MO. At the moment of the sample, MO was seeing her
friend and thinking that Lita must be looking at her because the beeper is beeping. MO was also hearing a
faint sound that would later turn out to be the beeper. The beep seemed to ramp up, gradually at first but
then faster. We asked MO to ask Lita about what she heard, and Lita said she heard the beep sound
immediately loud, just as the beep is designed.
Sample 1.6. MO was hearing the repetitive tapping of a pen. This time she was just beginning to hear the
pen and was not yet annoyed.
Sampling Day 2
October 13, 2010
Sample 2.1. Refer to page 154.
Sample 2.2. MO’s hands were resting on the table in front of her. She was experiencing the sweatiness of
her hands. She was feeling the sweatiness of each hand independent of the other.
Sample 2.3.
Sample 2.4.
Sample 2.5.
Sample 2.6.

Refer to page 152.
MO chose to skip this sample.
Refer to page 153.
Refer to page 151.

Sampling Day 3
October 19, 2010
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 3 were included in Chapter 11.
Sample 3.1. Refer to page 158.
Sample 3.2. Refer to page 156.
Sample 3.3. Refer to page 159.
Sample 3.4. Refer to page 160.
Sample 3.5. Refer to page 153.
Sample 3.6. Refer to page 157.
Sampling Day 4
October 21, 2010
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 4 were included in Chapter 11.
Sample 4.1. Refer to page 156.
Sample 4.2. Refer to page154.
Sample 4.3. Refer to page 154.
Sample 4.4. Refer to page 151.
Sample 4.5. Refer to page 152.
Sample 4.6. Refer to page 152.
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Sampling Day 5
October 26, 2010
Sample 5.1. Refer to page 155.
Sample 5.2. Refer to page 155.
Sample 5.3. Refer to page 152.
Sample 5.4. MO had finished eating and was sitting in her car in the parking lot with her windows open.
She had been hearing cars drive by her. At the moment of the sample, she was hearing the contrast
between a diesel truck and the rest of the cars. MO was attending to the auditory characteristics of the
truck and the cars, and attending to the difference between them. The fact that it was a diesel truck was not
in her experience at the moment of the sample.
Sample 5.5. Refer to page 152.
Sample 5.6. Refer to page 154.
KA’s Samples (see Chapter 12)
Sampling Day 1
December 1, 2010
Sample 1.1. KA had realized that her hair appointment was scheduled at 11:00 am on January 11, 2011.
Before the moment of the sample, she was experiencing a rising tide of feelings that preceded a thought.
At the moment of the sample, she was thinking about how the synchronicity of the numbers (11:00 on the
11th in the year 2011) made her feel good and connected to the universe.
Sample 1.2. KA was wondering if she had written her Narcotics Anonymous steps the best way. This was
a thought about the uncertainty of how she wrote the steps. She was also feeling doubtful about how
adequately she wrote the steps. This was a mental emotion.
Sample 1.3. KA was thinking that she was sleepy but she was not going to sleep. She was also
experiencing a bodily sensation of tiredness.
Sample 1.4. KA was innerly hearing “Your hair doesn’t look good, you’re not going to have a good day.”
The words were said in a fast and condescending manner. They were in KA’s voice. She was also feeling
frustrated.
Sampling Day 2
December 2, 2010
Sample 2.1.
Sample 2.2.
Sample 2.3.
Sample 2.4.
Sample 2.5.
Sample 2.6.

Refer to page 167.
Refer to page 163.
KA chose to skip this sample.
Refer to page 170.
Refer to page 177.
Refer to page 168.

Sampling Day 3
December 7, 2010
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 3 were included in Chapter 12.
Sample 3.1. Refer to page 169.
Sample 3.2. Refer to page 164.
Sample 3.3. Refer to page 175.
Sample 3.4. Refer to page 165.
Sample 3.5. Refer to page 170.
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Sample 3.6. Refer to page 166.
Sampling Day 4
December 9, 2010
Sample 4.1. KA had been talking to her friend, Melissa, about an art walk Melissa had attended in
Arizona. At the moment of the sample, KA was innerly seeing a park. She was seeing fluffy, green trees
in the upper right of the image and grass underneath the trees. She was seeing a walkway going across
diagonally. There were people on the walkway in walking positions but they were not detailed. The
people were small so KA was aware she was not very close to the image. It was as if she was looking at a
scene in which she was not herself present. Sunlight was coming from the upper left corner; however, the
day appeared cloudy. KA was not seeing a sun or cloud. KA also saw art booths to the sides of the
walkway but she was not noticing any particular piece of art. Most of her attention was directed at the
scenery. KA was scanning the image from right to left. This scene was an illustration of what Melissa had
been talking about.
Sample 4.2. Refer to page 168.
Sample 4.3. Refer to page 164.
Sample 4.4. Refer to page 167.
Sample 4.5. KA was watching TV and was absorbed in the television show she was watching. There was
nothing else in her experience.
Sample 4.6. Refer to page 172.
Sampling Day 5
December 14, 2010
Sample 5.1. Refer to page 171.
Sample 5.2. KA had been talking to her boyfriend on the phone about his laundry. At the moment of the
sample, KA was hearing her boyfriend talk. KA was also innerly seeing her boyfriend’s room. She was
mostly attending to a green towel on the floor but she was not paying particular attention to the greenness
of the towel. KA was seeing the towel from a perspective slightly elevated from the floor. She was also
seeing his bed, comforter, and the dresser behind the towel; however, the towel was the most clear in her
inner seeing. KA was seeing this as if she was looking at a still picture. Unlike previous images, KA was
not interested in the seeing of the light. She said the light source was to the upper left, and that that was
indeed a fact of her boyfriend’s room, so the illumination was realistic, but she was not particularly
attending to the light source in this sample.
Sample 5.3. Refer to page 173.
Sample 5.4. KA chose to skip this sample.
Sample 5.5. Refer to page 177.
JS’s Samples (see Chapter 13)
Sampling Day 1
September 21, 2010
Sample 1.1. JS had been reading a book for her History class. At the moment of the sample, she was
hearing the jingle of her dog’s collar.
Sample 1.2. JS had been peeing. At the moment of the sample, JS was expecting that the beeper was going
to beep. This expectation was an intimation, a sense, that did not involve words, images, or any other
symbolic representation.
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Sample 1.3. JS was driving to work to drop her keys off to her boss, Lucy. At the moment of the sample
JS was wondering if Lucy would ask her to stay and work. JS had some sense of Lucy’s asking her, but the
words were not present. The driving (car in front of her, etc.) was not in her experience at the moment of
the sample.
Sample 1.4. JS had been sitting across from her dad as he was reading the newspaper. Her dad was telling
her that there was an arrest warrant out for Lindsey Lohan, but, JS was not paying close attention to his
speaking. Rather, she was tracking the auditory characteristics of her dad’s speaking, and then the name
“Lindsey Lohan” stood out from the rest of her dad’s sentence. JS’s sense was that now that she heard
“Lindsay Lohan,” she could backtrack and retrieve the meaning from the rest of the sentence that her dad
had uttered, even though she was not aware of that meaning as he was speaking. She was also seeing her
father sitting across from her. He was visually part of her experience (unlike the car of 1.3), but she was
not paying particular attention to any aspect of him.
Sample 1.5. JS had been reviewing her homework. At the moment of the sample, JS was innerly saying, “I
don’t know how I am going to finish this by Thursday.” This speaking seemed to be in her own voice,
naturally inflected.
Sample 1.6. JS had been talking on the phone to her friend Barbara and they decided to go to the gym. At
the moment of the sample, she was innerly seeing the inside of the whole gym including equipment and
people from an aerial perspective. The seeing was in motion and color. The seeing was a realistic
recreation of the real gym but from a perspective that she had never actually seen.
Sampling Day 2
September 23, 2010
Sample 2.1.
Sample 2.2.
Sample 2.3.
Sample 2.4.

Refer to page 182.
Refer to page 181.
Refer to page 183.
Refer to page 180.

Sample 2.5. JS had been writing a paper when her mom knocked on her door and asked “How is it going?”
At the moment of the sample, JS’s focus had moved away from her paper and was moving towards her
mom. JS’s attention was in transition from her paper to her mom. She was aware of what her mom was
saying but it was not yet the focus of her attention.
Sample 2.6. Refer to page 181.
Sampling Day 3
September 29, 2010
Sample 3.1. Refer to page 187.
Sample 3.2. Refer to page 186.
Sample 3.3. Refer to page 187.
Sample 3.4. JS was walking down one of the aisles in the grocery store when her mom had asked her if she
could get rice. At the moment of the sample, JS was saying “brown?” There was nothing else in her
experience: no thought about kinds of rice, no image of rice packages, etc.
Sample 3.5. Refer to page 189.
Sample 3.6. JS was sitting next to her parents on the computer looking for hotel rooms in New York for
Thanksgiving. Her dad had asked her how much they cost. At the moment of the sample, JS was saying
“739,” referring to the price of the room. There was nothing else in her experience.
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Sampling Day 4
October 5, 2010
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 4 were included in Chapter 13.
Sample 4.1. Refer to page 184.
Sample 4.2. Refer to page 180.
Sample 4.3. Refer to page 186.
Sample 4.4. Refer to page 180.
Sample 4.5. Refer to page 189.
Sample 4.6. Refer to page 186.
Sampling Day 5
October 7, 2010
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 5 were included in Chapter 13.
Sample 5.1. Refer to page 188.
Sample 5.2. Refer to page 184.
Sample 5.3. Refer to page 180.
Sample 5.4. Refer to page 184.
Sample 5.5. Refer to page 185.
Sample 5.6. Refer to page 182.
TS’s Samples (see Chapter 14)
Sampling Day 1
May 23, 2011
Sample 1.1. TS was standing, putting on his watch. He was feeling a low level of anxiety about wasting
time. He was to pick up his friend from the airport and did not want to be early to waste his own time, but
did not want to be late to waste hers. It was difficult to tell how this anxiety/pressure presented itself to
him at the moment.
Sample 1.2. TS was lying on his bed, tired but not able to sleep. He clearly innerly saw three books on the
counter of Reprographics, arrayed diagonally away from him. He saw the shirt of the worker at
Reprographics. This was an accurate replay of a scene from earlier when the Reprographics worker had
shown him examples of bound dissertations, asking him what color title he preferred. TS was anticipating
a feeling of pride/excitement that he would feel when he picked up his bound dissertation, but it was not
clear whether this feeling actually existed at the moment or was merely somehow anticipated.
Sample 1.3. TS had seen a bag that belonged to his roommate, Samantha, next to a pair of shoes. The
seeing of the bag triggered a realization that Samantha had not yet unpacked. At the moment of the sample,
the notion that Samantha had not yet unpacked AND that TS would have were present in his experience.
The two ideas were sequential with the latter overlapping the first. They were not conveyed in words,
images, or any other symbolic representation.
Sample 1.4. TS was sitting at his desk, updating his cover letter. He had been pressing the backspace
button. At the moment of the sample, he was experiencing a pressure to get the cover letter right, to not
make any mistakes. This was experienced as a mental discomfort. There was nothing else in his
experience
Sampling Day 2
May 24, 2011
Sample 2.1. Refer to page 193.
Sample 2.2. Refer to page 191.
Sample 2.3. Refer to page 206.
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Sample 2.4. TS was sitting on the couch nearly finished eating his cereal. He had a spoonful of cereal in
his mouth (without the spoon). At the moment of the sample, he was tasting the sweetness of the cereal,
feeling the grainy/nutty texture of the cereal, and feeling the coldness of the milk in his mouth. He was
also seeing the living room including the wall, shelf, TV, couch, and carpet. This seeing was part of his
direct experience at the moment of the sample, but he was not paying any particular attention to any aspect
of the living room--all items were visually equal in his experience. He was also experiencing a pleasant
sensation of satiation in his stomach, a physical sensation.
Sample 2.5. Refer to page 199.
Sample 2.6. Refer to page 201.
Sampling Day 3
May 25, 2011
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 3 were included in Chapter 14.
Sample 3.1. Refer to page 195.
Sample 3.2. Refer to page 201.
Sample 3.3. Refer to page 197.
Sample 3.4. Refer to page 203.
Sample 3.5. Refer to page 193.
Sample 3.6. Refer to page 198.
Sampling Day 4
June 2, 2011
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 4 were included in Chapter 14.
Sample 4.1. Refer to page 205.
Sample 4.2. Refer to page 193.
Sample 4.3. Refer to page 204.
Sample 4.4. Refer to page 196.
Sample 4.5. Refer to page 199.
Sample 4.6. Refer to page 206.
Sampling Day 5
June 3, 2011
All sample summaries from Sampling Day 5 were included in Chapter 15.
Sample 5.1. Refer to page 204.
Sample 5.2. Refer to page 198.
Sample 5.3. Refer to page 200.
Sample 5.4. Refer to page 191.
Sample 5.5. Refer to page 197.
Sample 5.6. Refer to page 207.

270

REFERENCES
Aanstoos, C. (1983). The think aloud method in descriptive research. Journal of
Phenomenological Psychology, 14(2), 243-264.
Alliger, G. &Williams, K. (1993). Using signal-contingent experience sampling
methodology to study work in the field: A discussion and illustration examining
task perceptions and mood. Personnel Psychology, 46, 525-549.
Beck, S. (1953). The science of personality: nomothetic or idiographic? The
Psychological Review, 60, 353-359.
Beaton, A.A. (1997). The relation of planum temporale asymmetry and morphology of
the corpus callosum to handedness, gender, and dyslexia: a review of the
evidence. Brain and Language, 60, 255-322.
Beratis, I.M., Rabavilas, A., Nanou, E.D., Hountala, C., Maganioti, A.E., Capsalis, C.N.,
Papadimitriou, G.N., & Papageorgiou, C. (2009). Effect of initiation-inhibition
and handedness on the patterns of the P50 event-related potential component: a
low resolution electromagnetic tomography study. Behavioral and Brain
Functions, 5(51). doi:10.1186/1744-9081-5-51
Beratis, I.M., Rabavilas, A., Papadimitriou, G.N., Papageorgiou, C. (2010). Effect of
handedness on the stroop colour word task. Laterality: Asymmetris of Body,
Brain and Cognition, 15(6), 597-609. doi:10.1080/13576500903071104
Bergin, A. (1961). Psychology as a science of inner experience. Discussion Papers, 4,
95-103.
Bishop, D.V.M. (1990). Handedness, clumsiness and developmental language disorders.
Neuropsychologia, 28(7), 681-690.

271

Bogaert, A. (2001). Handedness, criminality, and sexual offending. Neuropsychologia,
39, 465-469.
Botros, M., Atall, S., & El-Islam, F. (2006). Schneiderian first rank symptoms in a
sample of schizophrenic patients in egypt. International Journal of Social
Psychiatry, 52, 424-431.
Cacioppo, J., Glass, C., & Merluzzi, T. (1979). Self-statements and self-evaluations: A
cognitive-response analysis of heterosocial anxiety. Cognitive Therapy and
Research, 3, (249-262).
Cacioppo, J. & Petty, R. (1981). Social psychological procedures for cognitive response
assessment: The thought-listing technique. Merluzzi, T.V., Glass, C.R., &
Genest, M. (Eds.). Cognitive Assessment, (pp. 309-342). New York: Guildford
Press.
Casasanto, D. (2009). Embodiment of abstract concepts: good and bad in right- and left
handers. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 138(3), 351-367.
doi:10.1037/a0015854.
Chemtob, C., & Taylor, K. (2003). Mixed lateral preference and parental left-handedness
possible markers of risk for ptsd. The Journal of Nervous and Mental
Disease, 191(5), 332-338.
Choudhary, C., & O’Carroll, R. (2007). Left hand preference is related to posttraumatic
stress disorder. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 20(3), 365-369.
Christensen, T., Barret, L., Bliss-Moreau, E., Lebo, K., & Kaschub, C. (2003). A
practical guide to experience-sampling procedures. Journal of Happiness Studies,
4, 53-78.

272

Clark, D. (1988). The validity of measures of cognition: a review of the literature.
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 12(1), 1-20.
Coren, S. (1993). The left-hander syndrome: The causes and consequences of left
handedness. New York: Vintage Books.
Coren, S. (1995). Differences in divergent thinking as a function of handedness and sex.
The American Journal of Psychology, 108(3), 311-325.
Coren, S., & Halpern, D. (1991). Left-handedness: a marker for decreased survival
fitness. Psychological Bulletin, 109(1), 90-106.
Costall, A. (2006). ‘Introspectionism’ and the mythical origins of scientific psychology.
Consciousness and Cognition, 15, 634-654.
Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Figurski, T. (1982). Self-awareness and aversive experience in
everyday life. Journal of Personality, 50(1), 15-27.
Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Larson, R. (1987). Validity and reliability of the experience
sampling method. The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 175(9). 526-536.
Csikszentmihalyi, M., Larson, R., & Prescott, S. (1977). The ecology of adolescent
activity and experience. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 6(3), 281-294.
Davison, G., Haaga, D., Rosenbaum, J., Dolezal, S., & Weinstein, K. (1991). Assessment
of self-efficacy in articulated thoughts: “States of mind” analysis and association
with speech-anxious behavior. Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy: An
International Quarterly, 5(2), 83-91.
Davison, G., Navarre, S., & Vogel, R. (1995). The articulated thoughts in simulated
situations paradigm: A think-aloud approach to cognitive assessment. Current
Directions In Psychological Science, 4(1), 29-33.

273

Davison, G., Robins, C., & Johnson, M. (1983). Articulated thoughts during simulated
situations: A paradigm for studying cognition and behavior. Cognitive Therapy
and Research, 7(1), 17-40.
Davison, G., Vogel, R., & Coffman, S. (1997). Think-aloud approaches to cognitive
assessment and the articulated thoughts in simulated situation paradigm. Journal
of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 65(6), 950-958.
De Souza Silva, M.A., Topic, B., Lamounier-Zepter, V., Huston, J.P., Tomaz, C., &
Barros, M. (2007). Evidence for hemispheric specialization in the marmoset
(callithrix penicillata) based on lateralization of behavioral/neurochemical
correlations. Brain Research Bulletin, 74, 416-428.
Derogatis, L.R. (1994). Symptom Checklist-90-R: Administration, Scoring, and
Procedures Manual. National Computer Systems, Inc. Minneapolis, MN.
Derogatis, L.R., Lipman, R.S., & Covi, L. (1973). SCL-90: An outpatient psychiatric
rating scale – preliminary report. Psychopharmacology Bulletin, 9, 13-28.
Dragovic, M., & Hammond, G. (2005). Handedness in schizophrenia: A quantitative
review of evidence. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 111, 410-419.
Eckhardt, C., Barbour, K., & Davison, G. (1998). Articulated thoughts of maritally
violent and nonviolent men during anger arousal. Journal of Consulting and
Clinical Psychology, 66(2), 259-269.
Ehrlichman, H., & Barret, J. (1983). Right hemispheric specialization for mental
imagery: A review of the evidence. Brain and Cognition, 2, 55-76.
Ehrlichman, H., & Wiener, M. (1980). EEG asymmetry during covert mental activity.
Psychophysiology, 17(3), 228-235.

274

Flugel, J.C. (1925). A quantitative study of feeling and emotion in everyday life. British
Journal of Psychology, 15(4), 318-355.
Foa, E., Cashman, L., & Perry, J. (1997). The validation of a self-report measure of
posttraumatic stress disorder: the posttraumatic diagnostic scale. Psychological
Assessment, 9(4), 445-451.
Freud, S. (1900). The interpretation of dreams (3rd ed.) (A.A. Brill, Trans.). United
States of America: Plain Label Books.
Gabriana, F. & Adenzato, M. (2004). At the root of embodied cognition: Cognitive
science meets neurophysiology. Brain and Cognition, 56, 100-106.
Gabrielli, W., & Mednick, S. (1980). Sinistrality and delinquency. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 89(3), 654-661.
Gallese, V. (2007). The “conscious” dorsal stream: Embodied simulation and its role in
space and action conscious awareness. Psyche, 13(1), 1-20.
Geschwind, N., & Behan, P. (1982). Left-handedness: Association with immune disease,
migraine, and developmental learning disorder. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 79, 5097-5100.
Habib, M., Gayraud, D., Oliva, A., Regis, J., Salamon, G., & Khalil, R. (1991). Effects
of handedness and sex on the morphology of the corpus callosum: A study with
brain magnetic resonance imaging. Brain and Cognition, 16, 41-61.
Hammond, G. (2002). Correlates of human handedness in primary motor cortex: A
review and hypothesis. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 26, 285-292.
Hatta, T. (2007). Handedness and the brain: A review of brain-imaging techniques.
Magnetic Resonance in Medical Sciences, 6(2), 99-112.

275

Heavey, C., & Hurlburt, R. (2008). The phenomena of inner experience. Consciousness
and Cognition, 17, 798-810.
Herron, J. (1980). Neuropsychology of left-handedness. Perspective in Neurolinguistics
and Psycholinguistics: Academic Press.
Hicks, R., Bautista, J., & Hicks, G. (1999). Handedness and the vividness of dreams.
Dreaming, 9(4), 265-269.
Hormuth, S. (1986). The sampling of experiences in situ. Journal of Personality, 54(1),
262-293.
Hurlburt, R. (1979). Random sampling of cognitions and behavior. Journal of Research
in Personality, 13, 103-111.
Hurlburt, R. (1980). Validation and correlation of thought sampling with retrospective
measures. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 4(2), 235-238.
Hurlburt, R. (1997). Randomly sampling thinking in the natural environment. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 65, 941-949.
Hurblurt, R. & Akhter, S. (2006). The descriptive experience sampling method.
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 5, 271-301.
Hurlburt, R. & Heavey, C. (2001). Telling what we know: Describing inner experience.
Trends in Cognitive Science, 5, 400-403.
Hurlburt, R. & Heavey, C. (2002). Interobserver reliability of descriptive experience
sampling. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 26, 135-142.
Hurlburt, R. & Heavey, C. (2004). To beep or not to beep: Obtaining accurate reports
about awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11, 113-128.

276

Hurlburt, R. & Heavey, C. (2006). Descriptive experience sampling codebook manual of
terminology. Retrieved December 30, 2009, from
http://www.nevada.edu/~russ/codebook.html
Hurlburt, R. & Heavey, C. (2006). Exploring Inner Experience: The descriptive
experience sampling method. Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Hurlburt, R., Koch, M., & Heavey, C. (2002). Descriptive experience sampling
demonstrates the connection of thinking to externally observable behavior.
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 26, 117-134.
Johnson, C. & Larson, R. (1982). Bulimia: An analysis of moods and behavior.
Psychosomatic Medicine, 44(4), 341-351.
Jones-Forrester, S. (2009). Descriptive experience sampling of individuals with bulimia
nervosa (Unpublished dissertation), University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
Keenan, J.P., Nelson, A., O’Conner, M, & Pascual-Leone, A. (2001). Self-recognition
and the right hemisphere. Nature, 409, 305.
Keenan, J.P., Rubio, J., Racioppi, C., Johnson, A., & Barnacz, A. (2005). The right
hemisphere and the dark side of consciousness. Cortex, 41, 695-704.
Kendall, P. & Korgeski, G. Assessment of cognitive-behavioral interventions. Cognitive
Therapy and Research, 3(1), 1-21.
Kendler, H. (2005). Psychology and phenomenology: a clarification. American
Psychologist, 60, 318-324.
Klinger, E. (1978). In K. Pope & J. Singer (Ed.s), The Stream of Consciousness:
Scientific Investigations into the Flow of Human Experience (pp. 225-258). New
York: Plenum Press.

277

Klinger, E. (1978-79). Dimensions of thought and imagery in normal waking states.
Journal of Altered States of Consciousness, 4(2), 97-113.
Knecht, S., Drager, M., Deppe, L., Bobe, H., Lohmann, A., Floel, E., Ringelstein, B., &
Henningsen, H. (2000). Handedness and hemispheric language dominance in
healthy humans. Brain, 123, 2512-2518.
Lewis, J.W., Phinney, R.E., Brefczynski-Lewis, J.A., & DeYoe, E.A. (2006). Lefties get
it “right” when hearing tool sounds. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18(8),
1314-1330.
Lindell, A. (2006). In your right mind: Right hemisphere contributions to language
processing and production. Neuropsychology Review, 16, 131-148.
Lloyd, D. (2002). Functional mri and the study of human consciousness. Journal of
Cognitive Neuroscience, 14(6), 818-831.
Lozano, S., Hard, B., & Tversky, B. (2007). Putting action in perspective. Cognition,
103, 480-490.
Lyre, H. (2008). Handedness, self-models and embodied cognitive content.
Phenomenological Cognitive Science, 7, 529-538.
Markman, A. & Brendl, M. (2005). Contraining theories of embodied cognition.
Psychological Science, 16(1), 6-10.
Martin, M., & Jones, G. (1999). Motor imagery theory of a contralateral handedness
effect in recognition memory: Toward a chiral psychology of cognition. Journal
of Experimental Psychology: General, 128(3), 265-282.
McNamara, P., Clark, J., & Hartmann, E. (1998). Handedness and dream content.
Dreaming, 8(1), 15-22.

278

Medland, S.E., Duffy, D.L., Spurdle, A.B., Wright, M.J., Geffen, G.M., Montgomery,
G.W., & Martin N.G. (2005). Opposite effects of androgen receptor cag repeat
length on increased risk of left-handedness in males and females. Behavior
Genetics, 6, 735-744.
Miller, M.B., & Van Horn, J.D. (2007). Individual variability in brain activations
associated with episodic retrieval: A role for large-scale databases. International
journal of psychophysiology, 63, 205-213.
Mizrachi, A. (2010). Examining the inner experience of left-handers using descriptive
experience sampling (Unpublished thesis), University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
Moneta, G. & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1985). The effect of perceived challenges and skills
on the quality of subjective experience. Journal of Personality, 64(2), 275-310.
Morin, A. (2001). Right hemispheric self-awareness: A critical assessment.
Consciousness and Cognition, 11, 396-401.
Morin, A. (2005). Possible links between self-awareness and inner speech: theoretical
background, underlying mechanisms, and empirical evidence. Journal of
Consciousness Studies, 4-5, 115-134.
Niebauer, C.L. (2004). Handedness and the fringe of consciousness: Strong handers
ruminate while mixed handers self-reflect. Consciousness and Cognition, 13,
730-745.
Niebauer, C.L., Aselage, J., & Schutte, C. (2002). Hemispheric interaction and
consciousness: Degree of handedness predicts the intensity of a sensory illusion.
Laterality, 7(1), 85-96.

279

Niedenthal, P., Barsalou, L., Winkielman, P., Krauth-Gruber, S., & Ric, F. (2005).
Embodiment in attitudes, social perception, and emotion. Personality and Social
Psychology Review, 9(3), 184-211.
Nisbett, R. & Wilson, T. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on
mental processes. Psychological Review, 84(3), 231-259.
Oldfield, R.C. (1971). The assessment and analysis of handedness: The Edinburgh
inventory. Neuropsychologia, 9(1), 97-113.
Ornstein, R. (1997). The Right Mind: Making Sense of the Hemispheres. San Diego:
Harcourt Brace & Company.
Overgaard, M. (2006). Introspection in science. Consciousness and Cognition, 15,
629-633.
Phillips, K.A., & Hopkins, W.D. (2007). Exploring the relationship between cerebellar
asymmetry and handedness in chimpanzees (pan troglodytes) and capuchins
(cebus apella). Neuropsychologia, 45, 2333-2339.
Phillips, K.A., & Sherwood, C.C. (2005). Primary cortex asymmetry is correlated with
handedness in capuchin monkeys (cebus apella). Behavioral Neuroscience,
119(6), 1701-1704.
Satz, P., & Green, M.F. (1999). Atypical handedness in schizophrenia: Some
methodological and theoretical issues. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 25(1), 63-78.
Scredl, M., Beaton, A.A., Henley-Einion, J., & Blagrove, M. (2013). Handedness and
dream-recall frequency. Dreaming. Advance online publication.
doi:10.1037/a0032210

280

Scollon, C., Kim-Prieto, C., & Diener, E. (2003). Experience sampling: Promises and
pitfalls, strengths and weaknesses. Journal of Happiness Studies, 4(5), 5-34.
Searleman, A., & Fugagli, A. (1986). Suspected autoimmune disorders and left
handedness: Evidence from individuals with diabetes, crohn’s disease and
ulcerative colitis. Neuropsychologia, 25(2), 367-374.
Shiffman, S. & Stone, A. (1998). In D. Krantz & A. Baum (Eds.), Technology and
Methods in Behavioral Medicine (pp. 117-132). New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
Shiffman, S., Stone, A., & Hufford, M. (2008). Ecological momentary assessment.
Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 4, 1-32.
Singer, J. (1975). Navigating the stream of consciousness: Research in daydreaming
and related inner experience. American Psychologist, 727-738.
Singer, J. & Kolligian, J. (1987). Personality: Developments in the study of private
experience. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 533-574.
Smyth, J. & Stone, A. (2003). Ecological momentary assessment research in behavioral
medicine. Journal of Happiness Studies, 4, 35-52.
Smyth, J., Wonderlich, S., Crosby, R., Miltenberger, R., Mitchell, J., & Rorty, M.
(2000). The use of ecological momentary assessment approaches in eating
disorder research. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 30(1), 83-95.
Sommer, I., Aleman, A., Ramsey, N., Bouma, A., & Kahn, R. (2001). Handedness,
language lateralization and anatomical asymmetry in schizophrenia. British
Journal of Psychiatry, 178, 344-351.

281

Sperry, R. (1984). Consciousness, personal identity and the divided brain.
Neuropsychologia, 22(6), 661-673.
Stein, R., Kendardy, J., Wiseman, C., Dounchis, J., Arnow, B., & Wilfely, D. (2007).
What’s driving the binge in binge eating disorder?: A prospective examination of
precursors and consequences. The International Journal of Eating Disorders,
40(3), 195-203.
Vasterling, J., Brailey, K., Allain, A., Duke, L., Constans, J., & Sutker, P. (2002).
Attention, learning, and memory performances and intellectual resources in
vietnam veterans: PTSD and no disorder comparisons. Neuropsychologia, 16(1),
514.
Verdoux, H., Liraud, F., Droulout, T., Theillay, G., Parrot, M., & Franck, N. (2004). Is
the intensity of schneiderian symptoms related to handedness and speech disorder
in subjects with psychosis. Schizophrenia Research, 67, 167-173.
Viggiano, M.P. & Vannucci, M. (2002). Drawing and identifying objects in relation to
semantic category and handedness. Neuropsychologia, 40, 1482-1487. Retrieved
from: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/neuropsychologia
Vogeley, K., Bussfeld, P., Newen, A., Herrmann, S., Happe, F., Falkai, P., Maier, W.,
Shah, N.J., Fink, G.R., & Zilles, K. (2001). Mind reading: neural mechanisms of
theory of mind and self-perspective. NeuroImage, 14, 170-181.
Ward, J., Alvis, G., Sanford, C., Dodson, D., & Pusakulich, R. (1989). Qualititative
differences in tactuo-spatial motor learning by left-handers. Neuropsychologia,
27(8), 1091-1099.

282

Watson, D., Friend, R. (1969). Measurement of social-evaluative anxiety. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 33, 448-457.
Westerhausen, R., Kreuder, F., Sequeira, S.D.S., Walter, C., Woerner, W., Wittling, R.A.,
Schweiger, E., & Wittling, W. (2004). Effects of handedness and gender on
macro- and microstructure of the corpus callosum and its subregions: A combined
high-resolution and diffusion-tensor MRI study. Cognitive Brain Research, 21,
418-426.
Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review,
9(4), 625-636.
Witelson, S.F., & Nowakowski, R.S. (1991). Left out axons make men right
hypothesis for the origin of handedness and functional asymmetry.
Neuropsychologia, 29(4), 327-333.
Yoshiuchi, K., Yamamoto, Y., & Akabayashi, A. (2008). Application of ecological
momentary assessment in stress-related diseases. Biopsychosocial Medicine,
2(13), 1-6.
Zotter, D. & Crowther, J. (1993). The role of cognition in bulimia nervosa. Cognitive
Therapy and Research, 15(5), 413-426.
Zwaan, R. (1999). Embodied cognition, perceptual symbols, and situation models.
Discourse Processes, 28(1), 81-88.

283

VITA
Graduate College
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Aadee H. Mizrachi
Degrees:
Bachelor of Arts, Psychology, 2004
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Bachelor of Arts, Criminal Justice, 2004
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Master of Arts, Clinical Psychology, 2010
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Dissertation Title: Examining the Inner Experience of Left-Handers using Descriptive
Experience Sampling.
Dissertation Examination Committee:
Chairperson, Russell T. Hurlburt, Ph. D.
Committee Member, Jeffrey Kern, Ph. D.
Committee Member, David Copeland, Ph. D.
Graduate Faculty Representative, Bo Bernhard, Ph. D.

284

